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SUMMARY
This thesis contains four chapters. Each chapter constitutes an empirical exercise in 
which I apply econometric ideas on studying the dynamics of large cross sections of data 
(Random Fields). Three of them concern the empirics of convergence and the fourth analyses 
business cycle fluctuations.
The first, "Notes on Convergence Empirics: Some Calculations for Spanish Regions," 
describes the econometric methods for studying the dynamics of the distributions and how to 
characterise convergence in this fiamework, explains why the standard cross-section regression 
analysis is misleading when testing for convergence and then performs some calculations for 
regions in Spain.
The second chapter, "Dynamics of the Income Distribution Across OECD Countries", 
considers its baseline hypotheses to be those generated by the Solow growth model. Using 
sequential conditioning, it studies whether the convergence hypothesis implications can be 
shown to hold for the OECD economies. It finds that neither absolute nor conditional 
convergence, in the sense of economies approaching the OECD average, has taken place.
The third chapter, "Cross Sectional Firm Dynamics: Theory and Empirical Results", 
extends ideas of distribution dynamics to a discrete choice setting, and extends the reasoning of 
Galton's Fallacy to the logit model. It provides evidence of the tendency of firm sizes to 
converge for the US chemicals sector by analysing dynamically evolving cross-section 
distributions.
Finally, the fourth chapter, "Unemployment in Europe and Regional Labour 
Fluctuations" applies distribution dynamics ideas to a business cycle setting. It analyses the 
dynamics of employment for 51 European regions from 1960 to 1990, addressing the issue of 
whether regional shocks have aggregate effects on unemployment or the opposite. It uses a 
model for non-stationary evolving distributions to identify idiosyncratic and aggregate 
disturbances.
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NOTE:
The four chapters in this thesis have been conceived as independent papers, as a 
consequence of that and for completeness of the papers, there is some overlapping among 
chapters.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Whether initially poor countries or regions tend to became as wealthy as the initially 
richest ones; whether wages equalise across industries or regions, whether in an industry firms 
tend to reach the same level of capacity or whether they tend to an equilibrium size in terms of 
the number of workers etc. are economic questions which have been intensively studied from 
both a theoretical and empirical perspective. Although each one of them refers to different areas 
in economics, all of them involve the idea of convergence as a process of economic 
homogenisation rather than a persistence of the inequality.
This paper concentrates on convergence across economies i.e. states, countries, regions, 
provinces, etc.. This issue is important given that the implications for economic policy are very 
different depending on whether the income inequality is vanishing or not, in other words 
whether poor economies are catching up with the richest ones or not. Consequently the subject 
has generated a wide and controversial literature from both the theoretical and empirical point 
of view. From the Economic Theory perspective, there is a contest between the growth models 
which predict convergence across economies (generally those that take growth as an exogenous 
process) and those models that do not (endogenous growth models). Therefore, it is very 
important to guarantee a correct performance of the empirical analysis.
The numerous and varied empirical studies of convergence in the recent growth 
literature differ basically in two aspects: the way in which they formalise the convergence 
hypothesis and the econometrics tools or empirical approach they use to test convergence. 
These two aspects are linked together in the sense that not every econometrics approach is able 
to test for all the aspects involved in the convergence issue. A first basic idea of convergence as 
a process of homogenisation across economies over time already suggests that the formalisation 
and testing of the convergence hypothesis must involve the characterisation of the behaviour of 
a broad cross-section of economies over long periods of time. The usual or standard empirical 
approaches to convergence may not be adequate to give evidence about convergence.
The empirical approach which has generated a wider and more questionable literature is 
the so-called cross-section regression analysis. It examines the regression of (averaged) growth 
rates on initial levels of income across economies. The more elaborate studies use panel data
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techniques or pool data regression in an attempt to avoid part of the wastage of information in 
averaging. Additionally this approach looks at the dispersion of incomes across economies, and 
tries to account for convergence formulated in following way: each country eventually becomes 
as rich as all the others, the cross section dispersion diminishes over time. This approach, as will 
be argued below, is not very informative about convergence, in fact it might be misleading.
A second approach to convergence is time-series analysis. It tests for the convergence 
hypothesis formulated as a lack of persistence in income disparity between economies, studying 
persistence in the context of unit roots analysis. In other terms it tests whether disparities across 
economies have neither units roots nor diverging deterministic time trends. The econometrics 
tools are time series and units roots analysis .
A third approach has been recently suggested by Danny Quah.1 It analyses the dynamics 
of large cross-sections by using econometrics ideas like mixing and ergodicity. It models 
directly the dynamics of the cross-section distributions as a more natural way to study 
convergence .Let us call it Cross-Section Distribution Dynamics. It is concerned with 
transitional characteristics and deals with the following formulations of the convergence 
hypothesis: (i) economies originally richer than average are more likely to fall below average 
eventually and vice versa, the cycle repeats and (ii) whether a country's income is eventually 
above or below the cross-section average is independent of that economy's original position.
Cross-Section regression and time-series analysis (call them standard empirical 
approaches) are not adequate to draw conclusions about convergence. In spite of its popularity 
regressing growth rates on initial levels of income across economies (growth equations) may be 
misleading when evaluating convergence. The time-series analysis does not use all the cross 
sectional information. Additionally, neither of them are able to account for transitional 
characteristics. On the other hand analysing the dynamics of the cross-section distributions 
embraces the other two approaches and it seems to be an adequate way to study large cross- 
sections.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes critically the 
cross-section regression analysis and explains where and why standard approaches fail. Section 
3 presents the cross-section distribution approach as an alternative empirical framework for 
studying the income or GDP dynamics of a broad cross-section of economies and offers some
16
calculations for the regions in Spain. Section 4 studies the notions of conditional convergence. 
Section 5 concludes.
The empirical study of convergence in other areas of economics, like industrial 
organisation or labour markets, deserves similar comments to those we will make for growth 
theory. The cross section analysis may fail in evaluating convergence and the study of the 
dynamics of large cross section would be also adequate for these cases.
2. THE STANDARD EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO CONVERGENCE.
2.1. Cross-Section Regression Analysis
Standard cross-section regression analysis proposes two measures of convergence: p and 
a  convergence.
P convergence is a property of the classical Solow growth model. The p convergence 
analysis consists of estimating growth equations in which the (average) growth rate of income 
over time for each economy is regressed on the initial levels of income (and a bunch of steady 
variables). It interprets a negative correlation between the growth rate of income per capita and 
its initial level as economies converging toward a common steady-state. The results are 
surprisely uniform: a negative and significant estimate of the initial level of income coefficient 
(positive p) of about 2% for different samples and periods3.
a  convergence is model free and has been proposed by the cross-section regression 
approach to be used together with p convergence. There is a  convergence if the dispersion of 
the real income across economies tends to fall over time.
Let us start by looking at the definition and empirical performance of p convergence, to 
subsequently analyse both together, p and a  measures.4
2.1.1.- p Convergence: Concept and Interpretation.
The studies on p convergence use as a framework the classical Solow growth model or 
the augmented Solow model. See for example Baumol (1986), Barro (1991) Barro & Sala-i- 
Martin (1991) & (1992), Mankiw, Romer & Weil(1992), and Holtz-Eakin(1992). Solow's 
model assumes a neo-classical production function with diminishing returns to capital.(CRS 
model). It takes rates of saving, population growth and technological progress as exogenous.
Let us assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for economy i.
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(1.1)
0<cc <1
Where: Y is output, K & L are inputs, capital and labour respectively, and A is the level 
of technology.5
Assume A and L to grow at the exogenous rates g  and n respectively. L(t) = L(0).ent, 
A(t) = A(0).egt. Denote y = Y/AL and k = K/AL.
Capital evolves according to:
k = sy(t) - (n+ g+ SJ k(t) (1.2)
s = saving rate, 8 = depreciation rate.
Therefore the capital converges to a steady-state defined by:
k* =[s/ (n + g  + 8 )/"7'“) (1.3)
The expression for the steady-state income per capita is found by substitution into the 
production function and taking log.
log(Y/L) = a + gt + (a /1 - a) log(s) - (a /1 - a) log(n + g  + 8) + 8 (1.4)
Where: log (A(0))=a + e , s and e independents.
Equation (1.4) shows how the steady-state level of income per capita in each country 
depends on its population growth and its accumulation of capital (physical in the original model 
and physical and human in the augmented version). Therefore different economies can reach 
different steady-states.
The empirical literature in estimating the steady-state growth path, includes variables 
such as government expenditure, population, investment, migrations, market distortions or 
political system as proxies of population growth and accumulation of physical capital. School
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enrolment rates, fertility, indicators of differences in the quality of the education, etc. are proxies 
of the human capital accumulation in the augmented version.
The Solow model predicts convergence of each economy to its steady-state. Let y* be 
the steady-state in each economy andy the actual value, by approximating (1.4) around y* it can 
be proved that:
y  = P [log (y*)- log (y (t))] (l .5)
Where : (3 —( «+g+ b)(l-a)
Solving this differential equation and rearranging we find that the average growth rate 
of y  over the interval between 0 and T is :
(l/T)log [y(T)/y(0)J = g + [(l-.e*T)/T]log (y*/y(0)) (1.6)
The convergence in equation (1.6) is a conditional convergence, i.e. given the steady- 
state y  the growth rate is higher the lower the initial income level y(0). The steady-state might 
differ across economies and in consequence in the empirical analysis it is necessary to hold 
fixed this variation, p is the convergence coefficient, which governs the speed of adjustment. 
The greater p the higher the responsiveness of the average growth to the gap between the 
steady-state and the initial income.
The empirical analysis considers a version of equation (1.6) which applies for discrete 
periods to the economy z, and checks for two kinds of convergence: absolute and conditional 
convergence. It tests for absolute convergence by regressing across economies the average 
growth rate of income over time for each economy on the initial levels of income, a negative 
initial income level coefficient is interpreted as economies moving towards a common steady- 
state. It test for conditional convergence by regressing on initial income and on the variables 
hypothesised as determinants of the steady-state, in other words conditioning on the determinant 
of the steady-state. In this regression the conditioning variables (government expenditure, 
investment, schooling etc.) determine the long run growth or the permanent component and the 
initial income level controls the transitory dynamics. A negative initial income level coefficient 
is interpreted as convergence of each economy to its own estimated steady-state.
2.1.2.- p Convergence: Criticisms.
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Some ideas have proposed that the above-described convergence test fails.
The cross-section regression analysis and in particular the concept of p convergence is 
based on a model for a single "representative" economy and extracts conclusions about the 
cross-section. This is not straightforward. In other words the adjustment process of the Solow 
model tells us whether or not each economy, after being perturbed from its steady-state path 
returns to it, approaching monotonically. This is a single-country implication and consequently 
has nothing to do with economies approaching each other6. Quah (1995), makes an enlightening 
distinction between the growth and convergence mechanism. He argues that the conventional 
analysis (cross-section regression) may be revealing in the growth mechanism or productivity 
performance for an economy but is uninformative on the convergence issue.
In addition to the fundamental question of whether this conditional convergence 
prediction of the Solow model has any practical interest, the steady-state in each economy y  is 
not observable and it has to be estimated from observed values of the explanatory variables. In 
claiming that economies converge toward their steady-state it is been assumed that the 
estimated steady-state is the true one, this adds new serious problems to the concept of 
conditional convergence apart from the one of interpretation. For example, Mankiw, Romer & 
Weil (1992) estimates the steady-state by the observed values of investment in human and 
physical capital, consequently the economies will converge to their steady-state only if both 
human and physical capital have already reached their steady-state values, if not they will 
converge to a pseudo steady-state that does not characterises the true one (if it exists). Cohen 
(1992) makes this point and finds that the correlation between growth and human capital 
accumulation vanishes once time-invariant country-specific effects are included in the standard 
regression. In general, some authors have shown that the causality among growth and 
accumulation rates is weaker than what the classical growth model would predict. Blomstrom, 
Lipsey and Zejan (1993) show that causality runs from growth to investment rather than the 
other way around. The theoretical model in Quah(1995b) predicts inverse causality. Quah 
studies the formation of clubs of convergence and coalitions, such that when different 
convergence-clubs form variables that have been used by the conditional convergence literature 
as explanatory variables are endogenous, for example high human capital is only found among 
the rich countries. Finally, many studies have found a significant correlation between growth
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and short-term macroeconomic indicators (inflation, exports, and so on) which nonetheless is 
not always robust to changes in the model specification (Levine and Renelt (1992)).
Other criticisms (which apply to both conditional and absolute convergence) refer to the 
implicit assumption that the permanent component of the income for each economy is well 
described by a linear or log-linear deterministic time trend. This implicit hypothesis is required 
in order to justify the usual interpretation of these regressions and in order that the average 
growth rate (LHS of the regression) makes sense. In fact the averaged growth rate is simply 
the slope of the deterministic trend. Pooling data or even estimating economy by economy, 
there is still a deterministic trend.
For example, Graphic 1 represents per capita income for 50 regions in Spain over 35 
year (i.e. 50 time-series with 35 time observations each). What cross-section regression 
analysis does is to take the slope of each time series ( i.e. 50 observations ) and regress it on 
initial income ( i.e. the first observation of each time series).
Suppose that each economy's income (in log), {Y/t), j=ij2,..j, t= o,..,t} could be 
decomposed into a permanent and transitory components, as follows:
Y/t) =Xji(t) +XJ0(t) j^j,r.o ....T  (1.7)
Xjj(t) is the permanent component, which is implicitly considered by the mentioned literature 
as a time trend: Xjj(t) = cty + Xjt, where: ay and Xj are coefficients that do not depend on t. 
Xj0(t) is the transitory component such that, E Xj0(t) = 0.
Then: Y/t) = a , + Xjt+Xj0(t) (1.8.1)
A Y/t) =Xj + AXjoft) EAXjo(t) = 0 (1.8.2)
Note that since EAXj0(t) = 0, EA Y/t) = EAXj/t) = Xj i.e. Xj is the growth rate of the 
economy f s  income and of its unobservable permanent component. Then equation (1.8.2) 
says that the growth rate Xj is the slope of the deterministic trend.
Xj varies across economies according to :
Xj = Zj p0 + Uj E ZjUj =0  (1.9)
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Zj includes the conditioning (education, policy, etc.) as well as the initial income 
level. On the other hand Xj is not observable and in the referred empirical work has been 
proxied by the averaged growth rate of Yj.
Summarising: these studies run the cross-economies regression of the averaged 
growth rate of income over time for each economy on the initial levels of income and on the 
conditioning variables hypothesised in
Xj = Zj Pq + Uj E ZjUj =0  (1-10)
Where Xj (averaged growth rate) is the slope of an assumed time trend in the 
permanent component of the income of economy j.
However, under stochastic growth, imposing a deterministic trend structure can be 
very misleading. This remains true even for the case in which pooled data on shorter averages 
is used. The procedure still assumes the non-stationary component of per capita income to be 
trend deterministic, although allowing for a changing slope.
Quah (1993a) checks the validity of a smooth time approximation to the permanent 
movements in income by fitting linear time trends to the log of per capita income country by 
country (Summer & Heston data) and compares the slope for different periods of time. The 
data do not support the implicit hypothesis of a smooth time trend approximation. Even then, 
it can be a good approximation if significant economic shocks happen only at the beginning 
of the sample.
Besides all the limitations just mentioned, Quah (1993b) has shown that convergence 
tests based on regressing average growth rates on initial levels ( and conditioning variables) are 
uninformative since a negative cross-section regression coefficient on the initial level is in fact 
compatible with cross-economies behaviours that are far from the idea of convergence, like 
overtaking, cycles etc..
The argument is the same as that which explains Galton's classic fallacy. Galton 
observed two facts that he could not reconcile: on the one hand taller than average fathers had 
sons who turned out to be not as much above the average as their fathers themselves, on the
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other, the observed population of male heights continued to display significant cross section 
dispersion.
The regression test of convergence suffers from Galton's fallacy in the sense that, 
economies with higher than average initial income (tall fathers) have income in the future that 
is not as large as the initial. But this does not imply a diminishing cross-section dispersion, a 
collapsing cross-section distribution of the income. Similarly currently richer economies might 
become poorer than average in the future without a significant narrowing in the cross-section 
dispersion of incomes. This argument applies to both, absolute and conditional convergence.
n
Danny Quah (1993b) shows how in estimating growth equations a non-positive 
coefficient in the initial levels arises even if it is assumed that the cross-section distribution is 
time invariant (there is not real convergence). The same conclusion holds when estimating in 
the final or even in a middle condition. And it can be negative also if there is divergence. 
Exactly the same reasoning applies to the idea of conditional convergence, just by taking the 
variable of analysis to be the residuals of the output after conditioning on the exogenous 
variables.
In consequence to use cross-section regression is inadequate for extracting out 
dynamic implications.
2.1.3 a Convergence
The standard approach introduces a  convergence as a measure of convergence in the 
light of the above criticism and tries to arrive at some information about the cross-section 
distribution. There is a  convergence if the dispersion of the real income across economies tends 
to fall over time. The dispersion is measured as the sample standard deviation (a^, and a  
convergence is formulated a t < a M, Vt, (equality in the case of the economy being already 
in steady-state).
cr convergence is model free and tries to contribute to the measurement of 
convergence with some kind of information about the dynamics of the cross-section 
distribution. The idea is that both a negative coefficient of the initial condition and a
o
decreasing cross-section dispersion over time would be sufficient to show convergence .
There are cases in which the sample standard deviation (a^ says little about the cross- 
section dynamics and additionally cannot account for some intra-distribution mobility. It is
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only a point in time statistic and may not be sufficient to describe the cross-section 
distribution dynamics. Sometimes a  convergence does not give any information about the 
cross-section dynamics, for example observations from a bimodal9 distribution may have the 
same sample variance as observations from a uni-modal one. The interpretation of those 
distributions in terms of convergence is obviously quite different. Also, it happens that cr 
convergence cannot account for some intra-distribution mobility, an illustrative example of 
this is Figure 2, where c t < a t+1, Vt, i.e. a  convergence holds and the standard deviation is 
identical in both cases, but 2a shows a situation where economies are overtaking each other 
and 2b displays a case of economies approaching monotonically. a  convergence cannot 
distinguish between 2a and 2b.
The main limitation of the conventional approach is that it relies on two single statistics 
(mean and standard deviation) that are not always sufficient to describe the cross-section 
dynamics distribution. They might not be very informative in terms of convergence.
Another attempt to incorporate the time dynamics in the cross-section regression 
approach has been to use panel data techniques. It still does not give any information on intra­
distribution mobility and in most of the cases leads to inconsistent estimators.10
2.2. Time Series
On the other hand, time series approach does not offer a better analysis. It is not 
possible to study the convergence of economies by looking at their univariate dynamics; for 
instance the income in each economy can be integrated, but jointly cointegrated across 
economies, therefore interpreting a unit root in each economy income as evidence against the 
convergence hypothesis would be incorrect. It is the relative behaviour and cross-section 
mobility or transactional properties which matter in analysing convergence. Looking at 
cointregration gives accurate information but still in large cross sections may be missing part 
of the dynamics and transition characteristics, it is not telling the whole story. An alternative 
may be to do vector regression, by defining a vector of cross sections, but then the dimension 
of the vector makes it impossible to carry out the calculations.
In consequence the convergence cannot be studied without considering both cross- 
section variation and dynamic behaviour over time.
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3. CROSS-SECTION DISTRIBUTION DYNAMICS. A simple exercise for Spain. 
Absolute Convergence.
An alternative approach suggested by Danny Quah (1993) which encodes the 
traditional ones mentioned above and overcomes some of their difficulties. This approach 
takes into consideration the whole cross-section distribution and does not impose any 
structure, nature of convergence, trend etc. It is able to account for transitional properties of 
the data, to characterize convergence, polarization, stratification etc.. It has been designed to 
deal with large cross-sections of data, in probability theory these structures, where both 
dimensions have the same order of magnitude, are called Random Fields. The current section 
presents this approach and illustrates it with a simple exercise for regions in Spain.11
3.1. The data:
The data in the empirical analysis are those in Dolado,J., J.M. Gonzalez-Paramo and 
12J.M.Roldan (1984) . The sample cover 50 regions (provinces: traditional administrative 
division) over a period of 35 years (1955-1989). The basic variable is real GDP per capita (as 
a proportion of the labour force) in each individual region (province) relative to the same 
variable for the country . Figure 1 is a three dimensional plot of that variable, the main 
message of this graphic is that both dimensions of variation in the data are very important, 
they have a interesting dynamics. It is these dynamics that the approach tries to account for.
3.2 The Random Element: Cross section Distribution
At each point in time there is an income cross-section distribution which is simply the 
realisation of a random element in a space of distributions. The idea is to model their 
dynamics directly. The dynamics of these distributions involve changes of the exterior shape 
and intra-distribution mobility which give us relevant information in characterising 
convergence. Whether the cross-section distribution evolves to a multi-modal or to a 
degenerated distribution etc. are features to look at in dealing with convergence. Furthermore, 
the dynamics of each country's relative position is also a crucial component of the notion of 
convergence.
Consequently, the random element which turns out to be a cross-section distribution 
function has to be estimated from data. There are two approaches to density estimation. The
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parametric approach which assumes that the data are drawn from one of the known 
parametric families of distributions with unknown parameters. The underlying distribution 
can then be estimated by estimating these parameters from the observed data set. The 
nonparametric approach which requires weaker assumptions. The data are allowed to speak 
for themselves in determining the estimator of the density function This is the approach we 
are using in our analysis because it does not require\ imposing any assumption on the exterior 
shape or about the moments of the density function from which the data are drawn. Due to 
their flexibility, nonparametric methods are able to detect structures deviating from traditional 
parametric forms.
The technical appendix in this chapter gives details on nonparametric estimation . It 
concentrates on kernel estimation, since it is the predominant procedure applied in this thesis. 
The reason to use kernel estimation is that conceptually is quite straightforward and the 
asymptotic theory is well developed.
We have estimated the density functions of relative per capita GDP across the 50 Spanish 
regions year by year. In this context of random fields, looking at the estimation of this cross 
section distribution is equivalent to looking at the values of the variable, observation by 
observation, in time series analysis. A few conclusions may be extracted from this exercise. Firstly 
when examining up to the end of the 1960s our estimators present two modes, a group of regions 
tend to concentrate at around one and a half times the average income of the country. During the 
1970s the distribution turns to be unimodal and the dispersion decreases only very slightly. It is 
mainly during the period 1955-60 and 1977-84 when the range of relative differences among 
regions' incomes diminishes as the poorest regions approach the average. From 1985 onwards two 
modes in the density function show up at 70% and 110% of the average. Figures 2a to 2d present 
some nonparametric estimated cross-section density functions of relative per capita GDP for each 
period of 3 or 4 years which summarise the evolution described. This first look at the density 
estimates suge^sts that the first and second moment do not entirely describe the behaviour of the 
distribution.
Another veiy useful and illustrative way of looking at our data before doing any modelling 
is the cross-profile graph, Figure 4. It ranks the regions according to the relative income per capita 
in the first year of the sample (1955) and shows the evolution of the ranking over time. Each line 
refers to a single year and sketches the relative income of the provinces ordered according to the
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initial ranking. The larger the income inequality the steeper these cross profile lines are. Notice 
that for 1955 the line is obviously monotonicaly increasing; for the richest regions it is much 
steeper (corresponding to the second mode). With the exception of the highest quantiles, the lines 
become flatter. The inequality does not seem to be persistent between the intermediate quantiles of 
income. With respect to the richest regions the inequality is persistent specially until 1970. A high 
mobility is observed with regard to changes in each region's relative position, note the number 
of peaks in each line.
Looking at the random elements is very intuitive but the distributions are just point 
estimates for the sample period and cannot be assumed to reflect out-of-sample patterns. This 
does not give any information about the long run steady-state nor about the intra-distribution 
mobility.
3.3 Modelling the Distribution Dynamics. Continuous case.
In order to solve these objections and make progress in the analysis it becomes 
necessary to develop a formal structure. In other words to develop a law of motion for the 
cross-section distribution of income as realisations of random element in the space of
distributions. Then we need a model for a stochastic process that takes values which are
probability measures associated with the cross-section distribution.
Let A-j be the probability measures (one each year) associated with the cross-section 
distribution. The simplest probability model is as follows:
K - T ' f k ' . j . u }  (1.13)
T* maps probability measures together with a disturbance to probability measures. It 
encodes information on how for example, the income levels of economies grow apart. T* 
must be estimated from the data.
The stochastic difference equation in expression (1.13) is unmanageable. By ignoring 
the disturbance and iterating it can be written as (1.14) :
\ t+s=(T*)s \  (1.14)
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So that as s goes towards infinity it is possible to characterise the long run distribution 
of income across economies. In other words, to characterise the existence and uniqueness of 
the steady-state. But it is still difficult to deal with equation (1.14).
In order to make (1.14) tractable one can use the concept of Stochastic Kernel 
(Stockey, Lucas & Prescott (1989)). Consider the measurable space (R, R). R is the real line 
where the realisations of income fall and R is its Borel sigma algebra. B(R, R) is the Banach 
space of finitely additive functions. Let K+i and Xt be elements of B that are probability 
measures in (R, R). A  Stochastic Kernel is a mapping M:RxR -> [0,1], satisfying:
( i ) V a G R ,  M(a,.) is a probability measure.
(ii) V A in R, M(.,A) is a sigma measurable function.
Then M(a,A) is the probability that the next state period lies in the set A, given that in 
this period the state is a.
For any probability measure X on (R, R ), V A in R:
Xt+l =J M(x, A) dkt(x) (1.15)
Where: is a Stochastic Kernel. And Xl+1 (A) = (T* Xt )A . T* is an operator
associated with the Stochastic Kernel that maps the space of probabilities in itself, (adjoin of 
the Markov operator associated to M).
Equation (1.15) measures the probability that the next period state lies in the set A, if 
the current state is drawn according to the probability measure Xr  (T* XJ is the probability 
measure over the next period state, if Xt is the probability measure over the current period. So 
we will consider T* in (1.13) and (1.14) as being generated in the differential equation (1.15).
Thus the Stochastic Kernels are a complete description of transitions, but they are 
simply point estimates, there is not a fitted model. Inference cannot be performed and it is not 
possible to calculate the long run. But there may be addressed some questions like whether 
convergence has taken place or whether it is taking place.
Figures 5 and 6 are non-parametric14 estimated stochastic kernels for relative income of k- 
year transitions (k=l, 5). Figures 5 display three dimensional plots of the transitions probability 
function, while Figures 6 display the contours of the function in Figures 5. A slice parallel to the
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t+k axis gives a probability density that describes transitions from a part of the income distribution 
to another in k periods. The location of the probability mass will give us the information about 
persistence and mobility that allows us to extract conclusions in term of convergence. 
Concentration of the probability mass along the positive sloped diagonal indicates high persistence 
in the economies’ relative position, and consequently low mobility. Concentration along the 
negative sloped diagonal would indicate that regions are overtaking each other in the income 
ranking. The transition probability describing horizontal lines (parallel to t+k) shows that there is 
very low persistence, the probability of being at any point in t+k is independent of the position in t. 
Finally, if the mass of probability is orthogonal to the t + k axis there is convergence.
According to Figures 5a and 6a, during the sample period (1955-89), the Spanish regions 
have a low probability of changing their relative position in one year (k=l), tending to remain 
where they are relative to each other, although the contour in Figure 6a shows a tendency of the 
poorest regions to concentrate around 50% of the average income.
Following the analysis in Dolado et al (1994), we divide the whole sample of 35 years into 
the three following15 sub-periods: 1955-64, 1964-77 and 1977-88. Looking at these we can 
observe that this concentration took place in the period 1955-64.
Regarding longer horizons, say 5 year transitions (k=5), the contour, Figures 6e-h, in most 
of the cases shows the probability placed along the main diagonal but less concentrated than 
before, which indicates there is a higher intra-density mobility. The contour for the 1956-64 period 
(Figure 6f), again seemingly indicates that the poorest regions tend to approach the rest and 
concentrate at a level of income of around 50% the average. It shows a high persistence for the 
high-income regions. For the period 1964-77 the probability of transition is mainly over the 
diagonal, although there is much more mobility than before for the richest. The contour for the 
period 1977-89 is steeper than the diagonal only for the poorest regions.
3.4 Modelling the Distribution Dynamics. Discrete case.
There is still a question about convergence that cannot be addressed, this being: will
economies converge in the long run? To address this long term calculations and inferences
are required. The way to proceed will be to work out T* from (1.15) and do the calculations
in (1.14). T* can be approximated by assuming a countable state-space for income levels St
*={slt, s2t, .. ,s rt). I.e. T is simply a transition probability matrix Qt such that Xt= Q t (kt_j, u j
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\(1.16) is tractable. Now Q contains all the relevant information about convergence and long 
run calculations are possible.
Under some regularity conditions, Q, defined for the fixed grid (St = S) is time- 
invariant and the long run calculation in (1.14) can be done in an explicit way. The sequence 
of powers of this matrix converges to a matrix whose rows (all of them identical) are the 
ergodic distribution, which allows us to talk about steady-state. In this setting convergence is 
characterised as the ergodic distribution tending towards a mass point.
Taking per capita income for each region, relative to the sample average, we discretize the 
space of possible values, S, in r states. For example the state i=(0.7,l.l) includes the regions which 
have an income between 0.7 times and 1.1 times the average for the country. The discretization 
defines a grid that can be thought of as an estimator of the initial unconditional probability 
distribution X. Each element of the Q matrix indicates the probability of transition from one state 
to another in k periods: the (qy) entry is the probability that a region in state i transits to the state j. 
Each row is a conditional probability vector. Each row of the matrix (in terms of the stochastic 
kernel above) is analogous to the density probability defined for each point in S when cutting the 
figure at that point by a plane parallel to the t+k axis.
Table 1 presents some estimates of the transitions matrix Q. The length of the defined 
states are different for providing a uniform distribution for the first year of the sample. In fact they 
are quite different, much wider for low and high income than for the intermediate ones.
The first column is the total number of transitions over the whole time sample, starting at 
each state. The rest displays an estimator of the time-invariant transition probability matrix rxr for 
a single period, calculated as an average over the total sample. The values in the main diagonal are 
high for the poorest and richest regions, being around 88%, which indicates that the probability of 
a region moving from being on the lowest and highest income group in one year is around 0.10. 
For instance, the probability that a region with income between 0.4 and 0.7 times the average 
moves in one period to an income between 0.7 and 0.9 times the country average is 0.11. There is 
less persistence for the intermediate groups, the probability of being off the diagonal for those 
reaches 20% and is symmetrically distributed between the probability of moving up or down (to a 
higher and lower relative position). Finally, Table 1 also offers an estimator of the ergodic 
distribution, which is the closest concept to the steady-state in this setting. The ergodic distribution 
tells us the unconditional probability for an economy to end up in a particular income range.
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Recall that the states are defined in a way such that the initial distribution is uniform. We end up 
with a distribution that is not degenerated at its mean value, but it gives a slightly higher 
probability of reaching the average state. Table 2 displays some estimates of the transitions matrix 
Q for the sub-periods defined above. For the second period (1964-77) the evidence is of less 
mobility than for the other two periods, except for the richest regions for which the probability of 
moving to a lower level remains about the same as in the rest of the periods.
These calculations require time-invariant transition probability, which is not always 
reasonable for long periods in which, for example, some economic structural changes may happen. 
And in our sample the previous analysis suggests different patterns of behaviour for different time 
sub-samples.
Alternatively it is possible to construct time-variant transition matrices by fixing the 
probability vectors to be uniform and identical for every time point (k, =X) and define a time- 
variant grid S, ={s7„s2/,.. ,s rt). Associated to that there is a sequence of transition probability 
matrices, Qj.
For example, let r be 4 , and define Xt =X= (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25), then the set of 
quantiles defining the grid consequently determines the sequence of cross-section distribution. 
Associated to these grids there is a sequence of transition probability matrices. The change in the 
grid describes the evolution of the cross-section distribution, i.e. the dynamics that refer to the 
exterior shape. The sequence of transition probability matrices shows the intra-distribution 
mobility.
The characterisation of convergence in this setting focuses on the sequence of 
quantiles tending to approach and it allows characterisation of the long-run. For example the 
sequence of quantiles degenerating to the mean will indicate convergence.
Table 3 and Figure 7 show the sequence of quantiles. Again the picture is one of 
persistence during the second period and slight convergence during the first and third periods, 
especially the limits of the lowest quantil have been rising since 1977.
4. BRINGING CONDITIONAL INFORMATION
Over and above all the problems faced by the traditional approach, the obvious and 
essential question that arises when talking about conditional convergence is whether the fact
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of a single economy reaching its own steady-state, or more precisely tending to its estimated16 
steady-state, has any practical interest.
17This section departs from Solow predictions and from conditional convergence 
understood as the classical model predicts. We simply try to illustrate how to bring 
conditional information into the cross-section distribution dynamics approach. Conditioning 
in this context means analysing the residuals from a first stage regression in which the effects 
of the variable we are conditioning on are removed. In other terms the idea is to analyse the 
income disparities that are orthogonal to the conditioning variables. This also may be of little 
interest since a great deal of information is likely to be removed.
4.1 Conditioning variables18
For Spain, we choose as the conditioning variable the inter-regional migration flows 
as a percentage of the previous year population. The data are those in Bentolilla19 and Dolado
(1991), the sample covers the 50 provinces above, over the period 1962 to 1986.
Consequently, the whole exercise consists of studying the dynamics of the distribution 
of income disparities which cannot be explained by migration flows. The methodology in this 
exercise follows the one in Quah (1996). Firstly we perform a causality test for bivariate 
VARs in the growth rates of regional per capita GDP (relative to the country GDP growth 
rates) and migration rates. There is significant dynamic correlation between those variables: 
GDP growth rates help to predict future values of net migration flows and vice versa, net 
migration helps to predict GDP growth rates.
4.2 Conditioning regression
There is not a structural interpretation of the causality above and consequently, 
following Quah (1996), we estimate a two sided projection of GDP growth rates on 
migrations rates, (Table 4). Then we accumulate the residuals from this projection (recall that 
the depend variable is the growth rate) to get the corresponding residual components in per 
capita regional GDP20, (relative to the country GDP), which is going to be our basic variable.
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4.3 Some results
Given that the sample available for migrations is shorter than the one for GDP (raw 
data), we will compare the results after conditioning with the ones for raw data during the 
2nd period analysed in section 3, i.e. 1964-1977, which was the one showing more 
persistence (or less convergence).
Figure 8 presents the cross profile plot for the raw data (before conditioning) and for 
the residuals after conditioning out migrations. The evidence from here seems to indicate that 
migration had a negative effect on the convergence process.
Table 5 presents the time-invariant transitions matrix, defined by taking as the initial 
distribution a uniform one. Comparing this with Table 2.b, Table 5 shows higher values in the 
diagonal for the regions with higher income per capita and lower for all the others. In other 
words the poor regions are more likely to move to higher levels, for example the probability 
of leaving the lowest state is now 0.76 while before conditioning it was 0.89, and the richest 
are more likely to stay in their income group. Looking at Figure 9, which displays an 
estimator of the stochastic kernel comparable with figures 6g. and 7g, the message is the 
same; after conditioning out the effect of migrations the contour presents a steeper slope in its 
middle and lower parts.
The effect of the migrations during the period analysed prevents the lower income 
regions catching up with the rest and on the other hand helps the richest to approach the 
average.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper describes some of the criticism concerning the traditional approaches to the 
hypothesis of convergence. It presents the econometric methods for studying the dynamics of 
the distributions as an alternative approach to characterising convergence and analyses the 
cross-section distribution of relative GDP per capita across regions in Spain. The main 
conclusions from this exercise are the following:
. The GDP disparities in Spain have narrowed (slightly) during the periods 1955-64 and 1977- 
89, and they showed persistence during the period 1964-77.
. During the years 1966 to 1977 the inter regional migration flows prevented the poor regions 
from catching up with the rest.
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ENDNOTES
1 Bianchi (1995), Desdoigts (1994), Paap and Dijk (1995) etc. have also folowed this 
approach.
2 For an application of this approach in industrial organisation and in labour market 
empirical literature see Koopmans and Lamo (1995) and Kogning (1995) respectively.
3 Quah (1994b) illustrates how the uniformity of this 2% may arise from a unit root in the 
time series, instead of from reasons related to the dynamic of economic growth.
4 p convergence is a necessary but not sufficinet condition for ct convergence.
5 Mankiw, Romer & Weil (1992) augmented Solow’s model by adding human capital 
accumulation. In this case the production function is as follows:
Y(t)  — K ( t ) H(t  f  ( A( t )L( t ) )  pwhere n  is stock of human capital. We can consider 
that in the regression of the original model, H  is an omitted variable. For simplicity and without 
any loss of generality reference will be made to the equations for the original model.
6 Chapter 2 in this thesis looks at this point in more detail.
7 Same exercise for discrete choice models is done in the chapter 3 of this thesis.
8 Quah (1995) shows why no combination of p and a  convergence can provide a 
satisfactory solution.
9 See Quah(1996) for more about bimodal distributions.
10 See Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Canova and Marcet (1996).
11 Dolado, J., J.M Gonzalez-Paramo and J.M.Roldan (1994) study convergence across 
Spanish regions in the framework of the traditional approach.
12 I thank J. Dolado for kindly providing me with the data. Some interpolation was required 
for which I used the sectoral sructure of each region and the sectoral GDP growth rates.
13 This normalization is a way to abstract each individual region from the country 
growth and fluctuations.
14 Obtained using the squared of standard Epanechnikov kernel for estimating the joint 
density f  ( X lTiX iT+^ ) and then rescaling to obtain the conditional probability. X is the per capita 
income for each individual region relative to the same variable for the country, and x= 1,5. The 
bandwidth is chosen by least square cross-validation (see Silverman(1986) section 3.4.3.). All the 
calculations were done with Quah’s shell tSrF.
15 As in Dolado, Paramo and Roldan (1994).
16 Abstracting from the problems of estimating the steady-state.
17 Chapter 2 of this thesis take as the baseline hypothesis the Solow model predictions 
and performs a sequential conditioning exerciseThe objective is not to test whether there is 
convergence after conditioning, but to test the solow model.
18 The purpose of our exercise is merely to illustrate the technique. Levine and Renel
(1992) found that the significance of hardly any of the conditioning variables (except saving 
rates) can be claimed robust. We use the variable migrations, in spite of the interpretation 
problems, due to its availibility.
19 I thank Samuel Bentolila for making the data available to me.
20 For more details in this procedure see the data appendix in Quah (1996a).
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TABLE 1
Spain Relative Per-Capita Income 
First Order Transition Matrix, Time Stationary 1956-89
Upper End of the States 0.756 0.906 1.061 1.879
(r) (1) (2) (3) (4)
412: 0.89 0.11 0.00 0.00
412: 0.10 0.79 0.11 0.00
415: 0.00 0.10 0.78 0.12
1411: 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.88
Ergodic Distribution 0.225 0.247 0.265 0.260
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TABLE 2a
Spain Relative Per-Capita Income 
First Order Transition Matrix, Time Stationary 1956-64
Upper End of the States 0.727 0.872 1.053 1.879
(r) (1) (2) (3) (4)
116: 0.84 0.16 0.00 0.00
111: 0.12 0.77 0.11 0.00
114: 0.00 0.11 0.75 0.15
109: 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.85
TABLE 2b
Spain Relative Per-Capita Income 
First Order Transition Matrix, Time Stationary 1964-77
Upper End of the States 0.746 0.909 1.073 1.583
t o (1) (2) (3) (4)
177: 0.91 0.08 0.01 0.00
177: 0.07 0.80 0.12 0.00
170: 0.00 0.09 0.81 0.10
176: 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.88
TABLE 2c
Spain Relative Per-Capita Income 
First Order Transition Matrix, Time Stationary 1977-88
Upper End of the States 0.798 0.932 1.065 1.501
(r) (1) (2) (3) (4)
147: 0.86 0.14 0.00 0.00
152: 0.14 0.75 0.11 0.00
154: 0.00 0.13 0.73 0.14
147: 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.88
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TABLE 3
Quantiles (0.25,0.5,0.75) 
Spain Relative Per-Capita Income
1956 0:0.457 1 0.677
1957 0:0.446 1 0.705
1958 0:0.457 1 0.712
1959 0:0.467 1 0.716
1960 0:0.481 1 0.712
1961 0:0.486 1 0.723
1962 0:0.453 1 0.736
1963 0:0.459 1 0.757
1964 0:0.518 1 0.721
1965 0:0.528 1 0.768
1966 0:0.532 1 0.768
1967 0:0.463 1 0.736
1968 0:0.471 1 0.749
1969 0:0.471 1 0.693
1970 0:0.459 1 0.693
1971 0:0.443 1 0.727
1972 0:0.443 1 0.731
1973 0:0.422 1 0.749
1974 0:0.414 1 0.749
1975 0:0.419 1 0.729
1976 0:0.422 1 0.730
1977 0:0.437 1 0.753
1978 0:0.450 1 0.774
1979 0:0.484 1 0.802
1980 0:0.490 1 0.827
1981 0:0.464 1 0.843
1982 0:0.469 1 0.763
1983 0:0.496 1 0.828
1984 0:0.489 1 0.800
1985 0:0.484 1 0.776
1986 0:0.510 1 0.783
1987 0:0.538 1 0.780
1988 0:0.526 1 0.775
1989 0:0.535 1 0.754
2:0.843 3:1.071 4:1.864
2:0.873 3:1.026 4:1.653
2:0.884 3:1.038 4:1.618
2:0.890 3:1.045 4:1.591
2:0.839 3:1.051 4:1.644
2:0.839 3:1.048 4:1.642
2:0.848 3:1.058 4:1.540
2:0.857 3:1.062 4:1.482
2:0.871 3:1.033 4:1.472
2:0.925 3:1.088 4:1.571
2:0.922 3:1.083 4:1.561
2:0.848 3:1.028 4:1.435
2:0.856 3:1.028 4:1.402
2:0.886 3:1.057 4:1.481
2:0.885 3:1.065 4:1.460
2:0.904 3:1.071 4:1.390
2:0.915 3:1.066 4:1.390
2:0.896 3:1.084 4:1.391
2:0.926 3:1.086 4:1.423
2:0.929 3:1.068 4:1.328
2:0.929 3:1.051 4:1.354
2:0.939 3:1.045 4:1.335
2:0.933 3:1.045 4:1.350
2:0.944 3:1.028 4:1.339
2:0.927 3:1.037 4:1.327
2:0.933 3:1.044 4:1.316
2:0.909 3:1.029 4:1.374
2:0.927 3:1.081 4:1.327
2:0.898 3:1.056 4:1.375
2:0.899 3:1.075 4:1.450
2:0.918 3:1.074 4:1.451
2:0.926 3:1.081 4:1.490
2:0.898 3:1.066 4:1.447
2:0.874 3:1.074 4:1.328
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TABLE4
Conditioning Regression 
Dependent variable: DGP growth rates_Spanish regions(relative to the country one) 
Conditioning variable: migration flows rates 
two sided projection
coefficiets-OLS se(OLS) se (HKC))
migration (3) 1.139 1.041 0.833
migration (2) 0.361 1.300 1.007
migration (1 4.054 0.990 0.822
migration 20166 0.750 0.652
migration (-1) 0.652 0.781 0.627
migration (-2) 0.066 0.795 0.673
migration (-3) 0.494 0.519 0.439
constant 0.961 0.007 0.007
R = 0.296, OLS, Sample 50 Regions, 1966-82
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TABLE5
Spain Residuals First Stage Regression 
Conditioning out migration flows 
(unexplained by migration flows)
First Order Transition Matrix, Time Stationary 1966-77
(r ) (1) (2) (3) (4)
146: 0.76 0.24 0.00 0.00
146: 0.02 0.71 0.27 0.00
139: 0.00 0.02 0.71 0.27
119: 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.95
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
NONPARAMETRIC DENSITY ESTIMATION
Density estimation deals with the construction of an estimate of density functions 
from observed data. There is a rich literature on this topic (see among others the almost 
classical books by Tapia and Thompson (1978), Prakansa Rao (1983), 
and Silverman (1986)). The ideas and techniques exposed here as well as the analysis in the 
paper follows Silverman (1986).
The remainder of this appendix consists of two sections. Section I concentrates on the 
estimation of a density underlying a set of univariate observations. Section II briefly 
considers the multivariate case.
I. UNIVARIATE DATA
This section is organised as follows. Paragraph 1.1 sketches out some of the main 
nonparametric methods for univariate density estimation. Paragraph 1.2 discusses the basic 
properties of the kernel estimate which is one of the best understood methods.
We consider a sample of n independent and identically distributed observations {Xb 
X2 ,—,X J  from a continuous univariate distribution, whose underlying density function f(x) is 
estimated from the data by /  (x ).
1.1. SOME METHODS
1.1.1. The histogram
The histogram is the traditional and most popular density estimator. In order to 
construct the histogram the data set is divided into a number of « bins ». Given a fixed origin 
xQ we define these bins to be the interval [x0 + mh, x0+ (m+l)h), where m is a positive or 
negative integer and h is a positive parameter called the bin width. The histogram is then 
defined by
/ ( x) = (1/nh) [number ofXt in the same bin as x]. (A. 1)
The parameter h controls the width of the partition and thus the smoothness of the 
histogram; as h decreases the number of peaks in the histogram tends to increase.
The popularity of the histogram is due to the fact that it is very easy to compute. 
However, it has some undesirable properties. Firstly, the asymptotic rate of convergence of
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the histogram to the true density is worse than for alternative density estimates. Secondly, the 
discontinuity of the histogram impedes the calculation of derivatives often needed as an 
intermediate tool or for their own sake. Finally, the choice of the origin x0 affects 
substantially the final shape of the histogram. Thus, for the same data set the histogram can 
give a very different impression depending on the chosen origin. Additionally, the histogram 
requires the choice of the bin width. The latter difficulty is common among all methods 
presented in this appendix.
1.1.2. The Naive Estimator
Rosenblatt (1956) proposed the naive estimator (NE). It consists of using the 
histogram method with bins centred on the point to be estimated, i.e. the naive estimator can 
be seen as a histogram where every point is the centre of a bin. The NE can be derived 
directly from the definition of a density function
f(x) = lim (l/2h) P(x-h<X<x+h). (A.2)
h-> 0
If we estimate P( x-h<X<x+h) by the proportion of the sample falling in the interval (x-h,
A A A 1
x+h), i.e. [F(x + h)~ F(x-h)] ,  where F(x) is the empirical distribution function then the 
density estimate is
/ (x ) = l/2nh( number o f Xt falling in (x-h, x+h))=[F(x + h) — F(x  -  /z)] — . (A .3)
2 h
It is proportional to the relative frequency of the data in an interval of length h centred around 
x.
The length of the interval is called bandwidth and has the same role for the NE as the
A
bin width for the histogram. Since F(x) is an unbiased estimator of F(x) with good statistic
A
properties the density function / (x) is expected to be a good estimator of f(x)= dF(x)/dx as 
h-+ 0.
A
A more compact and transparent way of writing /  (x) can be developed by defining 
the following weight function
w(x)
1/2 z/|x | < 1
0 otherwise • (A.4)
1 AF ( x )  = 1/nE I ( X<x) and /  is the indicator function.
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Consequently,
m  = (A.5)
n M h
Notice that
fl/2 (x-jr,)//,  |<1
A [0 otherwise and \x-Xt\<h
=>Xt E(x-h, x+h).
In other terms the NE consists of centring a « box » of width 2h and height (2nh)ml around 
each observation and then summing them up. The NE solves most of the shortcomings of the 
histogram apart from the discontinuity problem.
1.1.3. The Kernel Estimator
The kernel estimator (KE) generalises the naive estimator and produces continuous 
density estimates. It replaces the rectangular weight function, which is a uniform density 
function, by a general function2 K(x) which satisfies
oo
^K(x)dx = 1 K(): R-+R. (A.6)
-0 0
K() is called a kernel function. It will normally be continuous bounded, and symmetric.
The kernel estimator3, is defined as
/ ( x) = 1/nh Y K ( ( x -  X)/h), (A.7)
where h is the smoothing parameter known as bandwidth or window width.
The intuition is the following: for x fixed, if the realisation Xt is close to x, it follows 
that (x - X)/h  is approximately zero and K((x - X)fh) will be large. The more realisations 
close to x the higher is the value of / (x) . Obviously (x - X)/h  depends also on the value of h 
such that it can be close to zero because h is big. As mentioned before, the choice of h is a 
drawback shared by all nonparametric methods.4
The histogram and kernel methods may be misleading when the tails of the underlying 
density are large. This is because the smoothing parameter is fixed across the entire sample.
2 It replaces « boxes » by « bumps ».
A
3 It is immediate that if K  is a continuous density function so is f  (x )  .
4 The next section o f this appendix analyses in detail the bandwidth problem for the kernel estimate.
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On the one hand if it is small, values in the tails of the data can generate spurious noise in the 
tail of the estimates. On the other hand if h is large enough to avoid this effects then the 
resulting estimate will hide details in the main part of the distribution. In order to deal with 
this difficulty several alternative methods have been proposed which allow the smoothing 
parameter to vary with the data.
1.1.4. Locally Adaptive Methods
These methods try to accommodate the level of smoothing to the local density of the
data.
The alternative to the histogram is the variable partition histogram proposed by 
Anderson (1965) where each partition is of different length and contains a fixed number of 
data points k  Exactly the same idea is applied to kernel and naive estimates. For the naive 
estimate the locally adaptive alternative is called kth nearest neighbour density estimate. The 
boxes centred in each observation have the width needed to contain k observations. In other 
words, the smoothing parameter is the Euclidean distance between each observation and its 
kth nearest neighbour in the data set. Finally, the alternative to the kernel estimator is called 
the generalised kth nearest neighbour estimate defined as:
/(* )  = -  X  T J7^T K« x -  X ,) I hd(x)k),  (A.8)n hd(x)t
where d(x)k is the Euclidean distance between x and its kth neighbour.
1.2. PROPERTIES OF THE KERNEL ESTIMATOR
Rosenblatt (1956) showed that most of the density estimates are biased. Consequently, 
there is need for another measure of the discrepancy between the estimate and the density in 
order to analyse how good the estimate is. The discrepancy measures are usually based on 
absolute values, quadratic distances etc. Here we focus on quadratic distance measures only.
Given x, when considering the estimation at a single point, the MSE mean square 
error is defined as
M S E J ( x) = £ [ /(* )  -  f ( x ) f . (A.9)
More interesting is the global discrepancy between the actual function and the 
estimated one. For that purpose define the mean integrated squared error as
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MISEX i f )  = \ M S Ej ( x ) d ( x )  =
f f (A'10)j 6zar / ( x)d(x) + / (x)J(x)
In order to evaluate the MISE we derive the expression of the bias and of the variance. For
simplicity we assume that the underlying density function f(x) is continuous and has
continuous derivatives and hat the kernel function satisfies 
00 00 00
\K(x)dx = 1, \xK{x)dx = 0, jx 2K(x)dx * 0 . (A .ll)
Since the variables are independent the bias can be written as follows:
bias f { x )  = \  X  E [ m *  ~ X ,) / h)] -  f ( x )  = \ E [ K ( [ x - X ) l h ) ] -  f i x )
nh nh (A. 12)
= ^  l lK i x - y ) / h ] f i y )dy  -  f i x ) ,
The expression (A. 12) depends on f(x). Consequently, the evaluation of the bias 
requires an assumption on the functional form of f(x). This procedure is no very much in 
harmony with the nonparametric principles. We rather use an approximated expression of the 
bias. A change of variable y = x-ht gives the following formula
bias f i x )  = \ K { t ) f i x - h t ) d t - f i x ) , =  \ K { t ) [ f i x - h t ) - f i x ) ]d i t ) .  (A.13)
Using a second order Taylor approximation we write the bias as
bias f ( x )  = -hf ' (x)  j tK(t)dt+—h2f " ( x )  j t 2K(x)dt =
2 (A. 14)
^h2f"ix)^Kix)dt.
We proceed in a similar way with the expression of the variance. Using the 
independence property it can be written as
Var f i x )  = ~Y7T Z  VarK« x ~ X >) 1 h) = A j  VarK« x ~ X , ) / h )  = n h nh
1 { E [ K i i x - X ) l h f ' [ - E [ K i i x - X ) l h ) \ 1}=  (A.15)
nh'
5 The bias is : bias f  (x )  = Ef(x ) -  / (x )
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\ E [ K ( x  -  y)/h] f (y )dy  -  ±  \[K{x -  y)lh \f(y)dy (A. 16)
The change of variable y = x-ht gives the following expression
Var f { x )  = - ^ { ^ f { x - t h ) K i t ) 2dt -  (1 / n)[f{x)  + bias f i x )]2}. (A.17)
Approximating by a first order Taylor expansion results in
(A. 18)
Substituting the expression of the bias and the variance into MISE gives
MISEJ ix )  s  ( l / 4)/24( j / " ( * ) 2A )( jr2A:(0<*)2 + ± - ( \ K { t ) d t ) . (A. 19)
This measure depends on K  and h. The first part of (A. 19) is the systematic error 
(bias) which decreases as h goes to zero. The second is the random error (variance) which 
increases as h goes to zero. Consequently, the choice of the smoothing parameter implies a 
trade-off between random and systematic error.
1.2.1. Optimal kernel function
The choice of K  is not crucial for the MISE. Using calculus of variations Epanechnikov 
(1969) proved that the optimal kernel is:
* (0  = UV5 5
0 otherwise
This formula is known as the Epanechnikov kernel.
(A.20)
1.2.2. Optimal bandwidth
The bandwidth that minimises the approximated expression of MISE is
K ' S i ^ m d t ) (A.21)
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It depends on the density to be estimated. Several procedures have been proposed to 
calculate the optimal h.
(i) -Reference to a standard distribution. In order to compute the hop from (A.21) we 
need a value for f \  Assuming that f(x) belongs to a particular family of densities (e.g. 
Gaussian) the parameters of the assumed density (e.g. mean and variance in the case of a 
Gaussian family) can be estimated using robust procedures from the data. Then f  ’ can be 
computed numerically. By plugging its value into (A.21) we obtain the optimal h.
(ii) Subjective choice. This approach consists in choosing the parameter h which 
gives the density estimate / (x) most in accordance with one’s prior ideas about the density.
(in) -A very popular alternative is to treat h as a parameter which is estimated by 
optimising a criterion function.
a..-Least-square cross validation. The criterion function (to be minimised) is an 
estimator of the MISE. This is a data driven method which leads to the choice of a bandwidth 
that asymptotically minimises
MISE = } ( /(* ) - /(* ) )  *d{x) = f / ( x ) 2d x -  j / ( x ) f ( x ) d x+  j f ( x ) 2dx. (A.22)
Note that the last term of the above expression does not depend on /  (x). Thus the 
optimal h in the sense of minimising (A.23) is the result of minimising the first two terms
R( f )  = j f ( x ) 2d x -  f / ( x ) f ( x )dx . (A.23)
This gives an automatic method for choosing the smoothing parameter. The idea is to 
construct with the given data an estimator of R( f ) :
R i f )  = \ f ( x ? d x  -  2 n '  J / £ / _ ,  ( * ,) ,  (A.24)
/
where (x) is the density estimate constructed from all the data points except^
L  (*) = (« -1 )- ' h - ' ^ m x - X j ) /  h] (A.25)
i*J
Stone (1984) found that the h chosen by minimising this function is the best in the sense of 
minimising the MISE?. Let Iiscv(Xi,...Xr)  be the MISE of the density estimator constructed
6 Unless otherwise is stated, least-square cross-validation is going to be used in this paper and in the rest o f the 
thesis.
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using the h parameter that minimises the function R ( f ) . Let Iopt be the MISE if the h is 
chosen optimally. Under very mild conditions and with probability one
Ihc.{X\>-x *) j as _ (A 26)
Thus, least-squares cross-validation achieves the asymptotically best possible choice of the 
smoothing parameter.
b.-Likelihood cross-validation, h is chosen such that it maximises the following 
function
LCV = - f llogf_iXl) (A.27)
n m
A A
where log f _ £ X i)is the cross-validated log likelihood function, /_j(X,.) as in ( A.25).
(iv) -Other procedures are described in Silverman (1986), sections (3.4.5) and (3.4.6.).
II. MULTIVARIATE DATA
Multivariate methods generalise the univariate methods in an immediate way. Instead 
of dealing with areas one deals with volumes in the ^/-dimensional space Rd. Here we define 
only the kernel estimator.
Consider the random sample (XlfX2j...fXJ ,  where X  is now a d-valued vector with 
unknown density function f(x) to be estimated from the data. The kernel estimator is defined 
as
f ( x )  = { \ lnhd)YJK ( j { x - X i)), ! € « ' ,  (A.28)
with K(x) >0, and ^K{x)dx = 1.
Rd
As for the univariate case approximated expressions of the bias and variance can be 
derived and then be used for the choice of the kernel function and bandwidth. In order to 
choose the parameter h least-square cross-validation is possible and again the Epanechnikov 
kernel7 is optimal.
7 -i 2The multivariate Epanechnikov kernel is K(x) = {1 / 2cd (d + 2X1 -x 'x )  if x 'x< \,  0 otherwise, where cd is the 
volume of the unit d-dimensional sphere.
62
REFERENCES
Barro, Robert J., (1991), "Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries", Quarterly Journal 
o f Economics, Vol. 106(2), May, pp.407-443.
Barro, R. and Sala i Martin, X., (1991), "Convergence Across States and Regions", Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, Vol.l, April, pp. 107-182.
Barro, R. and Sala i Martin, X., (1992), "Convergence", Journal o f Political Economy, Vol. 100(2), 
April, pp.223-251.
Ben-David, D., (1994), "Convergence Clubs and Diverging Economies", Working Paper 
922, CEPR, London W1X1LB, February.
Baumol, W.J., (1986), "Productivity Growth, Convergence and Welfare", American Economic 
Review, Vol.76(5), December, pp.l 138-55.
Bernard, A.B. and Durlauf, (1991), "Convergence of National Output Movements", NBER 
Working Paper, Cambridge M.A., May.
Bianchi, M., (1995),“ Testing for Convergence: A Bootstrap Test for Multimodality” , Working 
paper. Bank of England, May.
Blomstrom, M., Lypsey, R.E. and Zejan, M., (1993), "Is Fixed Investment the Key to Economic 
Growth", NBER WP 4436.
Canova, F and Marcet A.,(1996) "The Poor Stay Poor: Non-Convergence Across Countries and 
Regions ” UPF Discussion Papers
Cohen, D., (1992), "Test of the Convergence Hypothesis. A Critical Note", CEPR Discussion 
Paper No. 691, August.
Cohen, D., (1992), "Economic Growth and the Solow Model. Some Further Empirical Results", 
CEPREMAP, August
De Long, J.B. and Summers, L., (1992), "Macroeconomic Policy and Long-Run Growth", Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 77.
Desdoigts, A.. Changes in the World Income Distribution: A Non-parametric approach to 
Challenge the Neo-classical Convergence Argument. PhD thesis, European University Institute, 
Florence. June 1994.
Dolado, JuanJ, Gonzalez-Paramo, J.M. and Roldan, J.M, (1994) "Regional convergence in 
Spain", Moneday Credito.
Durlauf, S. and Johnson, P., (1992), "Local versus Global Convergence across National 
Economies", NBER WP 3996.
63
Friedman, M., (1992), "Do Old Fallacies Ever Die?" Journal o f Political Literature, Vol.30(4), 
December, pp.2129-2132.
Genewe, J, Marshall, R.C. and Zarking, G.A., (1986), "Mobility Indices in Continuous Time 
Markov Chains", Econometrica, Vol.54(6), November, pp.1407-1423.
Holtz-Eakin, D., (1992), "Solow and the States: Capital Accumulation, Productivity and 
Economic Growth", NBER Working Paper 4144, Cambridge, M.A.
Kelly, M., (1992), "On Endogenous Growth with Productivity Shocks", Journal o f Monetary 
Economics, Vol.30, pp.47-56.
Knight, M., Loyza, N. and Villanueva, D., (1992), "Testing the Neoclassical Theory of Economic 
Growth: A Panel Data Approach", International Monetary Fund WP No. 106.
Levine, R. and Renelt, D., (1992), "A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth 
Regressions", American Economic Review, Vol.82.
Lucas, R.,(1988), "On the Mechanics of Economic Development", Journal O f Monetary 
Economics, Vol.22, July.
Lucas, R.,(1993), "Making a Miracle", Econometrica, Vol.61, pp.251-272.
Mankiw, N., Romer, D., and Weil, D., (1992), "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic 
Growth", Quarterly Journal o f Economics, Vol. 107, pp.503-530.
Paap, R. and van Dijk, H. K. (1994), " Distribution and Mobility of wealth of nations". Working 
paper, Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus University, October.
Parente, S. and Prescott, E., (1993), "Changes in the Wealth of Nations", Quarterly Review,
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Vol. 17, pp.3-13.
Pesaran, H. and Smith, R., (1995), "Estimating Long-Run Relationships From Dynamic 
Heterogeneous Panels", Forthcoming in Journal o f Econometrics.
PrakasaRao, B. L. S., (1983) Nonparametric Functional Estimation, Orlando:Academic Press.
Quah, D., (1992), "National Patterns of Growth: II. Persistence, Path Dependence and Sustained 
Take-off in Growth transitions" Economics Department Working Paper, LSE, October. (First 
draft July 1990.)
Quah, D., (1993a), "Empirical Cross-Section Dynamics in Economic Growth", European 
Economic Review, Vol.37(2/3), April, pp.426-434.
Quah, D., (1993b), "Galton's Fallacy and Test of Convergence Hypothesis", The Scandinavian 
Journal o f Economics, Vol.95(4), December, pp.427-443.
64
Quah, D., (1994), "Empirics for Economic Growth and Convergence" Economics Department 
Working Paper, LSE, September.
Quah, D., (1995a), "Coarse Distribution Dynamics, Divergence and Polarization", Economics 
Department Working Paper, LSE, London, July..
Quah, D., (1995b), "Ideas Determining Convergence ", Economics Department Working Paper, 
LSE, London, August.
Quah, D., (1996a), " Twin Peaks: growth and Convergence in Models of Distribution Dynamics ", 
Economic Journal. Forthcoming.
Quah, D., (1996b), "Convergence Empirics across Economies with (Some) Capital Mobility", 
Journal o f Economic Growth. Forthcoming.
Romer, P., (1986), "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth", Journal o f Political Economy, 
Vol.94.
Romer, P., (1989), "Capital Accumulation in the Theory of Long-Run Growth".
Rosenblatt, M., (1956) "Remarks on Some Nonparametric Estimates of a Density Function" 
Annals o f Mathematical Statistics, 27,832-837.
Silverman, B., (1986) Density Estimation for Statistical data Analysis, London:Chapman and Hall
Shorrocks, A.F., (1978), "The Measurement of Mobility", Econometrica, Vol.46(5), September, 
pp.1013-1024.
Solow, R., (1956), "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth", Quarterly Journal o f  
Economics.
Stokey, N., Lucas, R. and Prescott, E., (1989), Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics,
Harvard University Press.
Tapia, R. A., and Thompson, J.R., (1978) Nonparametric Probability Density Estimation, 
Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
65
CHAPTER 2:
DYNAMICS OF THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES
This chapter is joint work with Javier Andres.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Convergence across economies (states, countries, regions, etc) is an important economic 
issue. In recent years, it has been intensively studied from both a theoretical and an empirical 
perspective. If convergence is understood in terms of poor economies becoming as wealthy as the 
initially richer ones or equally as a process of economic homogenisation (non-persistent 
inequality) then a natural approach to the convergence proposition is to study the dynamics of the 
cross-economy income distribution along time. Nevertheless, most of the standard literature on 
convergence departs from this "natural approach" at least in two ways. Firstly, it collapses the 
time dimension by averaging and applies cross-section analysis. It summarizes the main features 
of the evolving distribution in a few sample statistics which might not always be very informative 
in terms of convergence. Secondly, it uses the framework of the "representative economy" model, 
(in particular, the classical or the augmented Solow growth model) to extract conclusions about the 
cross-section. It conceives the distribution of incomes as normally distributed around the mean 
representative economy. Under these assumptions, standard parametric methods yield consistent 
estimates of some basic moments of this distribution and make it possible to draw conclusions 
about its time evolution.
In a recent set of papers Danny Quah criticizes that approach, showing that regardless of 
how fancy it is, the standard cross-section regression over time averages delivers little information 
for the purposes at hand. While standard regressions come up with a positive and significant 2% 
of convergence across countries and regions, Quah finds that the evolution of the cross-section 
income distribution in the Summers and Heston data set shows a two camp world with very little 
upward mobility in the income ranking. The sequence of distributions displays an increasing 
concentration of economies at the two ends, as well as a few sharp upwards and downwards 
changes in the ranking1.
In this paper we analyse the dynamics of the income per capita distribution across the 
OECD countries during the 1960-90 sample period. We use Quah's approach, which studies the 
dynamics as well as the interrelation among economies by using all the cross-section and time
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series information on the data. It allows us to see (independently of any theoretical model) 
whether convergence is taking place during the sample period and to examine convergence as a 
long-run property. Additionally, conditioning in this fiamework helps also to discriminate among 
theoretical models.
Firstly, we try to asses whether the behaviour of the distributions tells us the same story 
about convergence on income per capita as the standard literature does. The main results of this 
first exercise go against the widespread view that OECD economies are approaching each other at 
a positive rate, and also indicate that wealth differences across countries are more persistent than 
what the constant returns growth model would suggest. There is a significant number of countries 
with per capita income around 50% of the OECD average. Furthermore, the transition probability 
from the low income to the high income group is very low for each country.
Secondly, we analyse the cross-section dynamics of the residuals series from a first stage 
regression of per capita income on different information sets as the neoclassical model suggests. It 
is a simple conditioning exercise which tries to replicate what the standard literature does (from a 
new econometric point of view) and allows us to say something about to what extent the 
differences in accumulation rates account for permanent differences in per capita income across 
countries. The results remain essentially unchanged after removing the effect of differences in 
accumulation rates.
Finally we illustrate the Solow Model prediction for the OECD data, studying the cross- 
section dynamics after conditioning each economy on its individual steady-state. The residuals 
from the first stage regression display a very high intradistribution mobility along with a strong 
tendency towards the estimated steady state value and a very low inertia. We conclude that the 
convergence prediction of the Solow model might hold as a single country property. This does not 
indicate any tendency whatsoever for countries to approach each other over the long-run. The 
results must be interpreted cautiously given the substantial amount of conditioning that is needed 
to achieve them. Most of the cross-country long-run differences in wealth are accounted for by 
country specific factors, other than differences in accumulation rates. This suggests that the 
conventional cross-country regression models might suffer form severe misspecification problems.
In other words, the estimated convergence rate in the literature is merely a poor estimate of the 
average first order autoregression coefficient in the OECD per capita income series.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains why the standard cross- 
section regression analysis approach is misleading and identifies the relevant issues to look at in 
the analysis of convergence. Section 3 applies Quah's approach to study the dynamics of the 
cross-section distribution of per capita income across the OECD countries. Section 4 analyses the 
distribution of income after conditioning in the way that it has been done by the standard 
regression literature and illustrates Solow Model predictions. Section 5 concludes with some final 
remarks.
2. CONVERGENCE AND CROSS-SECTION REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Intensive growth takes place whenever the marginal return of further investment is higher 
than that of consumption. According to the constant returns model, this can only happen while the 
capital-labour ratio is below some critical ("steady state") level. In this setting growth ceases when 
the economy approaches the steady state. The empirical counterpart of this property is the well 
known convergence proposition that simply asserts that an economy will monotonically return to 
its steady state income level if for some reason (initial conditions, shocks, etc) it happens to be 
away from it
Two measures of convergence have been proposed in this field (see for example Baumol, 
1986; Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991, 1992; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; and 
Holtz-Eakin, 1992). There is cr-convergence if the dispersion of the real per capita income across 
economies tends to fall over time. The ct measure is model free. On the other hand, a negative 
correlation between the growth rate of income per capita and its initial level is called absolute [3- 
convergence. This is a property of the Solow growth model which incorporates a neoclassical 
production function with diminishing returns to capital.
The main prediction of the Solow model is that for each economy the income per-capita 
converges to a steady state defined by
y ) ~ o  + gt + 7—— logf s) + ——— logf« + g +5 ^ +e (2.1)
i + a  1+ a
Where:
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\og( A(0)) = a + 8
where Y is output, L is labour, y=(Y/L), A is the level of technology and s, n, g and 8 are the rates 
of saving, population growth and technological progress and depreciation4.
Equation (2.1) shows that the steady state level of income per-capita in each country 
depends on its population growth and its accumulation of capital (physical in the original model 
and physical and human in the augmented version). Therefore different countries can reach 
different steady states. Let y* be the steady state in each economy and y  its current value, by 
approximating (2.1) around y*, it can be shown that:
y  = m o g ( y ) - \ o g ( y ( t ) ) J
(2.2)
Solving this differential equation and rearranging we find that the average p growth rate of y  over 
the interval between 0 and T is given by (2.3),
1 v(T) 1 - e * v*(^=nog( f^- ) = g+L±-\og(-y—)
T y(0)  T y (0)
(2.3)
The parameter p is the conditional rate of convergence, it is the rate at which the economy closes 
the gap between its current per capita income and its own y \ and then it is expected to differ 
across economies. The greater p the higher the responsiveness of the average growth to the gap 
between the steady state and the initial income.
The empirical analysis has concentrated mainly in estimating the parameter p in a discrete 
time version of equation (2.3) in which the average growth rate of income over time for each 
economy is regressed on the initial levels of income and a bunch of steady state variables. The 
results for these regressions is a negative and significant estimate of the initial level of income
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coefficient, that is a positive and significant estimate of the parameter p, mainly after controlling 
for the determinants of the steady state (conditional convergence). What is noteworthy is that this 
empirical finding is about the same for very different samples, whether across states in the US, 
regions in Europe or across countries in the world and over different periods of time5. This, 
together with a weaker evidence of a-convergence for some regions in the world, has been 
interpreted as strong and robust evidence of convergence across world economies caused by 
diminishing marginal returns to capital.
The extension of the stability property of the classical growth model for the "representative 
economy" to convergence in a multi-country setting is not straightforward. The adjustment process 
of the Solow model tells us whether or not each country when perturbed from its long-run pace 
gets back to it approaching monotonically, which is basically a single country implication. This 
property has nothing to do with countries truly approaching each other. In fact, growth theory 
teaches us that we should not expect that to happen unless the behaviour in some crucial aspects of 
economic and social life is alike across countries. Additionally, the traditional way of measuring 
the long-run, by taking time averages, is bound to leave us with very few degrees of freedom using 
single country series. To avoid this difficulty, the use (and indeed the production) of multi-country 
data sets has become very popular in recent times6.
The convergence rate that comes up from these cross-country regressions must be 
understood as the speed at which a country returns to its long-run trend from the level of per capita 
income it has at a given date. Of course, this speed is country and time specific, but as long as it is 
drawn form a multi-country data set the particular value that is obtained is merely an average. 
However, this interpretation has recently been questioned. As Pesaran and Smith (1993) have 
pointed out, cross-section averages or even panel data methods do not yield consistent estimates of 
average parameters in random fields data sets in which time and cross-section dimensions are 
reasonably large and similarly sized.
Other criticisms refer to how the steady state in each economy, y*, is estimated from the 
observed values of the explanatory variables. Some authors have shown that the causality among 
growth and accumulation rates is weaker than what the classical growth model would suggest 
Cohen (1992) finds that the correlation among growth and human capital accumulation vanishes 
once time invariant country specific effects are included in the standard regression. Similarly
71
Blomstrom, Lypsey and Zejan (1993) show that causality runs from growth to investment rather 
than the other way around. Finally, many studies have found a significant correlation among 
growth and short term macroeconomic indicators (inflation, exports, and so on) which nonetheless 
are not always robust to changes in the model specification (Levine and Renelt, 1992).
In order to justify the usual interpretation of convergence regressions and for the notion of 
average growth rate (the independent variable in the regression) to make sense, it is implicitly 
assumed that the permanent component of the income for each economy is well described by a 
linear or log-linear deterministic time trend. In fact, the average growth rate is simply the slope of 
the deterministic trend whose cross-section variation is explained in the standard regression. 
However, under stochastic growth, imposing a deterministic trend structure can be very 
misleading. This remains true even for the case in which pooled data on shorter averages is used. 
The procedure still assumes the non stationary component of per capita income to be trend 
deterministic, although allowing for a changing slope.
Over and above all the limitations just mentioned, Quah (1993b) has shown that 
convergence tests based on regressing average growth rates on initial levels are uninformative, 
since a negative cross-section regression coefficient on the initial level is in fact consistent with 
absence of convergence. The argument follows the so-called Galton's classical fallacy, which tells 
us that "tall fathers" are not expected to have "taller than average sons". Similarly, currently richer 
economies might become poorer than average in the future without a significant narrowing in the 
cross-section dispersion of incomes. This applies to absolute and conditional convergence.
The evolution over time of the cross-country distribution of per capita income involves 
two kind of dynamics: changes in the shape (bimodal distribution, mass-point etc) and intra­
distribution mobility. The main limitation of the conventional approach is that it relies on two 
single statistics that might not be a good description of the behaviour of the entire cross-section 
distribution and consequently may not be very informative in terms of convergence. A positive 
parameter p is compatible with cross-economies behaviours (overtaking, cycles etc) that are far 
from the idea of convergence. Sometimes a  convergence does not give any information about the 
cross-section dynamics, for example observations from a multi-modal distribution may have the 
same sample variance as observations from a uni-modal one. The interpretation of those
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distributions in terms of convergence is obviously quite different. Also, it happens that cr 
convergence cannot account for some intra-distribution mobility.
Consequently, it is necessary to develop an alternative econometric strategy to study what 
in probability theory are known as random fields. Danny Quah (1993a,b; 1994) suggests such a 
new and comprehensive approach that encodes the two kinds of convergence, p and a  measures. 
This approach takes into consideration the whole distribution (rather than a few statistics) and does 
not impose any structure about trends, nature of convergence and so on. The idea is to consider 
the cross-section distribution of the variable of interest, at each point in time as the realization of a 
random element in a space of distributions, and to analyse its dynamics. The variable of interest 
can be either income per capita or its residual after removing the effect of some variables trying to 
approximate the steady-state of each economy.
3. DYNAMICS OF THE EVOLVING CROSS-SECTION DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
ACROSS THE OECD COUNTRIES. ABSOLUTE CONVERGENCE.7
Contrary to what the constant returns to scale models would suggest, the cross-country 
distribution of per capita incomes in the world tends to concentrate around two extreme levels8. 
There are then two group of countries, one with a high level of per capita income and the other 
with a much lower level; with little mobility between these groups. This picture remains 
essentially unchanged after conditioning for some investment and human capital indicators, which 
possess a challenge to the widespread consensus about a 2% rate of B convergence. Nevertheless, 
most economists would argue that very few countries in the world meet the explicit or implicit 
assumptions of the canonical growth model. If this is the case, lack of convergence should not be 
a surprise to anyone.
The OECD is a different matter for several reasons. First, the OECD and Asia are the only 
regions with substantial and steady growth from 1960 to 1990 (see Figure 1). Second, in this 
region the share of GDP devoted to increase the capital stock is higher and far more stable than in 
other regions in the world. Similarly, these countries are predominantly market economies and 
share many social, political and cultural features. Third, since 1960 there has been a sizeable 
reduction in the dispersion of income per capita levels within the OECD (Figure 2), while this has
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not happened in Africa, Latin America or Asia (except Japan). Figure 2 depicts the evolution of 
the sigma measure of convergence from 1960 to 1990 for these four economic regions. The 
dispersion of per capita income within the OECD has fallen by 33% since 1960, whereas it has 
gone up in Africa and, specially in Asia, in a significant proportion. In fact most of the reduction 
in the OECD took place from 1960 to 1975, and has remained roughly stable since then. Finally, 
growth rates in the OECD also present two specific features: a negative correlation among growth 
rates and initial conditions (whereby yesterday's poorer countries are expected to grow faster than 
the average) and a significant persistence9 (so that today's fast growers are expected to enjoy a 
higher than average growth for some time). This has been usually presented as convincing 
evidence of the ability of the exogenous growth model to account for the long-run path of these 
economies. Actually, conventional regression analysis on the OECD sample yields a positive and 
significant estimate of the absolute convergence rate, although weaker than the conditional rate. If 
taken literally this would imply that OECD economies are effectively approaching each other, at 
least over the long-run. Since, the evidence of convergence within the OECD seems to be 
overwhelming according to the conventional regression analysis, the OECD countries become an 
adequate framework to confront the two econometric approaches. We start by analysing the 
distributional dynamics of the observed per capita income, without conditioning. The results in 
this section are directly comparable to the standard absolute convergence analysis.
Once the variable of interest is well defined, we proceed to estimate its cross-section 
distribution at each point in time as well as the intradistributional mobility from one period to 
another.
At this point we must define what we understand by convergence in this setting. A 
degenerate ergodic distribution would imply that all observations tend to concentrate around their 
sample mean, regardless of the initial conditions. Hence, all economies would be moving towards 
their steady state. The long-run inference requires some assumptions about stationarity time 
invariant transition probability) that might not be reasonable for long periods in which for 
example, some economic structural changes may happen. Alternatively we could have a non 
degenerate long-run distribution and still claim that convergence has taken or is taking place. This 
would be the case when the intradistributional mobility indicates that income disparities among
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countries are not persistent Recall then that the property of high mobility or low inertia is the 
crucial one to look at when testing for convergence.
3.1. the variable of analysis - sample and characteristics
The data are taken from OECD statistics, in particular the GDP (and its components) is 
drawn from National Accounts, 1960-1991 which uses the System of National Accounts (SNA) 
definitions. The sample covers 24 countries over a period of 31 years (1960-1990). Every nominal 
variable has been transformed in real terms by using its price index from National Accounts, then 
expressed in national dollars of 1985 by using estimated PPPs from 1990 for each aggregate. 
PPPs series are calculated involving only OECD countries10. The basic variable of analysis is the 
per-capita GDP in each individual country relative to the same variable for the entire OECD as a 
whole11. Figure 3 is a three dimensional plot of the variable, for the 24 economies over the 31 
years of the sample. It is clear that both dimensions of variation in the data appear to be very 
important and the regression analysis is missing a significant amount of the dynamics. It is 
precisely this two dimensional dynamics that we are interested in, for which conventional 
convergence analysis is not well suited. For example, the cross-section analysis simply takes the 
slope of the linear time trend for each country over the time sample and studies the dynamics of 
that slope across economies. In this way most of the time dimension is lost Alternatively 
estimating (2.3) for each individual country the cross-section dynamics is lost.
3.2. estimate the cross-section distribution of that variable at each point in time
The first step is to estimate the cross-section distribution of incomes at each point in time. 
The purpose of this exercise is to uncover any particular pattern in the time evolution of this 
distribution. In the context of random fields, the realization of the random element turns out to be a 
cross-section distribution function that has to be estimated from data. This requires the use of non- 
parametric and semi-parametric methods. Notice that it is the shape of the distribution that we are 
interested in, we must avoid imposing any prior assumption about it, or about the moments of the 
density function from which the data are drawn.
Figures 4a to 4d present some non-parametric estimated cross-section density functions of 
relative per capita income for each period of 3 or 4 years. The range of relative differences among
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countries' incomes diminishes mainly during the first decade of the '60s as the richest countries 
approach the average. The poorest countries also move towards the average but far more slowly. 
During the '70s and '80s a second mode in the density function shows up very clearly. A group of 
countries tends to concentrate around a 50% level of OECD average income. Rich economies still 
move slowly towards the mean. For the sample period as a whole there is a concentration (of 
probability mass) around two values. The cross-section distribution of income seems to be 
fluctuating over time. At first glance, these estimates suggest that the first and second moment do 
not entirely describe the behaviour of the distribution. In consequence by focusing only on the 
falling path of the sample variance (see Figure 5) we could conclude that there is ct convergence. 
However, ct is a statistic that gives us limited information about the dynamics of the countries 
relative cross-section position. The narrowing range gives an idea of diminishing dispersion, but 
the presence of two modes suggests that there are significant and persistent differences among 
countries that do not vanish, at least over the sample period.
33. dynamics of the (evolving) cross-section
This analysis is very intuitive but the distributions are just point estimates for the sample 
period and cannot be assumed to reflect out of sample patterns. Furthermore, the behaviour of the 
cross-section distribution refers not only to changes on the shape but also to the intra-distribution 
mobility. The dynamics of each country's relative position is a crucial component of the notion of 
convergence that the growth literature is concerned with. To make progress in the analysis 
requires a formal statistical structure. To develop a law of motion for the cross-section distribution 
of income, as realizations of random element in the space of distributions, we need a model for the 
stochastic process taking values which are probability measures associated with the cross-section 
distribution.
Let {AJ be the sequence of probability measures associated with the cross-section 
distribution. The simplest probability model is as follows:
\  = T \K i,u d  (2-4)
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where T maps probability measures plus a disturbance term into probability measures. Hence, T* 
encodes information on how economies transit from t to t+1, in particular about whether they get 
closer or grow apart. Unfortunately, this stochastic difference equation in (2.4) is unmanageable. 
By ignoring the disturbance and iterating it can be written as (2.5),
(2.5)
such that as s goes towards infinity it is possible to characterize the long-run distribution of cross-
12country income. In other words, it allows us to make out of sample inference and, eventually, to 
characterize the steady state.
In order to make (2.5) tractable one can use the concept of Stochastic Kernel (Stokey, 
Lucas and Prescott, 1989). Consider the measurable space (R, R), where R is the real line in which 
the realizations of income fall and R is its Borel sigma algebra. B(R, R) is the Banach space of 
finitely additive functions. Let At+1 and \  be elements of B that are probability measures in (R, R). 
A  Stochastic Kernel is a mapping M (x^ A.) MiRxR -> [0,1] satisfying:
(i) V a eR  M(a,.) is a probability measure.
(ii) V A in R M(.,A) is a sigma measurable function.
Then M(arA) is the probability that the next state period lies in the set A, given that in this 
period the state is a. For any probability measure X on (R, R), V A in R:
^7+/ = ^M(x, A) dkt(x) (2-6)
Where M(.,.) is a Stochastic Kernel, At+1(A)=(T*^1)A, and T* is an operator associated with the 
Stochastic Kernel that maps the space of probabilities into itself (the adjoin of the Markov operator 
associated to M). Equation (2.6) measures the probability that the next period state lies in the set 
A, if the current state is drawn according to the probability measure (T*^ is the probability 
measure over the next period state, if \  is the probability measure over the current period. We 
shall consider T* in (2.4) and (2.5) as being generated in the differential equation (2.6).
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Since the Stochastic Kernel is a complete description of transitions from a state into any 
other, it gives us information about the intra-distribution mobility. It describes the dynamics 
through the sample period.
However, before we can say anything about the steady state we must work out T* from
(2.6) and do the calculations in (2.5). Given that the Stochastic Kernel is infinite dimensional, 
some simplification is required to do empirical work. At the present, T* can be approximated by 
assuming a countable state space for income levels S  ={S!,S2, .. ,sr}. In this case T* is simply a 
transition probability matrix Q such that the difference equation (2.7) is tractable.
h  = Q(Ku»d (2.7)
The matrix Q encodes the relevant information on turnover in the distribution so that the long-run 
calculation in (2.5) can be performed. Under some regularity conditions, the sequence of powers 
of this matrix converges to a matrix whose rows (all of them identical) are the ergodic distribution, 
which allows us to talk about steady state.
Alternatively, by fixing the probability vectors to be uniform and identical for every time 
point, \=X, we define a time-variant grid (quantiles), and associated to that, a sequence of fractiles 
transition probability matrices, Qt.
33.a. estimation of the Stochastic Kernel
13Figures 6a to 6e and 7a to 7d show some non parametric estimated stochastic kernels for 
relative income of k-year transitions (k=l, 5). Figures 6 display three dimensional plots of the 
transitions probability function, while Figures 7 display the contours of the function in Figures 6. 
A slice parallel to the t+k axis gives a probability density that describes transitions from a part of 
the income distribution to another in k periods. The concentration of the probability mass along 
the positive sloped diagonal indicates high persistence in the economies relative position, and 
implies low mobility. Concentration along the negative sloped diagonal, on the other hand, would 
indicate that economies are overtaking each other in the income ranking. The transition 
probability describing horizontal lines (parallel to t+k) shows that there is very low persistence, 
the probability of being at any point in t+k is independent of the position in t. Finally, if the mass
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of probability is parallel to the vertical axis we get convergence in the p terms, ie richer countries 
growing slower than the poorer ones.
According to this, Figure 6a shows how OECD economies tend to remain where they are 
relative to each other with a low probability of changing state in one year. Relative incomes in the 
OECD are highly persistent from one year to another. This can be better seen in the contours in 
Figure 7a, which surround the positively sloped diagonal. For longer horizons (Figures 6b to 6d 
and 7b to 7d), the highest probability of transitions is still along the main diagonal, but is not as 
concentrate as before, which suggests a somewhat higher intra-density mobility. The contour for 
the 1960-65 period (Figure 7b), ranging from 0.4 to 1.6, appears to be slightly steeper than the 45 
diagonal, indicating that the poorer countries transit to a better state, whilst the opposite is true for 
the rich ones. For 1971-75 and 1981-85 (range 0.3 to 1.2) the probability of transition is mainly 
over the diagonal (Figures 7c & 7d). It seems that most of the convergence among the OECD 
countries took place in the first part of the sample period, in particular during the '60s, and was 
mainly due to the catching-up process of low income countries, which display substantial upward 
mobility.
33.b. estimation of the Transition Probability Matrix Q
These transition kernels are still point estimates. They deliver additional information 
about transition probabilities, but still inference cannot be drawn. To make the model operational 
we need to estimate a simple version of the Q transition matrix. Taking per-capita income for each 
economy, relative to the sample average, we discretize the space of possible values, S, in r states. 
For example the state i=(0.7,l.l) includes the economies which have an income between 0.7 times 
and 1.1 times the average for the total sample. The discretization defines a grid, that can be 
thought of as an estimator of the initial unconditional probability distribution Each element of 
the Q matrix indicates the probability of transition from one state to another in k periods: the 
entry is the probability that a country in state i transits to the state j. (Each row is a conditional 
probability vector.) The matrix row is analogous to the density probability defined for each point 
in S (S is continuous) when cutting the figure at that point by a plane parallel to the t+k axis.
Table 1 presents some estimates of the transitions matrix Q. The grid divides the total 
observed sample into categories for providing a uniform distribution for the first year of the
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sample. Consequently the length of the defined states are different. These categories are very 
narrow around the value 1, which corresponds to countries having an income around the mean, 
and much wider for low income countries. The first column is the total number of transitions over 
the whole time sample, starting at each state. The rest displays an estimator of the time invariant 
transition probability matrix rxr for a single period, calculated as an average over the total sample. 
The values off the main diagonal are very low, which indicates that the probability of a country 
moving from one state to another in one year is veiy low. For instance, the probability that a 
country with income between 0.6 and 0.9 times the average, transits in one period to an income 
between 0.9 and 1.04 is 0.09. This persistence is even higher for the low income group, 
preserving the conclusions from the estimation of the stochastic kernels. Finally, Table 1 also 
offers an estimator of the ergodic distribution, which is the closest concept to the steady state in 
this setting. The ergodic distribution tells us the unconditional probability for an economy to end 
up in a particular income range. Recall that the states are defined in a way such that the initial 
distribution is uniform. We end up with a distribution that is not degenerated at its mean value, 
but it gives an approximately equal probability of reaching different states (although this 
probability is slightly higher for the average state). These calculations require time invariant 
transition probability, which is not always reasonable for long periods in which, for example, some 
economic structural changes may happen.
Let us define the grid in such a way that the set of quantiles determines the sequence of 
cross-section distribution, hence, the change in the grid describes the evolution of the cross-section 
distribution for one period to the next one this would allow us to study whether convergence is 
taking place and to characterise the long-run as the sequence of quantiles degenerating to the mean 
(approaching). Associated to these grids there is a sequence of fractile transition probability 
matrices that show the intra-distribution mobility. Table 2 and Figure 8 show the sequence of 
quantiles. The 25% of countries with the lowest incomes in 1960 fell in a range of 0.26 to 0.54 of 
the OECD average. The upper limit of this interval rose steadily until the mid-'80s (reaching a 
90% of the average by 1983 and has been falling steadily since. The lower iimit has not changed 
substantially. Today we still find a quarter of OECD countries with incomes between 0.3 and 0.8 
of the OECD average14. On the other hand, the second and third quantil tend to concentrate around
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the mean while the richest quantil start with an upper limit of 1.56 and evolves until 1.25 times the 
average.
The associated sequence15 of matrices has high values over the diagonal, which indicates 
persistence, hence there is a low probability of the countries move from one income quantil to 
another. This is especially so for the lowest income countries during the second part of the sample 
period. Unlike in Table 1, the transition matrix Q is time variant so that we can evaluate the 
mobility across quantiles as well as its behaviour over time. In Figure 9 we present a set of 
mobility indices suggested by different authors (Shorrocks, 1978; Genewe et al, 1986; and Quah, 
1994) which summarize in one way or another the information contained in the transition 
matrices. The overall picture is one of very limited mobility. We shall return to this later to 
compare the mobility indices as well as the distributional dynamics and the ergodic distribution 
after conditioning for different information sets.
Figure 1016 gives the same kind of information. It ranks the countries according to the 
relative income per capita in the first year of the sample and shows the evolution of the ranking 
over time. Each line represents, for a single year, the relative income of the OECD countries 
ordered according to the initial ranking. The larger is the income inequality the steeper these cross 
profile lines are. Notice that for 1960 the line is obviously monotonically increasing and from the 
end of the 70s becomes flatter for the middle quantiles. The inequality is persistent and even 
increasing with respect to the poorest 20%.
At this stage we can draw some conclusions about the growth process in the OECD. The 
results so far show a bimodal distribution of income per capita across OECD countries. The 
lowest income quantil is still quite far away from the OECD average, and has not been 
monotonically approaching it over the sample period. Furthermore, the intra-distributional 
mobility is low. Some countries seem to be stuck in lower than average income paths. All this 
militates against the notion of convergence, in the sense of countries approaching each other over 
the long-run. This exercise is comparable to the notion of absolute convergence in conventional 
regression analysis, and it can be argued that even within the OECD absolute (3 is low and weakly 
significant in a fully specified constant returns to scale model (Andres et al, 1994).
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Absolute convergence is interesting on its own, but in order to establish a comparable 
analysis with that of the conventional regression we must proceed to remove the variance in 
accumulation rates and to analyse convergence in conditional per capita income defined as the 
residuals series from a first stage conditioning regression. This is what we discuss in the next 
section.
4. CONDITIONING ON THE SOLOW MODEL STEADY STATE.
The debate in growth theory is mainly about which model best represents the long-run 
evolution of market economies, and what policy implications we may draw from it.
The whole purpose of the statistical model in the previous section was not to explain why 
economies converge or not, but to test whether they converge or they fail to do so. The results 
there indicate that differences in income per capita among OECD economies are rather persistent, 
and this is the most relevant conclusion on practical grounds. However, if this conclusion is to be 
taken as evidence against the convergence proposition of the exogenous growth model, as it is 
usually presented in the empirical growth literature, we must control for the variation of 
accumulation rates (ie the steady state) across OECD economies. Conditioning in this context 
means simply analysing the distributional dynamics of the residuals from a first stage regression, 
and there are different ways to do so (Quah (1994)). The analysis of the cross-section distribution 
of first stage residuals seems to be of little practical interest since it removes the structural 
differences among economies but to some extent it helps for the purpose of discriminating among 
rival models of growth.
Convergence in this setting would simply mean that each individual economy tends to 
revert to its steady state, regardless of whether this is approaching the OECD average or not. And 
this is precisely what the constant returns growth model is about. If the first stage residuals still do 
not collapse to their average value, we ought to conclude that either the convergence property does 
not hold or else that the various accumulation rates included in the regressors do not suffice to 
capture the steady state behaviour of each particular economy. This latter possibility cannot be 
denied, and suggests a straightforward strategy for sequential conditioning. Thus, conditioning 
here is used for the purpose of testing the constant returns to scale model, bridging the gap
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between the structural (regression) approach and the analysis of the dynamics of the cross-section 
distribution of income across OECD economies.
17The evidence from the standard analysis , using alternative data sets, suggests that the 
Solow model, augmented to include human capital as a productive factor, explains rather well the 
evolution of growth rates in the OECD. According to the CRS model, growth is explained by 
two factors, the amount of resources devoted to accumulate human and physical capital (the steady 
state component), and the distance with respect to the long-run (sustainable) human and physical 
capital labour ratios (catching-up component). Strictly speaking, convergence only operates 
through the second component, hence it seems wise to remove the effect of the accumulation rates 
in order to asses whether or not it has effectively taken place. This implies that if the CRS model 
holds upon conditioning on these rates, we ought to be able to find a stronger tendency towards a 
degenerate distribution of incomes. The remaining differences in income across countries being 
explained by permanent differences in the way countries allocate their resources between savings 
and investment.
To analyse the evolution of the cross-section distribution of per capita income conditioned 
to its steady state, we have tried three different versions of the conditioning sets as suggested by 
the standard regression literature and by the basic Solow model.
The variable of analysis is defined as:
Yc= Y-Y®
where Y and Yss are the logs of the GDP per capita and the (time varying) steady state GDP per 
capita respectively. According to the Solow model, the steady state is estimated as,
Y \  = Tiio+TCi i log(I Yit)+7ti2log(TN)+git (2.8)
^ 18 Where IY and TN are the basic accumulation rates of physical capital and population . A linear
deterministic trend is included to capture (although rather imperfectly) the exogenous increase of
total factor productivity. We have tried different versions of (2.8).
4.1. conditioning on a common technology across countries
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We first impose the assumption of a common technology across countries, so that the 
parameters of the steady state can be consistently recovered in a pooling estimation of the steady 
state equation. In other words, we restrict the parameter values to be the same for all countries in 
the sample (7ii0=7r0,7Til=7t1, n-a=n2i gi=g> all i) so that their long-run differences are only due to their 
different accumulation rates19.
The dominant picture of the results in this first stage conditioning is quite similar to the 
one we got in the unconditional case. As Figures 11a to lid  make clear, conditioning does not 
make a huge difference to the estimated density functions. They are, if any, slightly smoother than 
the unconditioned ones, but still display very similar shapes and dynamics. Most of the 
observations tend to get closer to 1, although there is still a group (roughly 25% of the total) stuck 
at around 0.5. Quite similar features of persistence as in the unconditional case can be drawn from 
the picture of the stochastic kermis (Figures 12a-d and 13a-d).
The time-invariant matrix, defined by taking as starting point an empirically uniform 
unconditional distribution, shows a slightly higher mobility than before. Similarly, the ergodic 
distribution, far from being degenerate around 1, accumulates a significant mass of probability in 
other income ranges. Finally, the sequence of quantiles and mobility indices confirm that little is 
gained by conditioning in this simple way. The 25% smallest relative incomes in 1960 were 
between 0.35 and 0.70 of their estimated steady state, while the upper limit of this interval got 
closer to 1 by the mid '80s it went down again slowly. A group of countries remained below their 
expected long-run path all through the sample period. The second and third quantil tend to 
concentrate around 1 while the richest quantil starts with an upper limit of 1.98 and evolves until
1.43 times the steady state.
There is little change in the results after removing the effect of accumulation rates. It 
should be noticed that the interpretation of the bimodal distribution is slightly different to the one 
we made earlier. Now, the variable of interest is not income relative to the OECD average but 
income relative to its own steady state. The failure to obtain a degenerate distribution around 1 is 
not only evidence against conditional convergence but also about the way the steady state is 
defined. If a group of countries turns out to be persistently 50% of alleged steady state, we can 
conclude that either the saddle path property of the neoclassical model does not hold or that the 
steady state is wrongly measured, or both. In fact, as Figure 15 makes clear, part of the blame
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should be put on the conventional estimation of the steady state using multi-country data sets. 
Imposing the assumption of common technological parameters, we find that most countries do not 
even achieve their (estimated) steady state during the period 1960-1990. Even more worrying 
than this is the fact that over the whole sample period the richest countries are systematically 
above their steady state while the poorest ones tend to be below theirs.
4.2. allowing for country-specific and time-invariant effects
Controlling for accumulation rates is not enough to achieve the features of conditional 
convergence. One way to ascertain whether the saddle-path property of the neoclassical model 
does not hold or if we have not properly captured the long-run determinants of per capita income, 
is to improve our approximation to the steady state. In the second version of (2.8) we introduce a 
time-invariant country-specific effect to allow for differences in the initial level of accumulated 
technical knowledge. This means that 7il0 is allowed to vary across countries. By doing so we are 
controlling for structural differences across countries that we do not try to explain.
This procedure is related to some work in the empirical growth literature that has explicitly
20considered the possibility of country-specific effects in one way or another . The overall 
conclusion of these studies is that country specific effects are relevant and that convergence rates 
are higher once those effects have been controlled for. The analysis of the income distribution that 
we have performed is a sort of reduced form analysis which is not intended to uncover the 
economic factors behind the evolution of relative incomes. The specific effect does shift the 
estimated steady state for each country in such a way that the residuals are around zero. In this 
case, countries cross their steady state from time to time, but still the residuals are far from 
stationary and the level of income does not return to its steady state value even after long time 
periods.
Turning now to the main results of this exercise, we find, as expected, higher mobility and 
concentration around the newly defined steady-state. The estimated 1 year (average) transition 
kernel (Figure 16a) still displays a significant degree of persistence year by year, with the mass of 
probability concentrated around the main diagonal. Out of the initial state, transition probabilities 
are higher over a 5 year horizon (Figures 16b-d, 17b-d). The estimated contour is steeper than the 
main diagonal for the period 1961-65 indicating a strong tendency towards the steady-state during
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these years. It shows high mobility during the 1970-75 period and the persistence increases again 
for the 1981-85 period. The transition matrices give very much the same message although with, 
less persistence than in previous cases for the time invariant Q, but still an uniform ergodic 
distribution ie from a uniform initial distribution, the probability of each economy being above or 
below its steady state is the same. The states that define the sequence of quantiles approach 1 from 
above. The upper bound of the lowest quantil approaches 1 steadily until the mid-'80s and then 
falls again. The lower bound remains relatively unchanged at a low value (less than 0.3), so some 
countries remain quite far from their steady-state income level. The mobility indices are higher 
than in previous cases but there are still many zeroes in the off-diagonal entries in the transition 
matrices which imply substantial persistence that again increases during the '80s.
The transition matrices give very much the same message, less persistence than in 
previous cases for the time invariant Q and an uniform ergodic distribution i.e. the probability of 
each economy being above or below its steady state is the same.
43. a simple illustration of Solow Model’s predictions
Given the structure of the multi-country data set, some authors have argued that the 
estimation of the steady-state should explicitly allow for cross-country differences in the parameter 
set, over and above differences in the constant term. In fact, Pesaran and Smith (1993) show how 
the relevant parameters in these kinds of models can only be recovered in a consistent manner by 
averaging the estimated parameters in individual country regressions. In related work, Andres and 
Bosca (1993) have shown how the hypothesis of a common parameter set across the OECD 
economies can be rejected using standard econometric tests. This suggests another possibility of 
enlarging the conditioning set in a way that is consistent with the "representative economy" model.
In the final part of this section we analyse the evolution of the distribution of relative incomes 
calculated as in (2.8), but allowing for country specific differences in all 7t0i, 7iH, %  and 7r3i 
parameters. This exercise ensures a meaningful steady state (one with respect to which the 
residuals seem more stationary) and it permits comparisons with the analysis carried out so far to 
see whether (as expected) permanent differences across OECD countries are explained not only by 
differences in the accumulation rates but also in the technological parameters.
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This conditioning set yields a series of relative incomes such that for every single year),
the distribution is unimodal and clearly degenerated around 1. The stochastic kernels contours are
still around the main diagonal for 1 year transitions but become virtually vertical at the 1.0 level
for five year periods (Figure 18a-d and 19a-d), indicating that income transits quickly to its steady-
state value regardless of the initial level. For the 1960-65 period, the contours are even negatively
sloped indicating a significant amount of overtaking among countries ie those countries below
their potential income tend to be above it 5 years later. The invariant transition matrix is indicating
great mobility, with no entry with a zero value and a similar probability of upwards and
downwards mobility. The ergodic distribution is again uniform. The sequence of quantiles is very
21stable, but within very close range of 1 . Similarly, the time varying transition matrices have very 
few zero entries (some of them on the main diagonal) and suggest a substantial mobility which is 
confirmed by the very high mobility indices (Figure 9) which are twice as large as those found in 
previous exercises.
The features in the data on relative incomes, appear to be consistent with what we would 
expect if convergence is taking place. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that this income is 
relative to a country specific steady state. Following these results one may or may not trust the 
ability of the CRS growth model to account for the long-run behaviour of each economy taken 
separately. It should be noticed, that high mobility and low persistence in the residuals from the 
first stage regression might simply be a feature of the autoregressive process of per capita income 
in each country. In particular this low persistence is also an indication of stationarity in the first 
stage residuals. However, this is precisely what convergence is about; convergence must be seen 
as the tendency of income per capita to return to its long-run path. What is clear, however, is that 
the model, at least in the way it has been extensively used in the literature in recent times, has a 
much harder job of explaining the evolution of the distribution of incomes across countries. In 
fact, nothing in our results suggests that OECD economies should get even closer in the long-run.
In order to render the first stage residuals stationary we have had to remove a great deal of 
country specific features that account for most of the differences across countries and indeed for 
most of their persistence. In other words, the conventional exogenous growth model might (or 
might not) be a good representation of the representative economy, but it certainly fails to capture 
the long-run evolution of the distribution of incomes across a group of economies interacting with
87
each other. Hence, an alternative theoretical approach, which takes into account actions among 
economies is needed to take out conclusions about convergence.
5. CONCLUSION AND FINAL REMARKS
The main conclusions from the exercise carried out in this paper can be summarized as 
follows:
•The pattern of the cross-country distribution of per capita income within the OECD is not one of 
full convergence. Although the income gap has narrowed substantially over the sample period, 
there remain substantial differences that do not show a falling path in the last 15 years or so. 
Upward mobility in the income ranking is very limited, especially out of the 25% group of the 
poorest countries. In fact, the steady state cross-country distribution of income is not degenerate 
around the OECD average, but it reflects non vanishing sizable differences. These differences do 
not merely reflect variations in accumulation rates nor those in initial conditions (fixed effects). In 
fact, after conditioning we have found very much a similar picture, in which there is little tendency 
of countries to bounce around their steady state path, measured as is a common practice in most 
empirical studies. To obtain a picture compatible with the convergence proposition, we need to 
allow for time varying country specific effects as well, indicating that if the constant returns model 
would hold, it would only do so on a country by country basis, and that we should not use it to 
make inference about the long-run path of relative incomes, even within a homogeneous region 
such as the OECD.
•The conventional cross-country regression analysis and the study of the dynamics of the cross­
country distribution, yield somewhat different conclusions that are not easily reconcilable. While 
the dispersion and regression towards the mean measures indicate that OECD countries converge 
in the a  and in the P sense, the dynamic approach in this paper suggests a more pessimistic view.
•Finally, in the paper we have also shown that the standard way of testing the propositions of 
growth theory using multi-country data sets can be very misleading. This evidence is damaging 
for the conventional analysis in two ways. Firstly, because it indicates that the saddle point
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property for the "representative economy" cannot be easily extended to make multi-country 
comparisons. Secondly, because one of the advantages of the cross-country regression analysis, 
namely that of collapsing the most relevant information about long-run patterns in a bunch of 
relevant statistics, does not hold. From the empirical point of view, these conclusions suggest the 
advantage of using an approach that imposes as little prior structure as possible on the data. From 
the theoretical one, it is necessary to develop in more detail the multi-country implications of 
existing growth literature, beyond the representative economy assumption, and set up models that 
explicitly take into account the kind of idiosyncratic factors that lie behind the persistent economic 
differences among countries.
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ENDNOTES
1. "Miracles" and "disasters" in Parente and Prescott’s (1993) terminology.
2. See Danny Quah (1993a,b; 1994).
3. Although it may also take place in an endogenous growth setting (Kelly, 1992).
4. Mankiw, Romer & Weil (1992) augment the Solow model by adding human capital 
accumulation. For simplicity and without any loss of generality, reference will be made to the 
equations of the original model.
5. Quah (1994b) illustrates how the uniformity of this 2% may arise from a unit root in the 
time series, instead of from reasons related to the dynamic of economic growth.
6. This approach implies imposition (without formal testing) of the assumption of a 
common technology across countries in the sample. However, whenever the assumption of a 
common technology has been tested it has been more often rejected than not, suggesting that the 
"best practice" technology is not available to all countries in the sample at a particular point in 
time, leading also to substantial differences in convergence rates. See for instance Durlauf and 
Johnson (1992). Andres and Bosca (1993) formally test and reject the assumption of a common 
technology across OECD countries, obtaining parameter values which are inconsistent with the 
constant returns technology.
7. The calculations and graphics have been executed using Danny Quah's Time Series, 
Random-Fields shell tSrF.
8. D. Quah (1993a,b).
9. See Easterly et al (1993), among others.
10. See Andres J., Domenech, R. and Molinas, C., (1994).
11. This normalization is a way to abstract each individual economy from the overall growth 
and fluctuations.
12. Although without any indication about the accuracy of the predictions, yet
13. Obtained using the squared of standard Epanechnikov kernel for estimating the joint 
density / (X /T X iT+T) and then re-scaling to obtain the conditional probability. X  is the per capita
GDP in each individual country relative t the same variable for the OECD as a whole, t=1,5. The 
bandwidth is chosen by least square cross-validation (see Silverman (1986), section 3.4.3). All the 
calculations were done with Quah’s shell tSrF.
14. Hence the distance with the richest group average is still larger.
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15. The entry estimates are not presented here to save space.
16. These cross-profile representations were used in Juan J. Dolado, Jose Manuel Gonzalez- 
Paramo and Jose Maria Roldan (1994) and in Quah (1994).
17. Mankiw et al (1992) and Andres et al (1994) found evidence in favour of the constant 
returns to scale model which comes not only from the positive convergence rate, but also from the 
fact that the theoretical restrictions imposed by this technology seem to fit very well the OECD 
experience over the last thirty years.
18. We present here the results conditioning for investment rates, population growth, trend 
and dummies, conditioning also with respect to human capital does not change the results in a 
significant manner.
19. Although we present the results based in the linear version of (8) we have also estimated 
the coefficients in a non linear error correction format with very similar results.
20. See Durlauf and Johnson (1992), Knight, Loyza and Villanueva (1992), Andres and Bosca 
(1993).
21. In 1960, for instance, the lowest quantil had bounds 0.918 and 0.954, whereas the highest 
ones were 0.991 and 1.030.
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TABLE 1
OECD Relative Per-Capita Income 
First Order Transition Matrix, Time Stationary 1960-89
Upper End of the States 0.778 0.940 1.026 1.578
« (1) (2) (3) (4)
175: 0.95 0.05 0.00 0.00
174: 0.03 0.90 0.07 0.00
172: 0.00 0.06 0.87 0.07
175: 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.91
Ergodic Distribution 0.166 0.265 0.314 0.255
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TABLE 2
Quantiles (0.25,0.5,0.75) 
OECD Relative Per-Capita Income
Cell Partition:
1961: 0.265 0.538 0.853 1.064 1.565
1962: 0.264 0.561 0.860 1.042 1.540
1963: 0.272 0.584 0.860 1.042 1.526
1964: 0.263 0.585 0.868 1.042 1.514
1965: 0.254 0.593 0.858 1.045 1.520
1966: 0.265 0.610 0.861 1.030 1.523
1967: 0.263 0.653 0.848 1.001 1.506
1968: 0.262 0.698 0.842 1.004 1.485
1969: 0.258 0.715 0.859 1.022 1.451
1970: 0.258 0.745 0.893 1.012 1.442
1971: 0.268 0.775 0.903 1.033 1.449
1972: 0.267 0.776 0.909 1.017 1.423
1973: 0.260 0.766 0.917 0.998 1.392
1974: 0.275 0.802 0.914 1.019 1.409
1975: 0.295 0.831 0.920 1.024 1.351
1976: 0.305 0.824 0.928 1.021 1.352
1977: 0.302 0.824 0.914 1.005 1.358
1978: 0.295 0.814 0.915 0.992 1.363
1979: 0.279 0.849 0.925 0.997 1348
1980: 0.270 0.865 0.954 1.010 1.325
1981: 0.273 0.866 0.939 1.018 1327
1982: 0.282 0.889 0.954 1.036 1.296
1983: 0.280 0.903 0.947 1.020 1302
1984: 0.278 0.891 0.941 1.013 1322
1985: 0.279 0.897 0.942 1.008 1315
1986: 0290 0.899 0.940 1.022 1309.
1987: 0297 0.873 0.934 1.017 1302
1988: 0.291 0.828 0.949 1.000 1394
1989: 0281 0.807 0.942 0.993 1384
1990: 0296 0.785 0.946 1.004 1368
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TABLE3
OECD Residuals First Stage Regression 
Conditioning on a Common Technology across Countries 
First Order Transition Matrix, Time Stationary 1960-89
Erreur! Signet non 
definLUpper End of the States
0.866 1.102 1.250 2.142
(r) (1) (2) (3) (4)
169: 0.95 0.05 0.00 0.00
165: 0.02 0.90 0.07 0.00
169: 0.00 0.08 0.80 0.11
169: 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.87
Ergodic Distribution 0.163 0.318 0.279 0.241
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TABLE4
Quantiles (0.25,0.5,0.75)
OECD Residuals First Stage Regression 
Conditioning on a Common Technology across Countries
Cell Partition:
1961: 0.351 0.701 0.990 1.303 2.124
1962: 0.384 0.736 1.029 1.274 1.980
1963: 0.392 0.747 1.066 1.312 1.992
1964: 0.389 0.754 1.060 1.298 1.969
1965: 0.365 0.770 1.130 1.305 1.991
1966: 0.394 0.780 1.007 1.280 1.971
1967: 0.407 0.797 1.012 1.256 1.946
1968: 0.406 0.805 1.033 1.309 1.931
1969: 0.396 0.805 1.027 1.315 1.926
1970: 0.431 0.823 1.082 1.308 1.916
1971: 0.424 0.861 1.137 1.287 1.875
1972: 0.412 Q.872 1.154 1.272 1.866
1973: 0.386 • 0.891 1.138 1.301 1.810
1974: 0.403 0.888 1.098 1.277 1.803
1975: 0.368 0.871 1.111 1.236 1.808
1976: 0.433 0.865 1.089 1.211 1.802
1977: 0.447 0.896 1.106 1.224 1.807
1978: 0.416 0.928 1.121 1.225 1.793
1979: 0.414 0.946 1.118 1.214 1.773
1980: 0.404 0.896 1.120 1.218 1.721
1981: 0.408 0.910 1.107 1.150 1.654
1982: 0.407 0.913 1.100 1.193 1.619
1983: 0.417 0.925 1.098 1.170 1.614
1984: 0.409 0.954 1.073 1.140 1.593
1985: 0397 0.940 1.064 1.160 1.587
1986: 0.417 0.938 1.069 1.150 1.576
1987: 0.423 0.942 1.058 1.188 1.579
1988: 0.419 0.934 1.061 1.193 1.570
1989: 0.426 0.949 1.082 1.131 1.438
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TABLE5
OECD Residuals First Stage Regression 
Country-Specific and Time-Invariant Effects 
First Order Transition Matrix, Time Stationary 1960-89
Upper End of the States 0.960 1.009 1.060 1.217
(r) (1) (2) (3) (4)
160: 0.83 0.17 0.00 0.00
171: 0.17 0.61 0.21 0.01
170: 0.01 0.20 0.58 0.21
171: 0.00 0.01 0.21 0.78
Ergodic Distribution 0.259 0.249 0.248 0.243
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TABLE 6
Quantiles (0.25,0.5,0.75)
OECD Residuals First Stage Regression 
Conditioning on Country-Specific and Time-Invariant Effects
Cell Partition:
1961: 0.694 0.893 0.961 1.016 1.161
1962: 0.720 0.898 0.960 1.009 1.175
1963: 0.766 0.910 0.972 1.025 1.160
1964: 0.779 0.932 0.970 1.008 1.188
1965: 0.829 0.930 0.985 1.017 1.202
1966: 0.871 0.927 0.984 1.010 1.129
1967: 0.840 0.945 1.001 1.031 1.130
1968: 0.886 0.989 1.016 1.049 1.176
1969: 0.915 1.009 1.035 . 1.058 1.139
1970: 0.931 1.009 1.029 1.055 1.116
1971: 0.959 1.022 1.046 1.074 1.132
1972: 0.948 1.032 1.066 1.083 1.212
1973: 0.964 1.040 1.061 1.090 1.158
1974: 0.954 1.000 1.029 1.060 1.124
1975: 0.959 1.014 1.051 1.078 1.130
1976: 0.992 1.007 1.046 1.078 1.104
1977: 0 .9 8 8 / 1.011 1.048 1.072 1.139
1978: 0.974 1.004 1.052 1.082 1.127
1979: 0.955 0.994 1.028 1.085 1.141
1980; . 0.938 0.958 1.004 1.051 1.132
1981: 0.899 0.928 0.978 1.045 1.119
1982: 0.872 0.950 0.969 1.031 1.115
1983: 0.873 0.954 0.993 1.026 1.124
1984: 0.873 0.941 0.993 1.018 1.139
1985: 0.853 0.923 0.981 1.016 1.125
1986: 0.829 0.919 0.965 1.024 1.137
1987: 0.806 0.898 0.957 1.028 1.149
1988: 0.768 0.886 0.945 1.026 1.156
1989: 0.726 0.881 0.930 1.013 1.172
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TABLE7
OECD Residuals First Stage Regression 
Conditioning on Country-Specific and Time-Variant Effects 
First Order Transition Matrix, Time Stationary 1960-89
Erreur! Signet non 
defmLUpper End of the States
0.976 1.001 1.025 1.167
(r) (1) (2) (3) (4)
159: 0.64 0.21 0.12 0.03
170: 0.22 0.41 0.26 0.11
171: 0.08 0.26 0.41 0.25
172: 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.63
Ergodic Distribution 0.238 0.247 0.256 0.259
98
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982.
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
TABLE8 
Quantiles (0.25,0.5,0.75)
OECD Residuals First Stage Regression 
Conditioning on Country-Specific and Time-Variant Effects
0.918 0.954 0.972 0.991 1.030
0.896 0.964 0.976 1.004 1.043
0.926 0.973 0.982 1.000 1.038
0.943 0.965 0.980 1.003 1.059
0.888 0.963 0.981 1.006 1.057
0.919 0.960 0.973 1.001 1.026
0.898 0.966 0.991 1.007 1.089
0.940 0.998 1.011 1.037 1.049
0.963 0.988 1.016 1.054 1.100
0.967 1.003 1.017 1.045 1.115
0.984 0.999 1.013 1.056 1.095
0.914 1.015 1.033 1.047 1.163
0.965 0.999 1.054 1.068 1.156
0.958 0.987 1.006 1.031 1.137
0.960 0.996 1.007 1.039 1.106
0.988 1.001 1.017 1.038 1.087
0.985 1.003 1.019 1.037 1.096
1.001 1.009 1.025 1.039 1.079
0.983 1.008 1.028 1.039 1.095
0.953 0.987 1.020 1.029 1.077
0.948 0.976 0.996 1.020 1.047
0.936 0.969 0.985 1.006 1.047
0.950 0.971 0.997 1.012 1.041
0.954 0.979 0.988 1.005 1.041
0.949 0.973 0.987 1.006 1.035
0.953 0.960 0.978 1.007 1.028
0.902 0.961 0.980 0.997 1.017
0.901 0.954 0.962 0.989 1.029
0.770 0.940 0.958 0.996 1.079
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FIGURE 9
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FIGURE 11
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FIGURE 13c
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FIGURE 19c
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CHAPTER 3
CROSS-SECTIONAL FIRM DYNAMICS:
THEORY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM THE CHEMICAL SECTOR
This chapter is part of my joint research with Reinout Koopmans,
130
1. INTRODUCTION
Do firm characteristics converge or diverge? Do small firms grow faster than large firms, 
hence catching up, or do large firms have an inherent advantage in capturing new investment 
opportunities, dominating the industry in the long run? The classic papers by Simon and Bonini 
(1958) and Hart and Prais (1956) were among the first to study the dynamic nature of the firm size 
distribution. Major contributions have been made by Jovanovic (1982) and Cabral and Riordan 
(1994) on industry dynamics due to 'passive' learning, by Gilbert and Harris (1984) on the 
evolution of industry structure in a growing (Coumot) market, by Pakes and Ericson (1987) on the 
strategic investment in dynamic context, known as 'active' learning, and by Hopenhayen (1989) 
on dynamic competition between firms that face idiosyncratic cost shocks. A parallel literature on 
R&D and industry structure addresses similar issues although it is more specifically focused on 
the introduction of new products or technologies. A central question in the latter literature is 
which firm has the highest incentives to invest in R&D. Is it an entrant or the incumbent 
monopolist, the efficient or the inefficient firm? Two approaches have been used to address these 
issues1. One is an auction, as in Gilbert and Newbery (1982), Vickers (1986) and Katz and 
Shapiro (1987), the other a stochastic race, as in Lee and Wilde (1980) and Reinganum (1983).
The main problem in this literature is the lack of robust empirical implications. In many 
models, any outcome can be supported in equilibrium, depending on the details of the game or on 
specific parameter constellations which are empirically difficult, if not impossible, to observe2. 
This paper shows that if one specific assumption is made about the pay off structure, the 
indeterminacy can be resolved to some extent. To illustrate this resolution, three different games 
that allocate an investment project among firms will be analyzed. These are the auction and the 
stochastic race mentioned earlier, and one based on the 'Grab the Dollar’ game. The assumptions 
on the pay off structure are (i) that the profit of the project, if won, is identical for all candidates, 
(ii) the firms' existing operations are affected in the sense that winning changes the price cost 
margin (PCM) the firm earns on its existing capacity, and (iii) the project changes the PCM all 
competitors earn on their existing capacity (the market externality).
The theoretical result is that if this pay off structure is assumed, the three allocation 
mechanisms imply the same unique relationship between empirically observable industry
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characteristics and the evolutionary process of firm characteristics. In particular, it is the effect of 
the project on the firm's own PCM that determines if small firms tend to catch up with larger ones 
or large firms dominating the industry in the long run. If it is positive, then the large firm will 
generally win the project, if it is negative then the firm with the small initial capacity is in a better 
position to win3. This mechanism drives the result in a number of existing models4. What is 
pointed out here, though, is the generality of the result.
Although the results are general and not restricted to any industry in particular, the 
implications for homogeneous goods industries are particularly clear cut. Assuming firms 
competing in quantities, 'projects' are opening or closing down capacity. If the market price is 
decreasing in the market capacity, then the implication of the theory is that the small firm is more 
likely to open new capacity than an already large one.
In the second part of the paper, the predictions of the model are tested .We use the 
population data of firms, of 24 product markets of the chemicals sector, covering the period, 
between 1952 to 1983. The conventional way of testing this hypothesis is to estimate the 
probability of a firm being the next one to open a plant or capacity, which, according to the theory, 
should be decreasing in the firm's initial size. For illustrative purposes this is done for our dataset 
in Appendix 2. Although this is intuitively appealing, it can be shown that the negative sign of the 
initial size does not necessarily imply that differences in firm sizes tend to become smaller. We 
therefore use a methodology initially developed by Quah (1993a,b; 1994) to analyze convergence 
of per capita income across countries. Rather than looking at the negative coefficient of the initial 
condition in a cross- section growth equation or at the dynamic behaviour of the moments of the 
cross-section distribution, this approach analyzes the dynamics of the entire cross-section 
distribution, exploiting the time series and cross-section information more fully. Stochastic 
Kernels and transition matrices characterise the intra-distributional mobility of firms and we 
analyze the long term behaviour of the size distribution of firms. We find that in the period 
between 1952 and 1983 small firms have been more likely to increase capacity than larger ones, 
leading to a more fragmented industry structure. These tendencies have been particularly strong 
during those years in which there have been only a relatively small number of firms in the industry 
and they have seen strong growth.
The set up of the paper is as follows. Section 2 exposes the basic theoretical results. First
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a 'Grab the Dollar' game is analyzed, augmenting it with the earlier assumption about the pay off 
structure. Then a similar procedure will be repeated to analyze the cross-sectional allocation in an 
auction and in a stochastic race. Section 3 describes the empirical implications of the theoretical 
analysis for the chemical sector and points out why the standard cross-section analysis can be 
misleading. In Section 4 we use a novel approach to study firm dynamics. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
Two firms operate in a market. The large firm (1) has a historically given capacity q,, the 
small one (2) has a historically given capacity q2, where q, > q2 > 0. lfq2 = 0, firm 2 is a 
(potential) entrant. Firm i earns PCM, per unit of capacity. Assume that a profit opportunity 
arrives, which can be taken up by either firm. It can be opening another plant, a R&D project or 
an advertising campaign. We will say a firm 'wins' the project if it is allocated to that firm. The 
other firm is the 'loser'. The general features of the 'project' are:
Assumption A l. It is unique in the sense that it can only be realized by one firm, though both are 
potential candidates.
All firms are potential candidates for winning the project implying that its arrival is independent 
of firm characteristics.
Assumption A2. The winner receives (pays) a net 'fixed profit' (cost) equal to 7ie R which is 
identical for both firms.
Assumption A3. Externalities. The project, if won, changes the PCM of the winning firm by 
A PCM >  -  PCMi i -1 ,2  (the externality) and the PCM of the loser by max{yAPCM, -PCMJ 
i-1,2  (the market externality). The market externality is assumed to be smaller in absolute value 
than the externality: y e  [-l,l].
The fixed profit it, which can be interpreted as the profit an entrant would earn, is 
independent of the firm size, and so are the externalities ( y,APCM). The status quo
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PCMs might differ among the firms, i.e. PCM j ^  PCM2. The validity of the assumption of 
the market externality being smaller in absolute value than the externality is an empirical issue 
and depends on the precise characteristics of the project. This will be discussed below.
Assumption A4. The firm that wins implements the project ('no shelving')5.
The results presented here do not depend on intrinsic differences between the firms, only on 
differences in initial conditions.
If APCM > 0 and y  > 0, the project can be interpreted as an unique advertising project 
which generates positive spillovers for competitors. Alternatively, the project might be a product 
innovation or an improvement of existing technology, that is licensed to competitors or imitated 
by them6. The positive market externality might be due to diffusion of experience in the 
industry7. The project might be closing a plant in an industry, producing imperfect substitutes 
( y e  ]0,1[) or homogeneous goods ( y  = 1).
If APCM > 0 and y  < 0, the project can again be interpreted as an advertising or 
(product or process) innovation project, but with negative spillovers. An innovation that is 
patented might give the holder a competitive advantage and undermine the competitive position of 
other firms. Even if it would be licensed, the competitors can face a lower PCM due to the royalty 
fees. An extreme example is where an innovation is 'drastic* in the sense that the innovator can 
monopolize the market8. Then yAPCM = - PCM.
The constellation APCM < 0 and y  > 0 occurs for example if one firm adds capacity in 
a market of products that are imperfect substitutes, or homogeneous goods if y  = 1. 
Alternatively, it can be what Katz and Shapiro (1987) call a 'major' innovation, an innovation that 
replaces the existing technology and production capacity based on that technology cannot be 
operated economically any longer. Then APCM = - PCM.
Finally APCM < 0 and y  < 0. An extreme version of this case is a firm exiting from an 
industry producing imperfect substitutes or homogeneous goods (APCM = -PCM). If the 
production facilities are dismantled, the capacity reduction will increase the price cost margin of 
the firms that remain in the industry.
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There are two examples where y e [-1,1] is unlikely to hold. One is where goods are 
vertically differentiated and the introduction of a new variety can be located close to the 
competitor's variety in product space and far from the winner's own existing varieties, hence 
hurting the profitability of the competitor's existing varieties more than his own. The other is in 
the context of horizontal product differentiation. The project is opening a new plant, but there are 
transport costs. The plant can be located close to a competitor's existing plant, hence immunizing 
itself from the externality on its existing capacity. In these cases the market externality is higher 
in absolute value than the externality ( y  > 1).
The focus of the first part of the paper will be to determine which firm wins the project 
under which circumstances, i.e. for which parameter constellations (APCM,7t,y,q,,q2) does 
either firm end up with the project. This will be analyzed in the context of three different 
selection mechanisms. First a 'Grab the Dollar’ game, in which firms choose whether or not to 
grab the project. The second is an auction in which the firms bid for the project. The third 
mechanism is a stochastic race, in which firms make strategic investments that increase the 
probability of winning.
2a. Grab the Dollar
Consider a one shot game in which a project is to be allocated (a dollar on the table). The 
strategy space of the two asymmetric agents is to 'grab1 the project (G) or to 'pass' (P). The rules 
of the game are that if only one firm grabs that firm wins the project; if both firms bid, firm 1 will 
win with probability F. If neither grabs, the opportunity is lost and the PCMs are unchanged. The 
pay off firm i is n  + ( PCM-, + APCM)q.t if it wins, and (PCMt +yAPCM )qt if i looses. The 
pay off is PCM, qt if none of the firms bid for the project. Grabbing itself is costless.
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Firm 2
Firm 1 Grab G2 Pass P2
Grab
Gl
Fk +(F(1-y )+ y)(PCM i+APCM )q,
(1 - F)n + (/+  F(y - 1))(PCM2+ APCM)q2
71+ ( PCM j + APCM)q j 
y( PCM 2 + APCM)q2
Pass
PI
y(PCM, + APCM)q,
K + (PCM 2 + APCM)q2
PCM,q, 
PCM 2 q 2
(Expected) Pay Offs in the 'Grab the Dollar' Game
A symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which both firms grab {Gl, G2} exists if grabbing 
has a higher expected pay off than passing, given that the competitor grabs:
yAPCMqt £ H ( n  +yAPCMqi) + ( l - H X  yAPCMqO i = 7,2
=> tv > (y-l)APCM  qt (3.1)
where H  — F i f i - 1  
H  = 1 -F  i f i  = 2.
An equilibrium in which neither firm bids {PI, P2} exists if for both firms grabbing yields a 
negative pay off, given that the competitor passes:
7Z+ APCMqt < 0 i = 1,2. (3.2)
The conditions for asymmetric equilibria in which firm i bids and j passes {Gi, Pj} are:
- for firm i it is optimal to bid, given j passes:
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k  +  A PCMq. > 0 => K >  - A P C M  <?,.
- fo r  firm  j  it is optim al to pass, given that i bids:
yAPCMqi 2 H( n +yAPCMq,) + (1 - H)( yAPCMqi)
=> 7r <  ( y  -1 )APCM 4  j
where H — F ifj  = 2 
H = 1-F  ifj  = 1.
Figures 1 and 2 show the full set of pure strategy equilibria for APCM > 0 and 
APCM < 0 respectively. If APCM > Othe large firm is more willing to incur a high cost 
( k  «  0) than the small firm, given y. Hence, there exist parameter constellations for which 
the unique asymmetric equilibrium is {Gl, P2}. More importantly, if APCM > 0 there are no 
parameter constellations for which there is a unique equilibrium in which only the small firm bids. 
If APCM < 0 then there do not exist parameter constellations for which the unique equilibrium 
is one in which only the large firm bids. The small firm is less affected by the negative externality 
and hence is willing to grab for lower levels of the level of n, given y.
We can divide the space of outcomes into a part in which either firm or none wins in 
equilibrium and its complement, in which there is a unique equilibrium winner. We consider the 
latter first. A unique equilibrium winner exists if there is a unique asymmetric (pure strategy) 
equilibrium.
Proposition 1. If APCM > 0 and there exists a unique asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium, 
then the large firm wins. If APCM <0 and there exists a unique asymmetric pure strategy 
equilibrium, then the small firm wins.9
The figures show that larger differences in initial firm sizes amplify this effect in the sense 
that the areas for which there exists a unique asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium are larger.
Proposition 1 holds if the 'no shelving* assumption (A4) is relaxed. If winning firms have
(3.3)
(3.4)
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the discretion not to implement the project, the optimal response of a passing firm in an 
asymmetric equilibrium becomes:
yAPCMqi <> H Max{ n  +APCMqt ,0} + (1 - H)( yAPCMqi) (3.5)
where H  = F i f j - 2  
H  = 1- F if j  = /.
Firm j only implements the project if the pay off is non-negative. If k + APCM q.t > 0, 
then (3.5) reduces to (3.4). If K + APCM q{ < 0, (3.5) becomes:
yAPCM < 0.
The consequence is that the areas defined by (3.3) and (3.4) are no longer unique 
asymmetric equilibria, since the passing firms are better off to grab the project and shelve it if 
won.
Now relax the assumption that the market externality is smaller than the externality, i.e. 
y  <£ [-1,1]. Proposition 1 goes through for APCM < 0, but not for APCM > 0. If y  > 1 and 
APCM > 0, there exist parameter constellations for which {PI, G2) is an equilibrium, but {Gl, 
P2} is not This occurs if:
( y-1 )APCMq2 < K <  (y-l)A P C M qj (3.6)
The area defined by relation (3.4) is not any longer a subset of the area defined by relation (3.3).
We now return to the original game and consider the outcomes in which either firm can 
win in equilibrium. These can be symmetric equilibria, multiple asymmetric equilibria or mixed 
strategy equilibria. Which firm is more likely to win the project in the symmetric equilibrium 
{Gl, G2) depends on F. A weak auxiliary assumption would be that the outcome that leads to a 
lower industry profit is the less likely one. If firm i wins the project, the industry profit is 
n,- = K + APCM(q} + yqj).
Proposition 2. Assume that F > j  iff 11/ > n 2. In symmetric equilibria {Gl, G2} the large
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firm is more likely to win the project if APCM > 0  and the small firm is more likely to win the 
project if APCM < 0 . 10
The intuition is as before. The equilibrium that generates the highest industry profits is - 
here by assumption - the most likely in symmetric equilibria. As long as the market externality is 
smaller in absolute value than the externality, the equilibrium industry profits are the highest if the 
large firm wins if APCM > 0 and if the small firm wins if APCM < 0.
There exist parameter constellations for which there exist multiple asymmetric pure 
strategy equilibria. One possible way around this indeterminacy would be to assume that with 
probability F the equilibrium is played in which firm 1 wins. Assuming that F > j  iff 
FT/ > n 2, this would imply that the large firm is more likely to end up with the project if 
APCM > 0, whereas the small firm is more likely to end up with the project if APCM < 0. 
Note that in the auction, that will be described in the next section, the indeterminacy is fully 
resolved in favour of the outcome obtained here using an Kad hoc' argument.
There is a caveat. Mixed strategy equilibria do not generate any clear cut results 
concerning which firm is more likely to win the project under which circumstances. The 
probability of firm i grabbing in a mixed strategy equilibrium if F = 1/2, is
2[x-i APCMq.)
Pi -  x+<r+i)APCMqj> which is increasing or decreasing m qJf depending on the sign of 
APCMyn.
2b. Selection in an Auction
We now turn to a second selection mechanism, which is essentially a (Dutch) auction. The 
dynamic nature of the game allows for a considerably richer way of describing the incentives for 
the firms to grab the project, thereby refining the intuition of the result in the last section. The 
project is won by the large firm if APCM > 0, and by the small one if APCM < 0. What will 
be shown is that, with identical discount rates, the large firm is more eager to implement it if 
APCM > 0, since his opportunity cost of waiting is higher. Secondly the opportunity cost of 
losing is higher for the large firm if y  e [-1,1], hence giving him an incentive to preempt. A 
similar reasoning holds mutatis mutandis for the small firm if APCM < 0.
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The set up of the game follows Katz and Shapiro (1987). However, their analysis is 
augmented by Assumptions A2-A4.
Technically, the game is a stopping game. As before, there are two firms with historically 
given capacity q, > 0. Decisions are made at discrete dates, at t = 0,5, 28, ..., where
8 —> 0. The strategies of the firms are to 'grab', given that no firm has yet grabbed the project, 
or to wait. Grabbing means winning the project, developing it and realizing the pay off11. 
Waiting means not grabbing at t and deciding again at t + 8. The game ends as soon as one firm 
grabs the project. If neither of the firms grabs at any finite time, firm i earns PCMt per unit of 
existing capacity, generating a continuous stream of PCMt qt. The incremental profit for the 
winner consists of a fixed stream of profits (cost), with initial present value equal to 
n(t) > 0 (< 0) if the project is grabbed in t. Its current value is continuously differentiable and
increasing over time, though at a decreasing rate > 0, < o) with finite limit
\imT-+~iz(T)erT = 71°. For example, because development costs fall at a decreasing rate over 
time, or opening a plant becomes more and more profitable due to growing demand. The PCM 
the winner earns on its existing capacity is changed by APCM (  >  -  PCM). If firm i wins, then, 
as before, there is a market externality on firm j's profits (the loser). Firm j's PCM changes by 
yAPCM, where y e [-7,7].
Both firms have an identical discount rate r. The present value of the pay off of winning at 
time T is:
Wt(T) = k(T) + e rtAPCMq.tdt
e rr (3.7)
= n(T) +  APCM qt i = 7,2r
Assume that winning the project initially is not profitable for either firm, i.e.
11(0) + ^ 7 ^  < 0 i = 1,2.
The present value from losing at time T is:
Lj(T) = —  yAPCM q . j  = 1,2 (3.8)
r
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The equilibrium concept is a subgame perfect equilibrium, confining the analysis to pure strategy 
equilibria.
Two basic incentives determine the outcome. If firm j never grabs, then firm i's incentive 
to grab at any date depends upon the pay off from winning only. Following Katz and Shapiro 
(1987), we call the incremental profit of the winner Wi (T) the 'stand alone' incentive. Firm i is
willing to grab at T or any time after, if W,(T) > 0, since the actual value of winning, Wi(T)erT, 
is increasing in the grabbing date T. The optimal date to grab if j will never grab, the 'stand alone 
date' f i  is the solution of:
APCMqi = erfi!c'(fi)
The right hand side (RHS) of (3.9) is decreasing in T 12. Therefore, if APCM 
earlier stand alone date than firm 2 and vice versa if APCM < 0.
Lemma 1. If APCM q{ > -rjz~ for i = 1,2, then f j  < f 2 if APCM > 0 and f 2 < Ti if 
APCM < 0.
If APCM > 0 the large firm is more eager to implement the project than the small firm, 
since the large firm (1) is losing more by a further delay of the implementation of the project, 
although the firms have identical discount rates. It is this impatience that induces the large firm to 
implement the project earlier than the small firm would. A similar argument holds for the small 
firm if APCM < 0.
The other incentive is what Katz and Shapiro (1987) call the 'incentive to preempt', which 
is the difference in profits from existing capacity between winning and losing, (1 - y  )APCM qr  
That is, firm i is willing to preempt at T or any date thereafter if for t ^  T, 
Wi(t) > Li(t), t > T  even if it is before its stand alone date (t < f t). The 'earliest 
preemption date' of firm i, f  ,• is the solution of Wi(t) = Li(t):
-(1 - y)APCMq( = rK(Ti)erfl (3.10)
There exists a unique earliest preemption date if (1 - y)APCMq.t > - r ll, since
(3.9)
> 0 firm 1 has an
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Wj(t) - Lj(t) is increasing in t. Firm 1 has higher preemption incentive whenever APCM > 0, 
and because the RHS of (3.10) is increasing in t, firm l's earliest preemption date is before firm 
2's. If APCM < 0, by the same token, firm 2 has the higher preemption incentives and is the 
first to reach its earliest preemption date.
Lemma 2. If (1 - y)APCMqi > -r%~, i = 7,2 then f j  < f 2 if APCM > 0 and 
f  2 < Tj if APCM < 0.
This result is driven by the prospect of the firm being worse off if it loses, than it would 
have been had it won the project. If APCM > 0 and / e  [-1,1] the large firm has higher 
preemption incentives than the small firm because the opportunity loss from not wining the 
project is higher for the large firm. Similarly for the small firm if APCM < 0.
Summarizing, if APCM > 0, then firm 1 has both an earlier stand alone and preemption 
date. Katz and Shapiro (1987) show that in this case firm 2 cannot win in equilibrium, since firm 
1 would always preempt. Similarly, firm 2 will always preempt if APCM < 0 and firm 1 cannot 
win. Hence, Proposition 3 is a corollary of their result:
Proposition 3. If the selection mechanism is the above stopping game, then:
(i) the large firm is the equilibrium winner if APCM > 0,
(ii) the small firm is the equilibrium winner if APCM < 0.
Proof. The result follows from Lemmas 1 and 2, and from Katz and Shapiro’s (1987) necessary
condition for equilibrium no.5 (p.407).
If neither firm has a finite stand alone date (i.e. APCM q.t < -rjz~, i = 7,2), there is
always an equilibrium without grabbing. If in addition both firms have a finite earliest preemption 
date (i.e. (1 - y)APCMq. > -r ll > APCMq., i = 7,2), there is a second equilibrium
outcome in which the firm with the higher preemption incentives preempts before the earliest 
preemption date of its competitor (see Katz and Shapiro (1987) - Theorem lb). These are the 'self 
defence' equilibria. Both firms would prefer not to grab, and only do so because the other one 
does. It can be shown that they can only occur if the market externality is negative, i.e.
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yAPCM< 0 13.
Before turning to the analysis of the stochastic race, we compare our results to two related 
models that have been described in the literature. One is Gilbert and Newbery's (1982) model of 
preemptive patenting, which is essentially a second-price auction with an incumbent monopolist 
and an entrant bidding for a substitute product. If the monopolist wins, he remains the sole firm in 
the market. If the entrant wins, the market will become a duopoly, which reduces the profit of the 
monopolist. They find that the monopolist will win if entry results in any reduction of total profits 
below the joint maximizing level. In the unlikely case that the introduction of the substitute by the 
monopolist increases the profit margin of the existing variety, the outcome is consistent with our 
results. The more plausible case is, however, that the substitute will decrease the profit margin of 
the existing variety, though to a lesser extent than if the entrant would have introduced the variety. 
In our model this would mean that y  > 1, which is ruled out by assumption. This example
shows, however, that by assuming y e  [-7, /] economically interesting cases might have been 
ignored. Furthermore, they show that 'sleeping patents' might occur if the monopolist reduces his 
overall profit as a consequence of the introduction of the patent. In our model the implementation 
of the project was assumed.
Katz and Shapiro (1987) consider an R&D project, with a time dependent development 
cost. The loser faces no development costs, but earns a (different) profit flow due to imitation or 
licensing. The profit flows from winning and losing differ per firm. By choosing the appropriate 
parameter constellations all possible rankings of stand alone date and earliest preemption date can 
be generated. Hence, either firm winning the project can be an equilibrium outcome. Restricting 
the pay offs by adding assumptions A1-A4, effectively rules out the case in which firm i has 
greater stand alone incentives, but firm j has greater preemption incentives. The introduction of 
the additional assumption reduces the number of equilibrium outcomes. Moreover, the 
interpretation of the model as given here is more general than theirs in the sense that the fixed part 
of the profits can be either a cost or a profit and the externality on the profitability of existing 
capacity can be either positive or negative. The firms' pay off of winning is nevertheless concave 
in the grabbing date throughout, because it consists of either a time-increasing fixed profit with a 
given negative externality or a time-decreasing fixed cost with a given positive externality.
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2c. Selection in a Model of a Stochastic Race
In this section we analyze the stochastic racing model of Loury (1979), Lee and Wilde 
(1980) and Reinganum (1983). At any point in time either firm can win. The probability density 
of firm i winning the project is determined by the level of its strategic investment. In the R&D 
literature the flow of investment is interpreted as research intensity, which determines the 
probability of developing the new technology at any point in time. What will be shown is that the 
results derived earlier hold qualitatively in this framework. If the pay off structure satisfies Al- 
A4, the large firm has a higher investment rate if APCM > 0 and the smaller firm has a higher 
investment rate if APCM < 0.
Consider an industry with two firms. As before, firm 1 has a large historically given 
capacity, firm 2 a small one, so q, > q2 > 0. They are competing to be the first to win the 
project. Once one firm wins, the game ends.
The strategy of firm i is to select an investment rate z-,, that determines the probability 
density that firm i will win at any t. The success date of firm i is a random variable Tit 
distributed according to:
Pr(Ti < t) = Gi(t) = 1 - e* '*  (3.11)
where z,- > 0 and h( x,) is the hazard rate. Assume that the hazard rate is twice continuously 
differentiable, with h ’(.)>0, h”< 0, h(0) = 0 and limz^oh^z) = °°, limz-*~h'(z) = 0. The 
firm commits to a particular level at the start of the race, and pays zi until one of the firms wins. 
Until the first success date the flow of profits of firm i is PCMt qt - z,-. If firm i wins, its flow 
changes by k  + APCMqt + z, and firm j's profit flow by yAPCM qj + z j• Let r be the
common discount rate. The expected profit of firm i as a function of its own and the rival's 
investment rate is:
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V i ( z i . z j )  =  l - e ^ e ™  «> + «*'»'
h ( z i )
n  +  A  PCMq.
+ h(zj)
r yAPCM
- Zi dt (3.12)
h ( Zi)
rTl + APCM q ^
+ h ( Zj )
r yAPCM q ^
Zi r + h(zi) + h(zj)
The probability density of firm i winning at t is h(zi)e^h<Zi> + h<Zj)^ , generating a pay off of 
——7—^. The probability density of firm j winning is h( zj )e^h(Zi) + generating a pay off
for firm i of yAPCrMtli. With probability e' ^ z, ; + h(Zj)^  neither firm has won before t and firm i pays
Zi.
Proposition 4. If the selection mechanism is a stochastic race then in equilibrium
(i) the success date of the large firm stochastically dominates the grabbing date of the small 
firm in the sense of first order stochastic dominance if APCM > 0.
(ii) the success date of the small firm stochastically dominates the grabbing date of the large 
firm in the sense of first order stochastic dominance if APCM < 0. 14
As before, if APCM > 0, both the stand alone and the preemption incentives are higher 
for the large firm. If the small firm is indifferent between winning and losing, the large firm 
strictly prefers to win. Hence, the large firm has always an incentive to preempt. Moreover, the 
opportunity cost of waiting is higher for the large firm than for the small one, hence the larger is 
more impatient. The reverse argument holds if APCM < 0.
In the auction model the incentive to preempt dominates the firm's decision as long as the 
stand alone incentive is non-negative. The main difference here is that preemption is stochastic. 
Consequently, the impatience of firms to implement the project also becomes relevant for the 
outcome. But since the larger firm has uniformly higher incentives to invest if APCM > 0 it has 
a higher probability of winning. By assuming this particular pay off structure, both incentives are 
always aligned.
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This is of interest since the Gilbert and Newbery (1982) deterministic auction model and 
the Reinganum (1983) stochastic race model give opposite outcomes. In the former an incumbent 
firm preempts, whereas in the latter the potential entrant has a higher R&D effort. This can only 
occur if one firm has higher preemption incentives and the other has higher stand alone incentives.
3. APPLICATION TO THE CHEMICAL SECTOR
In this section we will test the theoretical implications that were derived in the last section, 
using data from the chemicals sector. The principal reason for taking this sector is that investment 
projects can be unequivocally defined as opening or closing a plant or production capacity within 
a plant The industries in the dataset (see Table 1) are typically bulk chemicals, relative 
homogeneous by nature. Most are intermediate or final petrochemical products. The advantage 
that homogeneous products have over differentiated products in testing the theory is, that the 
effect on the price cost margin can be determined under very weak conditions. If the market price 
is decreasing in the total market capacity, then opening capacity will decrease the market price and 
vice versa. Hence, in terms of the terminology of the last section, it must be that APCM < 0 if 
capacity is increased and APCM > 0 if capacity is reduced, with y  > 0 throughout. In an 
industry with differentiated products a typical 'project* might be a combination of increased 
advertising and increased production. If the former increases the price cost margin and the latter 
decreases it, the net effect is typically indeterminate, and hence the empirical implication of the 
theory unclear.
However, within the chemical industry capacity is certainly not the only strategic choice 
firms face. R&D programmes are essential in the strategic interaction among firms (Quintella, 
1993). Research in manufacturing technology has resulted in less expensive raw material, such as 
in the production Acrylonitrile and Vinyl Acetate. In Phenol, a more efficient process based on 
Cumene Hydroxide has been developed. In some cases the feedstock has changed. For example, 
Phtalic Anhydride used to be produced from Naphtalene, which then changed to ortho-Xylene. 
Research has focused on increases in size of existing plants, primarily by de-bottlenecking, and on 
'scaling up* of entire production processes. For example, in the early 1950s the largest Ethylene 
plants had a capacity of about 100 million pounds per year. In the 1970s the newly constructed 
Ethylene plants produced well over 1 billion pounds per year (Spitz, 1988, Ch. 11). Similar
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developments have occurred for Ammonia, Vinyl Chloride, Styrene and Methanol. Hence, the 
'project' of opening a plant or increasing capacity changed over time. This allows for the 
possibility that firms, depending on their R&D programme, faced different sets of opportunities in 
terms of opening additional capacity. In terms of the model the 'fixed pay off n  might be firm 
specific, due to firms using different technologies. However, most production technologies are 
non-proprietary, particular in petrochemicals. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the diffusion of 
new production processes is quick, which is according to Spitz (1988) due to engineering 
contractors learning how to build the scaled-up plants or how to apply new production techniques, 
which makes the technology available to whoever is willing to pay for it (see p.424). Any firm 
that opened a new plant, was it an entrant, a small incumbent or a large incumbent, seemed to use 
the state of the art technology at any time, suggesting that new production technologies were 
widely available. Mansfield (1985) found that in the petroleum sector, 60% of the process 
technology was available to competitors within 18 months of a firm's decision to develop a major 
new process. This effect was even more pronounced in primary metals, though less in other 
chemicals. Spitz (1988) described the effect of new technologies on petrochemical industries as 
follows (p.393):
"If the new route represented a substantial economic improvement, but was not 
judged to be able to provide a dominant position, the company making the 
invention usually embarked on a licensing program, settling for the income 
provided by royalties and catalyst sales, as well as the presumed benefits o f 
becoming a reasonably low cost producer. In other cases the company could not 
establish a controlling position, because it could not obtain broad patent 
protection to keep competitors from developing relatively similar process routes.
In still other cases, such as Badger-Sherwin Williams'fluid-bed Phtalic Anhydride 
process, the new technology was not so much better that it forced a wave o f 
shutdowns. Here, the new technology just added one or two new competitors and 
upgraded the economics of some of the existing producers, who switched to the 
new process."
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Well known exceptions include Du Pont in Titanium Dioxide (Ghemawhat, 1984), 
where it achieved a dominant position through its proprietary Chloride technology and its position 
in nylon, which it achieved through selective licensing. Sohio achieved a dominant position in 
Acrylonitrile, based on a revolutionary propylene technology (Stobough, 1987).
Related to this is that n  or APCM might be firm specific due to 'increasing returns to 
scale'. Although it is well known that there are increasing returns in the chemical sector, they 
seem to occur primarily on plant level rather than on firm level. Both Spitz (1988) and Stobough 
(1987) show significant gains from increasing plant sizes in terms of reducing per unit production 
costs, but firm sizes do only seem to play a role in the availability of capital to finance large scale 
production facilities. Learning is frequently mentioned as an alternative source of increasing 
returns. However, in petrochemicals these gains are not firm specific according to Spitz (1988, 
Ch. 10) and Stobough (1987, Ch.5), since again rapid diffusion of experience throughout the 
industiy undermines any competitive advantage. Although there is evidence of significant 
'industry wide' learning (Lieberman, 1984), individual companies do not seem to be able to 
maintain an advantage through more experience.
We therefore claim that it is a reasonable first approximation to assume that in the 
capacity game all firms face an equal investment opportunity f  project'), and hence that firms only 
differ in their existing capacity.
Another assumption that has to be satisfied for the theoretical results to hold is that the 
market externality is smaller in absolute value than the externality on the winning firm's existing 
capacity (-1 < y  < 1). Spitz (1988, p.540) describes how prices are often cut as new capacity 
comes on stream, due to firms giving discounts in order to fill new capacity. The effect on 
competitors is likely to be less than the full discount due to transportation costs, which are 
significant even though most of the US petrochemical capacity is located in the Gulf Coast region 
(Chapman, 1991, Ch.6). However, location is still relatively dispersed, due to the dependence of 
the US petrochemical industries on natural gas liquids as feedstock, rather than oil based raw 
materials as in Europe. An extensive network of pipelines gives firms considerable freedom in 
their locational choice without giving up nearness to raw material sources. Oil based feedstock 
would instead require the location close to refinery complexes and hence a higher degree of 
geographical concentration.
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A priori it is not clear which game is the most appropriate description of the cross- 
sectional allocation of 'projects'. However, all three that were described in the last section have a 
qualitatively identical empirical implication. Hence, the Empirical Hypothesis can be formulated 
independently of the allocation mechanism.
Empirical Hypothesis: In growing and declining chemical industries, firm sizes tend to converge.
In growing industries there is a sequence of arrivals of new investment projects, each of 
them being the opening of another plant. This decreases the PCM earned on existing capacity by 
the winning firm, and by Proposition 1-4 it follows that the initially small firm is more likely to 
win the project. Closing down a plant reduces capacity, increasing the PCM the winning firm 
earns on its remaining capacity. By Propositions 1-4 the firm that is larger ex-post is more likely 
to implement the project15.
3a. The Data
The dataset used in this section is Gilbert and Lieberman's (1987) sample of 24 growing 
chemical industries, see Table 1. The demand for all products increased from the earliest 
observation until at least 1975. The sample includes industries with more than three but less than 
twenty competitors, all producing an homogeneous good. The sampling period starts, depending 
on the industry, between 1953 and 1965 and ends in 1983. The capacity data are from annual 
issues of the Directory of Chemical Producers (SRI International), reporting firm and plant 
capacities by product16.
3b. The Standard Cross-Section Analysis of Convergence
The Empirical Hypothesis is tested for growing industries, using two different 
approaches. The first one, presented in Appendix 1, is a conventional logit analysis of the 
probability of firm i opening a plant We find indeed a negative coefficient for the initial 
condition, though the result is quite unstable. It sounds intuitively appealing to interpret this 
negative sign as firms within one industry converging towards a common size. In this section we 
will show that this interpretation is not generally true and can be misleading in many cases. We
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then perform what we think is a more natural way of analyzing convergence.
A negative relation between the firm is probability of opening another plant and its initial 
size can be consistent with a growing dispersion in the cross-section distribution of firm sizes.
•  17This is due to Galton's Fallacy or Regression to the Mean . The proof of the Fallacy for discrete 
choice models is in Appendix 2, showing that a negative cross-section coefficient for the initial 
level is consistent with absence of convergence.
Consequently, it has been argued18 that the standard deviation of the cross-section 
distribution should also be considered, suggesting that both a negative coefficient of the initial 
condition and a decreasing cross-section dispersion over time would be sufficient to show 
convergence. But those are single statistics (mean and standard deviation) that summarize the 
information in the cross-section distribution, and there are cases in which they say little about the 
distribution dynamics, in particular catching-up. The cross-section distribution dynamics involves 
changes in the shape of the distribution and intra-distribution mobility, which can only be 
imperfectly captured by points in time statistics.
4. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CROSS-SECTION DYNAMICS
A more natural way of dealing with convergence is therefore to consider the dynamic 
behaviour and the cross-section variation of the entire size distribution. For that, it is necessary to 
develop an alternative econometric strategy, suggested by Quah (1993a,b; 1994), which deals with 
the dynamics and cross-section dimensions, based on what in probability theory is called Random 
Fields. These are data structures that have variation of the same order of magnitude in both 
dimensions. At each point in time there is a cross-section distribution of firm sizes, which is 
simply the realization of a random element in the space of distributions. The idea is to describe 
their evolution over time, which will allow us to analyze intra-distribution mobility, persistence of 
the firms’ relative position, and to characterise the long run behaviour19. In this framework 
convergence is understood as the sequence of distributions tending towards a mass-point in the 
long run.
4a. The Variable of Analysis
The central conclusion of the theory in Section 2 is that small firms are more likely to
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install new capacity than their larger competitors. A somewhat stronger implication is that firms 
within one industry will ultimately reach the same size, i.e.the industry average. The difference 
between the size of a firm and the industry average should shrink over time, and possibly go to 
zero in the long run.
The theory suggests as the basic variables of analysis the firm's market share minus the 
industry average market share: ADMSH = MSH - 1/N, if there are N firms in the industry. 
Alternatively, firm sizes can be measured in terms of the number of plants a firm operates, in 
which case the variable of analysis is the firm's relative number of plants minus the average 
market share: ADPLS = PLSH - 1/N. The dynamics of the cross-section distribution of these 
variables is informative about convergence, since both go to zero as the firm sizes go to the 
industry average. The normalisation guarantees that this is independent of the actual number of 
firms in the market, consequently allowing to pool the industries.
In the literature a widely used variable to measure convergence has been the variable 
relative to the mean20. In our terms that would be the firm's market share relative to the industry 
average share (NMSH = MSH-s- 1/N) and the firm's relative number of plants normalised by the 
average market share (NPLS = PLSH-*- 1/N)21. For these variables convergence is understood as 
the sequence of their cross-section distribution tending towards a mass point at unity. The 
normalization is a way to control for overall growth and aggregate fluctuations of the industry, 
heterokedasticity, and again, it allows pooling of industries. In our case it can be shown that 
convergence in terms of NMSH and NPLS implies convergence in terms of ADMSH and 
ADPLS, since the normalization variable (1/N) goes to zero as the market becomes more
00 o^fragmented . We confine the analysis here to the former set of variables .
There is an important issue of potential entry. We have no indication for how long firms 
have been around, waiting in the wings, before they enter. We make alternative assumptions to 
test the robustness of the empirical results. We assume for example that an entrant has been 
around for seven years before opening its first plant Given a construction lag of 2 years, we 
include the firm in the sample as a potential entrant (with 0 plants) for five years, obviously taking 
into account the starting year of the sample for that industry24. These are NMSH5 and NPLS5. 
Similarly, though assuming that entrants could have opened a plant for two years only, are 
NMSH2 or NPLS2.
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The empirical analysis has been performed for both NMSH and NPLS under the 
alternative entry assumption. Figures 3a-b, show three dimensional plots of NPLS2. It is clear 
that in all cases both dynamic and cross-section variations are large, illustrating the importance of 
studying both dimensions if analyzing firm dynamics.
4b. Cross-Section Distribution of the Variable
In the context of random fields the realization of the random element is a cross-section 
distribution function that can be estimated from the data. Figures 4a-d present the cross-section 
density functions of the plant share for each period of 3 or 4 years. They have been estimated by 
non-parametric methods25 for the available sample. No assumption has been made about the 
shape nor about the moments of the density function from which the data were drawn26.
During the 32 years of the sample there is a tendency of NPLS to concentrate around the 
average industry size. However, there are two limitations of the distribution functions in this 
context. One is that convergence is generally a limit concept and the cross-section distributions 
are points in time estimates, available only for 1952-83. Hence, we cannot say anything about the 
long run behaviour of the size distributions. Further, the graphs do not give any information about 
the firm's relative situation and its movement over time. To deal with these limitations, it is 
necessary to derive a law of motion for the cross-section distribution in a more formal structure.
4c. Modelling Dynamics of the Cross-Section Distribution
Let be the probability measure (one for each year) associated with the cross-section 
distribution. The simplest probability model that can describe its dynamic behaviour is:
A< = T U -i,U t) (3.13)
T* maps the probability measures and a disturbance into another probability measure. T* encodes 
information on how the firms move over time relative to each other. By ignoring the disturbance 
and iterating, (3.13) can be written as:
X«. = CrVA4 (3.14)
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As s goes to infinity, the long run (ergodic) distribution of firm sizes can be characterised.
The stochastic difference equation in expression (3.13) is unmanageable, but so is (3.14). 
Given the impossibility of analytic solutions for T*, we will assume T* is being generated by the 
following differential equation:
= J M(x, A)d X,(x) (3.15)
For any probability measure X on the measurable space (R, R), R is the real line and R is the Borel 
sigma algebra, V A in R. M is a Stochastic Kernel27, that is, M(x,A) is the probability that the 
next state period lies in A given that in this period the state is x. T* is an operator associated with 
the Stochastic Kernel that maps the space of probabilities into itself, and A<+i(A) = (T*A<)A.
Equation (3.15) measures the probability that the next period's state lies in set A, if the 
current state is drawn according to the probability measure And (T%) is the probability 
measure over the next period’s state, if 7^  is the probability measure over the current period.
The Stochastic Kernel allows us to analyze the intra-distribution movements of firms, 
solving one of the limitations pointed out, but leaves the problem of the analysis of the long run 
behaviour unresolved, because the Stochastic Kernel is infinite dimensional. We can, however, 
simplify the problem by approximating T* assuming a countable state space for firms sizes S ={si 
S2.. sr ). In that case T* is simply a transition probability matrix Q, which makes the difference 
equation (3.13) tractable.
Xt = Q(Xm.uO (3.16)
Q encodes the relevant information about mobility within the cross-section distribution. But the 
ergodic distribution of (3.16) can be calculated explicitly. Under some regularity conditions the 
sequence of powers of matrix Q converges to a matrix which has identical rows describing the 
ergodic cross-section distribution. This allows us to analyze the long run behaviour of the size 
distribution.
4d. Estimation of the Stochastic Kernel
Figures 5a-d, 6a-d and 7a-d are three dimensional plots of some Stochastic Kernels for 
NPLS5, NPLS2 and NMSH2, estimated non-parametrically28. They describe the transitions from
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one state to any other in 1 and 5 years respectively. Figures 5e-h, 6e-h and 7e-h present the 
contours of the functions in 5a-d, 6a-d and 7a-d respectively.
A slice orthogonal to the plane (t,t+k) and parallel to the t+k axis, represents the 
probability density that describes the transitions from one part of distribution to another in k 
periods. The probability mass concentrated along the positive sloped diagonal, indicates a high 
persistence in a firms' relative position. A concentration of probability mass along the negatively 
sloped diagonal implies that firms overtake each other in size rank. The transition probability 
describing horizontal lines (parallel to t+k) indicates that there is very low persistence, the 
probability of being at any point in t+k is independent of the position in t. Finally, the mass of 
probabilities located along a vertical line in size 1 (the industry average) implies convergence in 
the sense that small firms grow faster than large ones.
The theoretical results are consistent with the probability mass being both along the 
negative diagonal, implying an 'action - reaction' pattern of opening a plant by alternating firms 
and along a vertical line around 1, in which case there is convergence of sizes in a stricter sense.
The graphs show persistence year by year, indicating that the firms remain in their relative 
position. Particularly for firms in size class zero, which represents the potential entry state. Not 
surprisingly, this effect is more pronounced for NPLS5 than for NPLS2, NMSH2.
The results are much more striking for the larger (5 years) horizon, where the probability 
of transition is no longer clustered along the positive diagonal but along the vertical line in 1, 
indicating convergence to the industry average. After 5 years, firms that were potential entrants 
initially, will have a positive share of the market A large probability mass is concentrated under 
the positive diagonal at zero in period t, indicating that entrants in period t reach the average size 
(1) in period t+5.
The contours show that in the first decade (between 1955 and 1965) the tendency of the 
firm sizes to converge is the strongest. The estimated kernels are consistently steeper than later 
estimates, indicating more persistence in subsequent decades. It is worth noting that this 
corresponds to the decade in which the industries saw their largest market growth and the fewest 
number of firms in the industry29. This is encouraging for the theory since two essential features 
are that (i) capacity in the market is increasing and (ii) there is a negative effect of additional 
capacity on the market price, that decreases as markets become more competitive.
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Note that these transition kernels are simply point in time estimates, describing what 
actually happened over the sample period. They are not fitted models. Hence, we cannot derive a 
law of motion, or make any inferences about the long run dynamic behaviour.
4e. Estimation of the Transition Matrix Q
Q is analogous to the Stochastic Kernel but in a discrete space such that inferences can be 
made and its long run behaviour described. Divide the space of possible values of the firm sizes 
into r states. For example, firms that have a plant share of 0.2 times the industry average to 0.6 
times the industry average, are in state i = (0.2,0.6). This defines a grid that can be thought of as 
an estimator of the initial unconditional probability distribution Each element of the matrix 
indicates the probability of transition from one state to another the entry (i j)  is the probability 
that a firm in state i moves to the state j in t periods. Hence, every row is a conditional probability 
vector, the discrete analogy of the distribution of the transitions in the figures above {Stochastic 
Kernels), when cutting the figure at a point by a plane parallel to t+k axis.
Tables 2, 3 and 4 present some estimators of the transition matrix Q. The grid divides the 
initial year total observed sample into approximately equal categories, i.e.a uniform initial 
distribution results by construction. Consequently the length of the defined states varies. Note 
that they are very narrow around the mean.
The first column in the tables is the total number of transitions over the whole time 
sample, starting at each state. An estimator of the time invariant transition probability matrix Q is 
presented in the remaining columns, for a single period and for differing number of states r. Q is 
calculated as a time average over the total sample.
Most of the entries of the matrices are different from zero implying that a transition to 
almost any state in the distribution can occur within one year. Hence, there is substantial mobility. 
The conclusions from the estimation of the Stochastic Kernels go through unchanged.
The last row in Tables 2,3 and 4 show estimates of the ergodic distribution^ Independently 
of the initial position of a firm, the ergodic distribution gives the probability of that firm being in a 
particular state. Recall the states were defined in such a way that the initial distribution is 
uniform. Though the ergodic distributions are not degenerate at 1, they are unimodal with a peak 
around this value. Whatever of the position of a firm in the initial uniform distribution, the
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probability of ending close to the average firm size is higher than the probability of ending up 
anywhere else.
Table 5 shows an estimators of Q for the subsample 1955 to 1965. Comparison of the 
ergodic distribution for this subsample with the one estimated using the full sample confirms the 
earlier finding that the tendencies to converge are strongest during the years of strong industry 
growth in industries with a small number of firms30.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper theoretically shows that in the chemicals sector there is a tendency for firms 
sizes to converge. The appendix 2 of the paper demonstrates that the conventional empirical 
approach to test for convergence using discrete choice models is inappropriate in this context.
Analysing dynamically evolving cross section distributions the paper provides evidence of 
that tendency of firms sizes to converge for the USA chemical sector.
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ENDNOTES
1. See Reinganum (1989) for a more complete description.
2. Although Budd, Harris and Vickers (1992) find that competition tends to evolve in the 
direction where joint profits are higher, the implication for 'catching up* versus 'increasing 
dominance' depends on the exact nature of the pay offs. For example in Vickers (1986), the 
outcome is reversed if price competition is Bertrand rather than Coumot. Reinganum (1983) 
shows how Gilbert and Newbeiy's (1982) results that a monopolist will spend more on R&D than 
an entrant is reversed if the very same question is analyzed in a stochastic race, rather than a 
bidding game.
3. In this paper a firm is defined by its presence in a particular market, its size by the capacity 
it operates in that market. Inter-industry ownership structures and issues relating to the boundaries 
of the firm are not addressed.
4. Gilbert and Harris (1984), for example, find in a dynamic Coumot-Nash oligopoly with 
increasing demand and indivisibilities in installing new capacity, that market forces tend to push 
the industry towards equal market shares as smaller firms invest to catch up with larger ones. 
This is consistent with our results, since installing additional capacity implies a decreasing PCM 
for existing capacity. Farrell and Saloner (1988) and Beggs and Klemperer (1992) find both that 
in the presence of consumer switching costs and new customers arriving in each period, market 
shares converge to equality, since the larger firm gains relatively more from charging a high price 
to exploit its current customer base than charging a low price to gain a greater share of the new 
customers. The smaller firm can attract the new customers at a lower cost, since the loss on its 
existing customer base from charging a lower price to attract new customers is smaller. These 
models solve the full dynamic game with a stream of profit opportunities arriving over time. In 
this paper the analysis is confined to a single project. Katz and Shapiro (1987) find in a dynamic 
model of R&D that the leader tends to develop an innovation that, if licensed or imitated, reduces 
cost by an equal amount for all firms (add-on technology).
5. This is primarily relevant for R&D projects, in particular those that can be patented. In the 
EU national laws typically provide for compulsory licenses in two situations. The first is where 
an invention has not been worked within the country to the extent to meet national demands. The 
second is where the working of a subsequent invention is prevented by the prior patent.
6. Foster (1985) describes a strategy "often used in the chemical industry. [BASF] 
developed a catalyst, which it then improved. The first generation of the catalyst went to its 
licensees, the second and improved generation into its own plants" (p. 119). Katz and Shapiro 
(1987) quote a number of studies in which competitors imitate innovations at a lower cost than the 
innovator faced. Although the licensee might have to pay a fee, or imitation involves some R&D 
expenses, it is generally recognised that this is less than the development cost, and can be 
normalized to zero within the framework of this model.
7. Mansfield (1985) finds evidence of a high rate of information diffusion in several 
industries.
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8. See Arrow (1962).
9 For the Proof, see Koopmans and Lamo (1995)
10 For the Proof, see Koopmans and Lamo (1995)
11. If both firms grab at the same time, either firm will win with equal probability.
12. This is the case because d2n ert/ d t 2 = dK'fOe'1 / dt + rdKe^/dt < 0, and since
due* / dt > 0, it must be the case that dTc'fye* /  dt < 0. The SOC K"(t) + re* APCM < 0 
is satisfied for t = T, since by (3.9) it is equivalent to k ”(T) + r7t'(T) < 0. This is implied by 
dn ' ert /  dt < 0.
13. The two conditions are: (i)APCMqi < - rn°  i = 1,2 (neither has a finite f . )  and
(ii)-rK° < (1-y)APCMqt i = 1,2 (both have a finite7,). If APCM > 0, (i) and (ii) can 
only be satisfied simultaneously if y  < 0, and if APCM < 0 they can only both be satisfied if 
y  > 0.
14 For the Proof, see Koopmans and Lamo (1995)
15. Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1990) find a qualitatively similar result. The mechanism is, 
however, somewhat different In a declining industry the optimal size of firms declines over time. 
Large firms have reached this optimal size and reduce their capacity accordingly. However, their 
smaller competitors have a suboptimal size and only reduce their capacity once the optimal size is 
smaller than their actual size.
16. See Gilbert and Lieberman (1987) for a more detailed description of the dataset
17. See Quah (1993b), Friedman (1992), Huigen et al (1991), Hall (1987) and Leonard (1986) 
Strictly speaking this Fallacy refers to growth equations, with the initial size as one of the 
explanatory variables.
18. In particular by some authors in growth theory, see for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992).
19. All the calculations and graphics in this section have been made using Danny Quah's 
Time-Series Random-Field shell tsrF.
20. For example, in growth theory the variable of interest is the per-capita income or output 
per worker of each individual economy relative to the same variable for the total economy as a 
whole. This variable has been used in Desdoigts (1994), Quah (1993; 1994).
21. These measures are equivalent to the absolute firm sizes (in terms of capacity or plants 
resp) relative to the corresponding average firm size in the industry.
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22. This result holds if the series is bounded.
23. The empirical analysis has been performed for both sets of variables, the results are 
consistent.
24. i.e.if the period between the beginning of the sample for that industry (see Table 1) and the 
opening of the first plant is shorter than five years, accordingly fewer zeros are included.
25. See Silverman (1986), Section 2.10.
26. These graphs show clearly the limitations of describing density functions by their first and
second moment
27. See Stokey and Lucas (1989).
28. They are obtained using the squared of standard Epanechnikov kernel for estimating the 
joint density and then re-scaling to obtain the conditional probability (tSrF).
29. Between 1955 and 1965 the average of annual industry growth rates of market capacity 
was 14.6%, the average number of firms 6.8. Between 1965 and 1975 the former was 9.3%, the 
latter rose to 8.01. Between 1975 and 1983 the growth rate dropped to 4.4%, whereas the average 
number of firms was 7.7.
30. We also estimated kernels and transition matrices for a subsample of industries, leaving
out those industries for which there was a proprietary production technology (i.e.Aciylonitrile, 
Caprolactam and Titanium Dioxide). Qualitatively, the conclusions remained unchanged.
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TABLE 1
Product First Total Plant Max Number of
Observation Openings Firms
Acrylic Fibers 1953 4 6
Acrylonitrile* 1956 6 6
Aluminum 1956 16 13
Aniline 1961 5 6
Bisphenol A 1959 4 5
Caprolactam 1962 3 4
Ethylene Glycol* 1960 11 14
Formaldehyde* 1962 34 18
Isopropyl Alcohol* 1964 2 4
Maleic Anhydride 1958 9 8
Methanol 1957 11 12
Pentaerythritol* 1952 6 7
Phenol 1959 8 12
Phthalic Anhydride 1955 15 12
Polyethylene-LD 1957 15 15
Polyethylene-HD 1957 20 14
Sodium Chlorate 1956 15 10
Sodium Hydrosulphide 1964 4 6
Sorbitol* 1955 3 5
Styrene 1958 12
13 1
Titanium Dioxide 1964 7
6
1,1,1 -Trichloroethane* 1966 2 4
Vinyl Acetate* 1960 8 7
Vinyl Chloride* 1962 12 13
233
The industries that were included in the specification of column (7), Table Alb.
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TABLE 2
PLSH2 First Order Transition Matrix
Time-Stationary
Upper End of the 
States
0.625 0.786 0.857 1.000 1.429 4.103
(r) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
916: 0.78 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.00
963: 0.07 0.71 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.01
1032: 0.01 0.17 0.71 0.09 0.01 0.01
1206: 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.78 0.05 0.02
478: 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.67 0.12
869: 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.88
Ergodic Distribution 0.086 0.188 0.209 0.243 0.089 0.184
TABLE3
PLSH5 First Order Transition Matrix
Time-Stationary
Upper End of the States 
(r)
0.333
(1)
0.800
(2)
0.917
(3)
1.000
(4)
1.500
(5)
5.050
(6)
981: 0.76 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 I
979: 0.06 0.77 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.00
989: 0.03 0.15 0.64 0.15 0.02 0.01
986: 0.03 0.01 0.20 0.61 0.13 0.02
899: 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.69 0.07
935: 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.88
Ergodic Distribution 0.111 0.179 0.195 0.190 0.158 0.167 |
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TABLE 4
NMSH First Order Transition Matrix
Time-Stationary
Upper End of the 
States
(r)
0.273
(1)
0.507
(2)
0.775
(3)
1.139
(4)
1.756
(5)
5.843
(6)
886: 0.74 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.01
874: 0.10 0.78 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.01
862: 0.01 0.14 0.70 0.12 0.02 0.01
920: 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.71 0.11 0.01
872: 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.73 0.09
870: 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.89
Ergodic Distribution 0.077 0.156 0.178 "0.203 0.191 0.195
TABLE5 
NMSH First Order Transition Matrix
Time-stationary, 1955-60
Upper End of the 
States
(r)
0.00
(1)
0.75
(2)
1.00
(3)
1.11
(4)
1.66
(5)
5.05
(6)
180: 0.79 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.01
52: 0.02 0.67 0.27 0.00 0.04 0.00
172: 0.01 0.04 0.80 0.03 0.09 0.02
41: 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.37 0.02 0.02
108: 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.63 0.09
100: 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.85
Ergodic Distribution 0.030 0.056 0.439 0.057 0.209 0.208
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FIGURE 1
A PCM < 0
APCMq,
(-T-l)A PCMq.
APCM q ,
(7 - l  ) APCMq,
FIGURE 2
A PCM > 0
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FIGURE 3a 
NPLS2
FIGURE 3b 
NMSH2
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FIGURE 4 
Estimated Density Functions NPL2
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FIGURE 5a
Stochastic Kernel, 1 Year Transition
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FIGURE 5c
Stochastic Kernel, 5 Year Transition
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FIGURE 5c
Stochastic Kernel Contour Plot, 1 Year Transition
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FIGURE 5f
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FIGURE 5g
Stochastic Kernel Contour  Plot, 5 Year Transi t ion
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FIGURE 5h
Stochastic Kernel Contour Plot, 5 Y ear Transition
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FIGURE 6c
Stochastic Kernel, 5 Year Trans i t ion
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FIGURE 6d 
Stochastic Kernel, 5 Year T ransition
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FIG U RE 6c
Stochastic Kernel C ontour  Plot, 1 Year  Transi t ion
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FIGURE 6f
Stochastic Kernel Contour Plot, 5 Year T ransition
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Stochastic Kernel Contour  Plot, 5 Year  Transit ion
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FIGURE 7a
Stochastic Kernel, 1 Year Transi t ion
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FIGURE 7c
Stochastic Kernel, 5 Year Transition
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Stochastic Kernel, 5 Year Transition
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APPENDIX 1
The Logit Model
In this appendix we present the results of testing the Empirical Hypothesis using the 
conventional discrete choice approach.
The empirical model estimates the probability of firm i opening a plant, conditional on 
at least one firm in the industry opening one:
Prob(x, = l\SUMOP > 0) = F(MSH,, SUMOP,, SUMF,) (Al.I)
Where:
SUMOPjj: total number of plants opened in industry j between t and t+1.
: 1 if firm i opens a plant in industry j  between t and t+1, 0 otherwise.
F : Logistic distribution function.
MSHjjji firm i's total capacity in industry ](qijt)relative to the total industry
capacity: MSH^ = qijt /£ , qijr 
SUMF j j : total number of firms in the industry and potential entrants.
We will test for alternative functional forms of the (log) odds ratio h(.). Our basic specification, 
which reflects the outcome of the game, is linear:
ht = a + bMSH, + c SUMOP, + d SUMF, + u, (A1.2)
The reason for conditioning on the number of openings (SUMOP) is that the theoretical model 
does not predict the time series dynamics, only which firm is more likely to win the project 
given that it is available.
In some of the estimated models MSH will be replaced by an alternative measure of 
relative firm size PLS, which is the number of plants of firm i in industry j relative to the total 
number of plants currently in operation in j. SUMOP is included as an explanatory variable to 
account for multiple arrivals of projects, as only the cross-sectional allocation is tested. The 
implicit assumption of this procedure is that the arrival process of new investment opportunities
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(projects) is independent of the firm characteristics. The validity of this is tested in Koopman 
and Lamo (1995)
A change in the number of firms competing for the projects changes the probability of 
firm i opening a plant, cp the relative sizes. But not only incumbent firms compete for opening 
new plants, potential entrants do too. This, as before, begs the question on how to deal with 
potential entry. In the dataset potential entry is not observable. If firms actually enter, it is not 
clear for how long a firm has been a potential entrant. All that can be said is that it has been for 
at least two years, since it takes on average two years to build a new plant31. We will make 
alternative assumptions on how long firms have been potential entrants before actually entering, 
to show that the results are robust in this respect. We will also assume that all potential entrants 
will enter over the course of the sampling period. Exiting firms remain potential entrants for 
some years by assumption. Hence, SUMF depends on the specific assumption that is made in 
this respect.
Large firms will open and close more plants than small firms due to replacement of old 
plants by new ones, effectively not changing the industry capacity. To control for this bias, a 
firm opening a plant t will be considered as replacement if the firm closes one between t-2 and 
t+2.
A testable hypothesis H0 that follows from the Empirical Hypothesis is that b < 0, 
although in Section 3b we claimed that the interpretation of a negative coefficient of the initial 
condition as indicating convergence is not necessarily valid.
Table A1 shows the result of the ML estimators of (A 1.2) for alternative specifications. 
Column (1) reports the estimated coefficients assuming that entrants have been around to grab a 
project for four years before opening their first plant, taking into account the two years it takes 
to build one. The coefficient of MSH is negative and significant. Hence, we cannot 
reject H0 on first sight. The coefficients of both SUMF and SUMOP have their expected signs. 
Column (2) corresponds to a specification of the model that includes non-linear effects of MSH. 
The quadratic term is significant. It indicates that for MSH < 0.37 the relationship between the 
probability of opening and MSH is negative, though it is positive for liigher values. It should be 
noted that 95% of the observations of MSH are below this critical value in this sample.
Some misspecification tests were performed. To test for industry specific effects we
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estimated the model (A 1.2) for each industry, the estimates of b were instable, often 
insignificant and not always negative. Allowing b and the coefficient of MSH2 to be industry 
specific, generated significant estimates only for a few industries. Adding industry dummies to 
the equation (A 1.2) did not show significant industry effects32.
Testing for time varying effects, time dummies were added to the original specification 
(A 1.2). They were all insignificant and the estimation results did not change substantially. 
Splitting the sample into two sub-samples, pre- and post oil crisis (1973) shows that there is a 
structural break, but qualitatively the results are unchanged.
The coefficients in column (3) are estimated under the same entry assumption as (1) and 
(2), but replacing MSH by PLS. The conclusions are similar to those for (2). Also industry and 
time effects are as before. In (4) the sample is changed, assuming that all entrants could have 
opened a plant since the beginning of the sampling period and all exiting firms stay around as 
potential entrants until the end of the sampling period. The earlier conclusions remain 
unchanged.
The results of estimating (A 1.2) using the sub-sample of incumbent firms are reported 
in column (5). In various alternative specifications, both MSH and PLSH become insignificant. 
Industry by industry, none of the estimates for b are significant. However, there might be a 
problem of sample selection in the sense that we ignore the part of the sample with initial size 
being zero, since a firm does not enter the sample until it has a positive size. The estimation of 
the model for incumbents should, strictly speaking, take into account that the initial size being 
equal to zero is a truncation point in the considered sample34. On the other hand, to consider the 
whole sample as we did in the first place assumes that an entrant's decision of opening a plant 
can be described by the same model as the incumbent's. This is in line with the theoretical 
result since both respond to the same motivation, i.e. the fixed profit of the plant and the 
externality on the existing capacity.
Although these first results show some support for the theoretical results, they seem 
very sensitive to the exact empirical specification and the sample that is used.
Another testable implication of the theory are that the relative size of the firm is a 
sufficient statistic for determining which firm is most likely to win the project. Some exercises 
trying to test for this are performed in Koopman and Lamo (1995).
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APPENDIX 2
Galton's Fallacy for Discrete Choice Probability Models (Probit)
Let the variable X„be the size of the firm i at time t. Define:
(A2.1)
The probability of an individual firm increasing capacity given its current size, can be 
formulated as the following Discrete Choice Probability Model:
(A Probit Model if F is O).
We get (Appendix 2) a negative estimator of the parameter p. This negative relation 
between the probability of increasing size and the initial size has been understood in the 
literature as convergence in the firm's sizes. We claim that p is not informative in terms of 
convergence. In fact it can be shown that no convergence is compatible with p < 0.
Suppose that X jt follows the process:
Prob [ Y,,=l / X M  ] = Prob [ X„ > XM / X M  ] = F( p X u) = 1 - F(- pX„)
(A2.2)
-{!) + £ it (A2.3)
Where |± is the mean and can be a function of exogenous variables X’<|). 
For simplicity redefine Xu as its deviation respect to the mean p.:
Xit — yXit-l + £ it (A2.4)
£~ N (0 ,ae) and Xt-,~ N(0, a e/(l-y)).
Let us assume that there is not convergence in the sense that the cross-section 
distribution of sizes remain unchanged along time. In other words Xu is stationary, i.e.:
\y\ < 1
Subtracting Xit_i from (A2.4),
XirXit.} = -(l-tfXn.j + £„
then (A2.2) is simply,
Prob [  (  XirX , ) > 0 / Xu., j  = Prob [-(1 + e„ > 0 J =
1- Prob[ e< (l-y)Xu-, ]  = 1 - F [  (l-y)X„.;]
So, our - P= ( l- ’Y) i.e. P = ( y - 1 ) < 0 even if the firm's sizes are stationary.
( A 2 . 5 )
( A 2 . 6 )
( A 2 . 7 )
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ENDNOTES TO APPENDICES
31. See Lieberman (1987).
32. The output of those specification tests are omitted for reasons of space. Available on 
request.
33. For sample selection problems in this context see Hall (1987).
34. This might be related to Gilbert and Lieberman (1987) finding a positive sign for MSH 
in their logit model of the probability of incremental capacity expansions. Their sample is also 
restricted to incumbents.
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TABLE A1
Logit Analysis of Plant Openings.
 (Estimated coefficients)_____
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MSH -7.14* -15.65* -5.85* 3.37*
(1.53) (2.59) (1.53) (0.98)
MSH2 20.92*
(5.52)
8.14
(2,81)
PLSH -28.75*
(2.59)
PLSH2 50.50*
(5.64)
SUMOP 0.28* 0.25* 0.27* 0.23* 0.16
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
SUMF -.18* -0.17* -0.21* -0.11* -0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CONST 0.27 0.27 -1.81 0.13 -2.13
No of Obs. 1642 1642 1642 2223 807
Log Likelihood -606.8 -584.9 -527.6 -706.4 -291.2
Heteroscedasticity consistent (White) SE are in parentheses. 
* Significant at 1% (One tailed test).
184
REFERENCES
Arrow, K., (1962), 'Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions', In 
Nelson, R., (ed), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, NJ.
Barro, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1992), 'Convergence', Journal o f Political Economy, Vol. 100, 
No.2, pp.223-251.
Beggs, A. and Klemperer, P.(1992), 'Multi-Period Competition with Switching Costs', 
Econometrica, Vol.60, No.3, May, pp.651-666.
Budd, C., Harris, C. and Vickers, J.(1992), 'A Model of the Evolution of Duopoly: Does the 
Asymmetry Between Firms Tend to Increase or Decrease?1, Review of Economic Studies, 
Vol.60, No.3, pp.543-573.
Cabral, L. and Riordan, M. (1994), 'The Learning Curve, Market Dominance and Predatory 
Pricing', Econometrica, Vol.62, No.5, September.
Chapman K., (1991), The International Petrochemical Industry, Blackwell: Oxford.
Desdoigts, A. (1994), Changes in the World Income Distribution: A Non-Parametric 
Approach to Challenge the Neoclassical Convergence Argument, PhD thesis, European 
University Institute, Florence, June.
Dolado, J. and Gonzalez-Paramo, J.(1994), 'Regional Convergence in Spain', Moneda y 
Credito, .
Farrell, J. and Shapiro, C.(1988), 'Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs', Rand Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 19, No.l, Spring, pp. 123-137.
Foster, R., (1985), Innovation: The Attacker's Advantage, Summit Books.
Friedman, M. (1992), 'Do Old Fallacies Ever Die?' Journal o f Political Literature, Vol.30, 
No.4, December, pp.2129-32.
Ghemawat, P.(1984), 'Capacity Expansion in the Titanium Dioxide Industry', The Journal of 
Industrial Economics, Vol.33, No.2, December, pp. 145-163.
Ghemawat, P and Nalebuff, B.(1990), 'The Devolution of Declining Industries', Quarterly 
Journal o f Economics, Vol. 105,1990, pp. 167-186.
Gilbert, R. and Harris, R. (1984), 'Competition with Lumpy Investment', The Rand Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 15, No.2, pp. 197-212.
185
Gilbert, R and Lieberman, M.(1987), 'Investment and Coordination in Oligopolistic Industries' 
Journal o f Economics, Vol. 18, No.l, Spring , pp. 17-33.
Gilbert, R and Newbery, D.(1982), 'Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly’, 
American Economic Review, Vol.72, No.3, June, pp.514-26.
Hart, P. and Prais, S.(1956), 'The Analysis of Business Concentration: A Statistical Approach’, 
Journal o f the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, Vol. 119, pp. 150-81.
Hall, B.(1987), 'The Relationship between Firm Size and Firm Growth in the US 
Manufacturing Sector1, The Journal of IndustrialJDrganisation, Vol.35, No.4, June, pp.583 - 
606.
Huigen, R., Kleiiweg, A. and Van Leeuwen, G.(1991), 'The Relationship Between Firm Size 
and Firm Growth in Dutch Manufacturing Estimated on Panel Data’, Research Paper 9105, 
Research Institute for Small and Medium-sized Business in the Netherlands, Zoetermeer 
October.
Hopenhayen H.(1989), 'A Dynamic Stochastic Model of Entry and Exit to an Industry’, mimeo, 
Graduate School of Business - Stanford University, Research Paper 1057.
Jovanovic, B.(1982), 'Selection and Evolution of Industry’, Econometrica, Vol.50, pp.649-70.
Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. (1987), 'R&D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation’, American 
Economic Review, Vol.77, No.3, June, pp.402-20.
Koopman R. and Lamo A. (1995), 4 Cross-Sectional Firm Dynamics: Theory and Empirical 
Results From The Chemical Sector’ LSE, CEP Discussion Paper No.229, March.
Lee, T. and Wilde, L.(1980), 'Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation’, The 
Quarterly Journal o f Economics, Vol.94, March, pp.429-36.
Leonard, S.(1986), 'On the Size Distribution of Employment and Establishments', NBER 
Working Paper No 1951, NBER: Cambridge, MA.
Lieberman, M.(1984), 'The Learning Curve and Pricing in the Chemical Processing Industries’, 
Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No.2, Summer, pp.213-28.
lieberman, M.(1987), - 'Postentry Investment and Market Structure in the Chemical Processing 
Industries’, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 18, No.4, Winter.
Loury, G.(1979), 'Market Structure and Innovation’, The Quarterly Journal o f Economics, 
Vol.93, August, pp.395-4I0.
Mansfield, E.(1985), 'How Rapidly Does New Industrial Technology Leak Out?’ Journal of 
Industrial Economics, Vol.34, No.2, December, pp.217-223.
186
Pakes, A. and Ericson, R.(1990), 'Empirical Implications of Alternative Models of Firm 
Dynamics', mimeo,.
Quah, D.(1993a), 'Empirical Cross-Sectional Dynamics in Economic Growth', European 
Economic Review, Vol.37, No.2/3, December pp.426-443.
Quah, D.( 1993b) 'Galton's Fallacy and Tests of the Convergence Hypothesis', The 
Scandinavian Journal o f Economics, Vol.95, No.4, December, pp.427-443.
Quah, D.( 1996)'Convergence Empirics Across Economies with (Some) Capital Mobility', 
Journal of Economis Growth. Forthcoming
Quintella, R., (1993), The Strategic Management ofTeclmology in the Chemical and 
Petrochemical Industries, Pinter Publishers: London.
Reinganum, J.(1983), 'Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly', American 
Economic Review, Vol.73, No.4, September, pp.741-48.
Reinganum, J (1989), 'The Timing of Innovation: Research Development and Diffusion', in 
Schmalensee, R. and Willig, R., (eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol.I, Amsterdam, 
pp.849-908.
Silverman, B., (1986), Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis, Chapman and Hall: 
New York, NY 10001.
Simon, H. and Bonini, C.(1958), 'The Size Distribution of Business Firms', American Economic 
Review, Vol.48, September, pp.607-17.
Spitz, P., (1988), Petrochemicals, The Rise of an Industry, John Wiley & Sons: New York.
Stobaugh, R., (1987), Innovation and Competition, Harvard Business School Press: Boston, 
MA.
Stockey, N. and Lucas Jr, R., (1989), Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics, Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, Mass.
Vickers, J.(1986), 'The Evolution of Market Structure when there is a Sequence of Innovations', 
The Journal o f Industrial Economics, Vol.35, No.l, September 1986, pp. 1-12.
187
CHAPTER 4
UNEMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE AND REGIONAL LABOUR FLUCTUATIONS
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1. INTRODUCTION
Whether idiosyncratic or disaggregate1 (regional, sectors, etc.) shocks are responsible 
for aggregate business cycles or whether aggregate disturbances are the causes of 
macroeconomic fluctuations which then disseminate across regions or sectors is still an open 
question in the business cycles literature.
This paper attempts to be a contribution to the empirical business cycle literature in the 
labour market addressing the issue above for the European labour market. It studies 
unemployment and labour market fluctuations. Specifically it deals with the question of whether 
shocks in employment growth rates across regions in Europe have aggregate effects on 
European unemployment or on the contrary, the aggregate fluctuations are primary.
The standard theories of employment decompose unemployment into natural or 
structural rate and fluctuatuions around it, calling these fluctuations cyclical unemployment. 
The economy can be above or below the natural rate but in the long run equilibrium tends to i t  
The interest in cyclical unemployment appears during the 1980s, when macroeconomists try to 
explain the behaviour of European unemployment rates. The picture in the early 80s was one of 
rising unemployment together with a deflation process. The traditional approach explained the 
labour market behaviour by assuming that unemployment rates were over their natural or 
structural level. The puzzle emerges when in the second half of the decade the inflation levels 
stabilise and unemployment remains high in spite of the actions taken to reduce it. It seems that 
the natural rate of unemployment m Europe has risen and arguments such as oil prices, high 
interest rates etc. fail to explain why. One of the possible explanations is that the cyclical 
unemployment in Europe is turning into structural unemployment. Consequently, business 
cycle literature has an important role to play, since understanding fluctuations in labour market 
becomes crucial to understanding the high unemployment rate in Europe and its persistence.
Traditionally, it has been argued (Barro (1977)) that the cause of unemployment 
fluctuations were aggregate demand shocks. More recent ideas (hysteresis theory) claimed that 
temporary labour demand shocks may have long-lasting effects on unemployment. Also it has
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been maintained that unemployment reacts imperfectly to permanent shocks and they have a 
delayed effect on unemployment. A controversial explanation of unemployment fluctuations 
was raised by David Lilien (1982). He claimed that an important part of the fluctuations in 
employment is due to shifts in demand across sectors or regions rather than aggregate 
disturbances.
There is an enormous amount of empirical work trying to relate aggregate and 
disaggregate (or idiosyncratic) fluctuations in labour markets, in other terms attempting to see to 
what extent idiosyncratic shocks can generate aggregate fluctuations in the labour market This 
literature deals with aggregate unemployment, sectoral and regional labour imbalance and 
labour mobility. Methodologically it makes use of measures hardly useful to analyse the issue at 
hand and additionally it makes assumptions about stationarity. The current paper deals with the 
same kind of issues. The analysis performed here overcomes some of the methodological 
drawbacks of the existing literature. It uses a model for non-stationary evolving distributions to 
identify idiosyncratic and aggregate disturbances and then analyses their joint dynamics. It 
provides some evidence on whether regional shocks in the European labour market are 
responsible for the evolution of unemployment rates in Europe.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the recent empirical 
literature in labour mobility and sectoral/regional imbalance and explains why the techniques 
and the measures used in the existing literature are not adequate to account for idiosyncratic 
shocks. Section 3 suggests a more natural approach in the context of cross-section dynamics 
analysis proposed by Quah (1994a, 1996). Section 4 studies the dynamics of employment for 51 
European regions from 1960 to 1990, and provides some evidence on whether regional shocks 
have aggregate effects on unemployment or whether aggregate fluctuations spread across 
regions. Section 5 concludes.
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2. CYCLICAL EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR IMBALANCE LITERATURE
Lilien (1982) found a high positive correlation between the standard deviation of 
employment growth rates among sectors (a^ and the aggregate unemployment rate for the US 
during the post-war period. From this correlation he concluded that shocks in demand across 
sectors are responsible for an important part of the cyclical variation in unemployment. 
Conclusion that relies on two assumptions: the employment growth rates among sectors is a 
good proxy of labour reallocation and its standard deviation describes adequately the dynamics 
of the cross-section distribution. Further it interprets correlation as causality.
Lilien's argument generates a wide response, given that the implications for economic 
policy are very different depending on whether the driving force of cyclical unemployment is 
sectoral shifts or aggregate disturbances. Idiosyncratic shocks as the main cause of 
unemployment fluctuations suggest that an efficient policy would be that conceived to smooth 
the adjustment process of the labour force across categories and consequently it would discard 
the aggregate demand policies3. In this respect a very influential paper is Abraham & Katz 
(1986). They showed that a pure aggregate demand shock could produce a positive correlation 
between <rt and the employment rate if some categories (regions, sectors, etc.) are cyclically 
more sensitive than others. They also gave evidence on how Lilien's measure may be affected 
by aggregate variation influences. They understand the correlation found by Lilien as reverse 
causality, in other words, aggregate fluctuations generate the dynamics in Lilien's measure and 
not the opposite.
Abraham & Katz (1986) suggest using information on job vacancy rates in order to 
indicate whether a pure idiosyncratic shift or a pure aggregate demand has been the more 
important cause of the correlation. This is based on the negative relationship between 
unemployment and vacancy rates. Holding structural characteristics fixed, the plot of 
unemployment rates versus vacancy rates describes a negatively sloped curve which is known 
as Beveridge or UV curve. Changes in aggregate demand lead to movements along this curve, 
then the response of unemployment and vacancies would go in the opposite directions. A pure 
idiosyncratic shock shifts the curve generating higher unemployment rate at each vacancy rate. 
This is compatible with movements of vacancies and unemployment rate in the same direction
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for example a negative shock across regions increase the unemployment rate but it also increase 
vacancies. In other terms there is a matching problem between demand and supply for labour. 
Excess and deficiency for demand and supply coexist.
From that, several studies in the literature have pointed out the concept of deficient 
matching between labour supply and demand for labour. They define some measures of the 
imbalance between unemployment and vacancies across different labour-market categories 
(sectors, regions, skills, etc.), which are called mismatch indices and study their evolution over 
time and their correlation with aggregate unemployment. There is a big variety of indices which 
correspond to different concepts of mismatch. In fact there is no unified view of the mismatch 
concept.
The most popular measures of mismatch arise from the equilibrium models. Mismatch 
is defined as the distance between the actual and the optimal unemployment rate derived from 
an equilibrium model. If the model is such that the optimal unemployment rate is the one at 
which the unemployment and vacancies ratio coincides across categories, then the empirical 
measure of mismatch is the following 4
MM1 ^ J/3I i\ur vi \ , (4.1)
where ux and vt are respectively the share of unemployed persons and the share of job vacancies 
in category i= 1....N.
If the equilibrium unemployment rate is the NAIRU,5 the empirical measure of 
mismatch is the following index6:
Ih
MM 2 = —var[ -Jr1-  ]' (4-2)
2  1 Z u ,
ZNi
Where Ut and Nt are unemployment and employment in group i respectively. In fact 
this index uses the idea of relative dispersion of regional unemployment as an indicator of 
mismatch.
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There are several studies of mismatch based on the Dreze and Bean disequilibrium 
model. The Unemployment can be constrained by lack of demand (Keynesian regime), lack of 
capacity (classical regime) or lack of labour (repressed inflation regime). Mismatch here is 
identified with regime disparity across regions, sectors, etc.. In each micro market the short side, 
determines the unemployment, the existence of rationing implies that there are unfilled 
vacancies or unemployment. Finally there is an approach which understands mismatch as a 
short term phenomenon. The index that better reflects this short-term approach to mismatch is a 
turbulence9 index of the type of Lilien's measure, i.e. the sum of absolutes changes in regional 
/sectoral/etc. shares of employment.
The mismatch literature is inconclusive. The evidence from MM1 indicates that 
mismatch increased in Germany and Japan but did not in the UK and Sweden during the post­
war period. According to the MM2 index mismatch falls over time in the majority of the 
categories (skill, occupation, region, etc.) and countries, but nevertheless it seems to explain 
more than one third of the total unemployment10 Lilien's measure has been included in the 
estimation of some labour market equations and is basically not significant Few other studies 
replicate Lilien's work and find what they call evidence in support of Lilien's argument, for 
example Neeling (1987) for Canada or more recently Kazamaki (1994) for Sweden.
All the studies in this labour imbalance/idiosyncratic shock literature, suffer from the 
same kind of general but critical problem: the empirical measures used do not capture the 
economic phenomenon that they are trying to reflect.
Lilien simply takes the time series of cross-section variances of changes in the 
employment rate (in logs, i.e. employment growth rates) and examines its correlation with 
aggregate unemployment time series. Firstly, he measures labour reallocation due to sectoral 
shifts as rates of change in employment. Abraham and Katz (1986) argued that there is evidence 
to believe that Lilien's variable includes labour reallocation due to sectoral shocks and to 
aggregated fluctuations. There are a few attempts in the literature to construct proxies that 
distinguish aggregate shocks from the idiosyncratic ones. See for example Neeling (1987) or 
Kazamaki (1994)11. Secondly, the cross-section standard deviation crt is a point-in-time statistic 
of the cross-section distribution.
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These studies assume that it is a good summary of all the relevant information about the 
dynamics of the variable in question (employment growth rates). An assumption that is quite 
questionable. In order to accept it, it would be necessary to test whether c t describes adequately 
the cross-section distribution of the employment growth rates.
The mismatch indices approach deserves similar comments. The study of labour 
imbalances requires the characterisation of the behaviour of employment and/or vacancies of a 
cross-section (regions, sectors, etc.) over time. Instead what this literature does is the following. 
Given a definition of imbalance between labour demand and labour supply across categories, it 
uses an index to measure that imbalance. Again, the mismatch indices are simply summary- 
measures, statistics of the cross-section distribution of that imbalance at each point in time. The 
indices collapse all the cross-section information in a single statistic. The studies of mismatch 
look at the evolution of these indices over time. In other words they are using data in the 
distribution across categories of employment and/or unemployment but they do not exploit 
efficiently the information contained in those data.
Entorf (1993) analyses the performance of the above defined MM1 and MM2 and shows 
that they can easily fail when unemployment shows upward additive shifts. He proves 
analytically that both measures can give spurious results arising from stochastic trends and 
changes in aggregate unemployment.
Consequently, the mismatch analysis which initially appeared as a promising alternative 
way to analyse disaggregate and aggregate fluctuations in the labour market, turns out to be 
misleading and requires alternative measures that take into account the dynamics of the 
imbalance phenomenon. Additionally most of the existing measures of mismatch are derived 
from stationary and more precisely static equilibrium models.
The current paper, goes back to the original problem in Lilien (1982) and analyses 
directly the dynamics of labour reallocation. It attempts to obtain some evidence on whether the 
evolution of European unemployment during the last 30 years is attributable in part to the 
dynamics of regional shocks. It models the dynamics of changes in employment, after 
conditioning out the aggregate component, across categories (in this case regions) using a 
natural approach that exploits all the cross-section information available and models its
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dynamics over time. The study of the dynamics of vacancies and unemployment imbalances is 
in the agenda.
3. REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS AND AGGREGATE UNEMPLOYMENT 
FLUCTUATIONS
This section suggests an approach to study the dynamics of aggregates and 
12disaggregates. Our question is whether idiosyncratic regional shocks to employment (labour 
reallocation due to regional shocks) explain the dynamics of aggregate unemployment 
fluctuations. The empirical analysis of this question requires two steps. Initially there is need for 
an adequate proxy of regional shocks in labour. Once the variable is well defined, what this 
approach suggests is simply to characterise the dynamics of its cross-section distribution, 
instead of focusing on one statistic of that distribution as previous studies do. The idea is to 
model the dynamics of aggregates, whose fluctuations we are interested in explaining, 
together13 with the dynamics of the disaggregates This proposed analysis is a natural way of 
looking at the information, it is model free and does not make any assumption about stationarity 
or similar, exploiting all the cross-section information.
While the aggregate unemployment rate in Europe, is a time series structure, the 
disaggregate (idiosyncratic regional shocks to employment ) has the structure of a Random 
Field.14 At each moment t there is one observation for each region, i.e. at each point in time is a 
cross-section distribution. The dynamics of these cross-section distributions involves: (a) 
changes on the exterior shape and (b) intra-distribution mobility. The way to proceed is to 
characterise that dynamics and to relate it to the unemployment dynamics.
Formally, let u be a vector of aggregates with a fixed finite dimension and let y  be the 
cross-section of disaggregates. The hypothesis is that aggregates and disaggregates (u,y) evolve 
together over time. We are interested in their joint dynamics. Let us start by modelling the 
dynamics of the disaggregates. Let {Oyt, integer t> 1} be the measure (one for each year) 
describing the distribution of y. More precisely Oy t is the dynamically evolving probability 
measure of the distribution of y. It is defined on the measurable space (R, R), (where R is the 
real line and R is the sigma algebra.
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Dynamically evolving distributions (Oy t+1) can always be written in terms of the 
following stochastic kernel equation:
=  J s , C , (4 .3)
for every A in R, where Ht is a Stochastic Kernel.15 That is, S  t(y, A) is the probability that the 
next state period lies in A given that this period the state i s y .
The {Et} sequence of stochastic kernels, encodes all the dynamics of Ot (the cross- 
section distribution of the disaggregates. However E t is infinite dimensional, for the discrete 
case the stochastic kernel equation describes a Markov chain sequence. The latter may be 
parameterized by two elements: a sequence of transition matrices which indicates intra­
distribution mobility and a sequence of grids which are an estimator of the cross section 
distribution shape16. Hence, {Et} turns up to be a sequence of transition probability matrices 
and <Dt are the corresponding marginal distributions (grids). Since we are interested in the 
relation between the dynamics of the disaggregates (regional fluctuations) and the aggregate 
fluctuations in unemployment, we must study correlation and causality between the aggregate 
and the sequence of transition matrices and the sequence of grids, which parameterize the 
disaggregate.
Let us define the grid in such a way that the set of quantiles determine the sequence of 
cross-section distributions, hence the change in the grid describes the evolution of the cross- 
section distribution Denote it by qt={ ql p q2j ••• qn,t }> ^  number of cells in the grid. The 
sequence of fractile transition probability matrices, associated with these grids, shows the intra­
distribution mobility. Let us denote this sequence of fractiles transition probability matrices for
17regional disaggregates by {Mt}.
Each transition probability matrix {Mt} includes n x n  cells. Therefore it is difficult to 
extract information about intra-distribution mobility. In order to do that we can use the notion of 
Mobility Index. A mobility index is a continuous scalar function defined over the set of 
transition matrices. Each index collapses the information about mobility contained in the n(n-l) 
independent numbers of the matrix into a single number. From each time series of matrices 
{Mt}, each index defines a time series of mobility measures.
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• 18 In this paper we are using three of these indices, and a fourth one which additionally
includes information on the quantile location, (i) Shorrocks (1978) proposes a measure of
mobility the following form:
hm=n - H M ) = (44a)
n — 1
= (4-4b) n — 1 j
where M - is the probability of remaining in the state j  and (1- Mjj ) is the probability of exiting 
state j  (non persistence). This index (hm)can be interpreted (see expression (4.4b)) as the inverse 
of the harmonic mean of the expected duration of remaining in a given part of the distribution. 
The higher hm the less persistence is in the transition matrix, (ii) A second index frequently 
used in the literature is the following :
e2 = l - \ X 2\, (4.5)
where X2 is the second largest eigenvalue of the transition matrix. To understand the intuition 
behind e2 as an index of mobility notice that every stochastic matrix M has an eigenvalue equal 
to unity and the modulus of the others is smaller than one. If M implies a unique ergodic (long 
run) distribution, the sequence of matrices converges to this long-run at a speed given by the 
powers of the eigenvalues. In particular the rate of convergence is driven by the second largest 
eigenvalue. Consequently the second largest eigenvalue module is often used as a measure of 
the convergence speed. The higher the index e2 the faster the convergence, (iii) Based on the 
same intuition there is another index, called it ev
ev=  J — # (4.6)
n - 1
where Xj are the eigenvalues of M . The index ev relates positively to the average (not only the 
leading term) rate of convergence of the transition matrix towards the ergodic limit. Normally 
ev and hm are not related but when all the Xj are real and positive ev coincides with hm. To see
this notice that the trace of a matrix equals the sum of the eigenvalues, hence, hm can be written 
as:
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n - ^ X j
h m -  -------  * (4.4c)
n — 1
These three indice (hm, ev and e2) are bounded in the interval [0,1]. (iv) In addition we use the 
index of mobility proposed by Quah (1996), this index exploits simultaneously information on 
M and q. From each time-series of pairs {M  ^q(}9 each index defines a time series of mobility 
measures. Quah (1996) argues that the information on the quantiles sets is also relevant since it 
makes a difference moving from the lowest to the highest quantile when the latter are close or 
far away from each other. Hence, not only moving from one state (quantil) to another matters 
but also the location of those quantiles.
The index is derived from the autoregressive stochastic process corresponding to the 
evolution of the transition matrices. It is defined as the unity minus the correlation coefficient in 
that process. Quah (1996) defines the index as
ar = l - p ,  , (4.7)
where p, is the correlation coefficient Notice that a correlation coefficient is an indicator of 
predictability, i.e. of immobility.
The next section utilises the methodology above described to study regional 
employment dynamics and aggregate unemployment fluctuations in Europe.
4.- SOME RESULTS FOR EUROPE 19
After questioning the validity of the existing literature on mismatch and proposing a
new approach to analyse the relation between aggregate and disaggregate fluctuations, this
section performs an empirical exercise which illustrates the proposed approach using data for
regions of the European Union.
20The choice of Europe, in spite of the difficulties in data availability, does not need 
much justification. As it has been mentioned in previous sections understanding European 
unemployment in the past two decades is a challenge faced by macroeconomists, not only is its 
level high and persistent but also its behaviour differs from the OECD countries.
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We do not try to explain European unemployment, we simply attempt to find some 
evidence on one of the multiple explanations that are present in the literature, that is regional 
shocks as a cause of unemployment fluctuations. Three different considerations have motivated 
this specific analysis: firstly, the regional shocks hypothesis seems to be compatible with the 
movement upward of the UV curve in Europe and the high unemployment rates correspond to 
certain regions, those with intensive heavy industry or agriculture. The second consideration is 
methodological; the existing empirical analysis on this question suffers from a few problems, 
discussed in section 3, which may prejudice the results. Thirdly the evidence from the 
traditional analysis is inconclusive.
21An additional reason to choose European regions is that as a by-product of the 
analysis it is possible to form an idea of whether the regional shocks in employment are 
symmetrically distributed, an issue that has been argued as relevant for the viability of the 
EMU. The reason for this is that a flexible exchange rate can balance the labour market shocks. 
Although the current paper will not consider this aspect, it will be treated in future work.
In this section the disaggregate refers to European regions and aggregate refers to
22
Europe as a whole. The available data include 51 regions of similar population size for a 
period of 31 years (1960-1990) (see data appendix). The basic variable for the aggregate is the 
European unemployment rate (ut) and for disaggregates it is the log of changes in employment 
for each region after conditioning out the components which are common to all the regions.
The regional variable is meant to reflect the regional (idiosyncratic) shocks, however the 
log of changes in employment for each region is affected by aggregate and country-specific 
changes.
To substitute out all or a part of the aggregate influence we first choose a very simple 
variable: the growth rate of regional employment as a proportion of European employment, hit 
= A log (Nit\NJ = A [log (Nit))~ log (Net) ]  = glt - geP where Nit is employment in region i at 
time t and Ne( is European-wide employment at time t. git = Alog Nu is employment growth 
rate in the region i, time t and get = Alog Net the employment growth rate in Europe.
Table lb gives the contemporaneous correlation between the aggregate unemployment 
growth rates and the mobility indices for the cross-section dynamics of the disaggregates. The
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contemporaneous behaviour of the unemployment rates in Europe seems to be strongly related 
to the intra-distribution mobility of relative employment growth rates across regions. There is a 
positive and very high correlation in every case, ranking from 0.74 to 0.8.
Regarding the behaviour of the aggregate together with the quantile location (shape of 
the cross-section distribution), the contemporaneous correlation is negative for the lower 
quantiles, it is -0.7 for the 20th percentile, -0.75 for the 40th and only -0.30 in the case of the 
60th percentile. A higher relative employment growth rate for the regions in the lower quantiles 
(i.e. as the lower quantiles approach the average) corresponds to a lower aggregate 
unemployment rate. The correlation of the aggregate with the 80th percentile and the maximum 
is positive and quite high: 0.64 and 0.79 respectively. Movements towards the average 
correspond to a lower aggregate unemployment rate.
23The causality evidence, is more complicated. We perform an exclusion restriction test 
in bivariate VARs (unemployment rates and, one by one, the measures that characterise the 
disaggregate dynamics). These kind of tests consist of testing the joint significance of the lags 
of a group of variables. The estimated VAR coefficient of unemployment suggests that it is an 
integrated variable. It is well known that if the variables in the VAR are integrated the exclusion 
tests in this context may have non-standard asymptotic properties. We follow a very simple 
alternative proposed in Dolado and Liitkepohl (1994), such that the test may be done directly on 
the coefficients (least squares estimators) of the VAR process in levels. It consists of fitting a 
VAR the order of which exceeds the true one. It does not require unit root test and is robust to 
the integration process properties.
Table 2b shows the marginal significance levels for the exclusion restriction test, in a 
bivariate VAR which includes our measures of intra-distribution mobility and the 
unemployment rate.
Testing in two lags systems shows no causality relations. The three lags analysis 
indicates that the indices hm, ev and e2 help to predict aggregate unemployment rate and the 
opposite is also true for e2. The index that we will say is more efficient in the sense that 
incorporates more information, i.e. ar does not show any power to predict unemployment or 
vice versa.
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Table 2a, for the quantile element, suggests that the 40th and 80th, percentiles cause 
aggregate unemployment rates. The msl for exclusion of the quantiles in the equation of the 
unemployment are 3% and 0.4% for 40th percentile, 10% and 2.3% for the 80th. 
Unemployment helps to predict the maximum ( msl 1% and 0.5%.). The 60th percentile does 
not show any pattern of causality.
The previous normalisation assumes that the elasticity of labour reallocation across 
regions with respect to aggregate fluctuations is the same for each region and equals the unit. 
Relaxing this hypothesis implies to repeat the analysis above taking as the basic variable h \t =
g,t - |3. get 24 where p is the elasticity parameter estimated by fitting the following univariate 
process for each region:
&<=«(+ P , A log N„ + s„ (4.8)
How far to go with conditioning depends on what is understood by idiosyncratic or 
region-specific fluctuations. Part of the fluctuations in h ’it still may be not region-specific but 
common to all the regions in the same country, think of country-specific economic policy etc.. 
The sample analysed in this exercise, includes eleven countries that during the considered 
period have had different macroeconomic policies; five of these are divided in regions the rest 
are considered as a unique region.
To condition out the country-specific effect we take h ’it as the basic variable if the 
country is not divided into regions. For each one of the other countries, which are divided in
25regions, we fit the following model.
Su= “ / + P /' A log Nel + y A log Na+ e„ (4.9)
where Nct is country-wide employment, gct is country growth rate. git and Alog Net as before.
Now the basic variable is h ’it = gir (3. A log Net - y A log Nct.
Tables 3a,b and 4a,b show the results of performing similar analysis to the one before 
after conditioning out the country-specific effects and allowing for different elasticity of labour
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reallocation across regions with respect to aggregate fluctuations. The contemporaneous 
correlation gives us the same picture as in the previous exercise. There is negative 
contemporaneous correlation for the lower quantiles and positive for the higher. The 
contemporaneous behaviour of unemployment rates and the intra-distribution mobility of 
regionally specific employment growth rate is very high and positive.
In regard to whether aggregate and disaggregate fluctuations are dynamically correlated 
we test causality as above. The evidence is that e2 and ev cause aggregate unemployment. For 
hm and ar there is no evidence of causality (except for hm in the 4 lags system where msl is 
10%). Unemployment does not help to predict the indices.
For the quantile location the causality evidence is that unemployment causes the 
maximum of the distribution. The 40th quantile causes unemployment and so does the 60th, for 
the 20th and 80th there is no causality evidence.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS
1. There is an interesting dynamic relation between European unemployment and 
labour reallocation across regions that cannot be summarised with a simple (point in time) 
statistic in the way that the empirical literature does.
2. The contemporaneous behaviour of the unemployment rates in Europe seems to be 
strongly related to the dynamics of regional employment growth rates across regions (dynamics 
of the regional shocks). There is a positive and very high correlation between aggregate 
unemployment and intra-distribution mobility of the regional variable. Regarding the behaviour 
of the aggregate together with the quantile location (shape of the cross-section distribution) the 
contemporaneous correlation is negative for the lower quantiles and positive for the higher. In 
other words, lower quantiles moving up and higher moving down correspond to a lower 
aggregate unemployment rate.
3. If we have conditioned out the aggregate and country-specific effects correctly, we 
can conclude that there are some interesting relations between the aggregate and disaggregate 
fluctuations in the labour market. The intra-distribution mobility in the cross section distribution 
of employment growth rates (indices ev and hm) helps to predict aggregate unemployment.
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Aggregate unemployment causes the maximum and the dynamics on the shape of the regional 
shocks distribution (40th and 60th percentiles and the maximum) helps to predict aggregate 
unemployment rates.
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ENDNOTES
1 Idiosyncratic or disaggregate is understood as specific to a sector, region, skill or similar 
categories.
2 Either unemployment was previously below its natural rate or this rate has raised.
3 In line with the traditional approach in Business Cycle literature.
4 Bean & Pissarides (1990).
5 NAIRU is the unemployment rate compatible with price stability.
6 Jackman, Layard & Savoy (1990).
7 Ignores vacancies but it can be a good proxy to mismatch.
8 See for example Bentolila and Dolado (1990).
9 Formally: Turbulence index = Z|A(A^^\9|, where Nt is employment in category i and N  
is total employment.
10 See Layard, Nickel and Jackman (1990).
11 They define predictable versus unpredictable component of the employment growth 
rates.
12 Danny Quah (1994a, 1996).
13 Most of the literature looks at the correlation coefficient.
14 It exhibits a similar order of magnitude in both, cross-section and time series 
dimensions.
15 See Stokey and Lucas (1989).
16
Notice that characterising the disaggregates by using the standard deviation most likely
we will loose a big deal of the information contained in (Mt, q t).
17
Notice that the Markov process (Mt, qt) is not necessarily stationary.
18
They have been used in Shorrocks( 1986) and Genewe, Marshall and Zarking (1986) 
among others.
19 The calculations and graphics have been executed using Danny Quah's Time Series 
Random- Fields shell tSrF
20 Europe in this paper refers to the countries in the European Union.
21 Decressin and Fatas (1994) study in detail this issue for a similar data base and for the 
same regional partition. They compare mobility in Europe with that in the US to see whether it 
may compensate for the absence of flexibility of the exchange rate as a policy instrument. 
Buiter (1995) argues that the sort of labour mobility that can be a substitute of the flexibility in 
the exchange rate must be a temporal one, and notices that temporal migration does not happen 
even in the US and the monetary union is viable there.
22 For a more detailed description of the regions see Decressin, J and A. Fatas (1993).
23 I.e. whether past values of one variable help to predict values of the other variable.
24 Other possibilities of conditioning out the aggregate shocks would be including in the 
regression variables such as oil prices, etc. (conditioning on the causes of the common shocks) .
25 Estimating git— p t A log Net + y A log Nct+ sit by pooled OLS, (under Swamy 
assumption) will yield unbiased and consistent estimator.
204
TABLE la : Contemporaneous Correlation: Unemployment and
Regional Relative Employment Rates (quantiles)
U 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
u - -0.771 -0.750 -0.305 +0.642 +0.794
qO 0.2 +0.801 +0.136 -0.745 -0.713
qi 0.4 - +0.356 -0.67 -0.779
q2 0.6 - - +C.305 -0.279
q3 0.8 - - - +0.645
q4 1.0 - - - -
TABLE lb  : Contemporaneous Correlation: Unemployment and 
Regional Relative Employment Rates(mobility indexes)
U hm ev e2 ar
U - +0.743 +0.819 +0.798 +0.795
hm - +0.973 +0.968 +09572
ev - - +0.991 +0.976
e2 - - +0.975
ar - - -
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TABLE 2a : Granger Causality. Exclusion Restriction Marginal Significance Level *
Regional Relative Employment Rate (quantiles)
Quantile System Lag Length
2 3
q0:0.2
ql:0.4
q2:0.6
q3:0.8
q4:1.0
0.315, 0.652 
0.030, 0.643 
0.325, 0.794 
0.107, 0.946 
0.158, 0.005
0.222, 0.592 
0.004, 0.679 
0.370, 0.777 
0.023, 0.659 
0.093, 0.010
* For each lag length the first column is the Marginal Significance Level for excluding the 
corresponding quantile in the VAR for unemployment, the second one is for excluding 
unemployment from the VAR for the quantile.
TABLE 2b : Granger Causality. Exclusion Restriction. Marginal Significance Level * 
Regional Relative Employment Rate (mobility indexes)
Mobility System Lag Length
Indexes 2 3
hm 0.323,0.162
ev 0.113,0.488
e2 0.205,0.102
ar 0.560,0.517
0.048,0.400 
0.009,0.587 
0.170,0.037 
0.677,0.689
* For each lag length the first column is the Marginal Significance. Level for excluding 
the corresponding mobility index in the VAR for Unemployment, the second 
one is that for excluding unemployment from the VAR for the mobility index.
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TABLE 3a : Contemporaneous correlation: Unemployment and Regional Employment 
Growth Rates after conditioning out the Europe-wide and country-specific effects, (quantiles)
U qO 0.2 ql 0.4 q2 0.6 q3 0.8 q4 1.0
u 1 - 0.7601 -0.693 -0.124 +0.769 +0.807
qO 0.2 - - +0.719 +0.114 - 0.725 -0.683
ql 0.4 - - - +0.490 - 0.616 - 0.683
q2 0.6 - - - - +0.180 -0.123
q3 0.8 - - -0.816
q4 1.0 - - - - - -
TABLE 3b: Contemporaneous correlation: Unemployment and Regional Employment 
Growth Rates after conditioning out the Europe-wide and country-specific effects, 
(mobility indexes) ________________
U ar e2 ev hm
U 1 0.769 0.784 0.837 0.8014
ar - - 0.940 0.948 0.967
e2 - - - 0.983 0.982
ev - - - - 0.993
hm - - - - -
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TABLE 4a : Granger Causality. Exclusion Restriction. Marginal Significance Level * 
Unemployment and Regional Employment Growth Rates after conditioning out the Europe- 
wide and country-specific effects (quantiles).
Quantile
2
System Lag Length 
3 4
qO 0.2 0.208,0.387 0.304,0.308 0.277,0.416
ql 0.4 0.015,0.843 0.003,0.847 0.001 0.780
q2 0.6 0.216,0.932 0.001,0.539 0.009 0.002
q3 0.8 0.445,0.332 0.183,0.383 0.152,0.119
q4 1.0 0.095,0.004 0.060,0.131 0.304,0.003
* For each lag length the first column is the Marginal Significance Level for excluding the 
corresponding quantile in the VAR for Unemployment, the second entry is that for excluding 
unemployment from the VAR for the quantile.
TABLE 4b : Granger Causality. Exclusion Restriction. Marginal Significance Level * 
Unemployment and Regional Employment Growth Rates after conditioning out the Europe- 
wide and country-specific effects (mobility indices)
Mobility
Indexes 2
System Lag Length 
3 4
hm 0.125, 0.608 0.124,0.411 0.106, 0.127
ev 0.033, 0.778 0.000,0.394 0.001,0.322
e2 0.062, 0.144 0.000,0.174 0.001,0.152
ar 0.377, 0.478 0.374,0.764 0.261,0.113
* For each lag length the first column is the Marginal Significance. Level for excluding the 
corresponding mobility index in the VAR for Unemployment, the second one is that for 
excluding unemployment from the VAR for the mobility index.
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TABLE 5a : DIRECTION OF THE CAUSALITY 
Unemployment and Regional Employment Rates 
QUANTILES
2 lags 3 lags
qO X X
qi —> —>
q2 X X
q3 X -»
q4 <- <— >
MO]3ILITY INDICES
2 lags 3 lags
hm X ->
ev X -»
e2 X <— >
ar X X
—» : from disaggregate to aggregate 
< -: from aggregate to disaggregate 
X : no causality, (msl >0.1)
TABLE 5b: DIRECTION OF THE CAUSALITY 
Unemployment and Regional Employment Rates
(conditioning out Europe-wide and country-specific effects) 
QUANTILES
2 lags 3 lags 4 lags
qO X X X
qi —^ -> -»
q2 X -> <— >
q3 X X X
q4 <— > <— > <-
MO]3ILITY INDICES
2 lags 3 lags 4 lags
hm X X X
ev —> -> -»
e2 -> ->
ar X X X
-> : from disaggregate to aggregate 
<—: from aggregate to disaggregate 
X : no causality (msl >0.1)
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DATA APPENDIX: Variables and sources and specific samples:
National employment and National Labour Force
Source: OECD Labour Force Survey.
Time Sample: 1960-1990
Cross-Section Sample: 11 countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, Belgium, Denmark, 
Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal.
European Employment (Nt) and European Labour Force (Lt): calculated by adding 
country variables.
Unemployment rate. Defined as ut = (Lt - Nt) / Lt 
Regional Employment.
Source; OECD, Regional Employment and Unemployment 1960-87 
Time-sample: 1960-1990 (max), annual data.
Cross-section sample: 51 regions
France: 8 regions, Germany: 8 regions, Italy: 11 regions, Spain:7 regions(Bentolila and Dolado), 
UK: 11 regions, Belgium :1 region, Denmark: 1 region, Greece :1 region, Ireland :1 region, 
Nether.: 1 region, Portugal: 1 region.
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